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The author’s interest in air carrier’s liability, and the conflict between the Shariah and private 
international air law, took root in 1996 when he was completing his M.A. thesis on the role of 
international law in the investigation of air accidents. Two years preceding that, an air accident 
involving Aseman Airlines occurred in Iran. At that time, heated discussions took place between 
Islamic jurists and legal experts on the liability of the air carrier for the death and bodily injury 
suffered by the passengers. In the course of the court proceedings, it transpired that there was a 
conflict between the Shariah principles and those of private international air law. Whilst the Shariah 
prescribes the Diyah in the case of death or bodily injury, this differs from the principles of liability 
and compensation under private international air law. The critical question that emerged was whether 
the Warsaw-Hague rules should have priority over the Shariah when determining liability for 
passenger’s death and bodily injury. No decisive unified opinion has hitherto been held on the matter. 
Indeed, diverse views have been proffered by the Iranian courts and legislative bodies.  
Iran has just ratified and given effect to the Warsaw Convention 1929, The Hague Protocol 1955, and 
the Guadalajara Protocol 1961 for international flights, in 1975. According to the Specific Act of 1985 
entitled ‘Determining the Scope of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights’ in air 
transport accidents of domestic flights, Iran applies the provisions of  limited liability in the Warsaw 
Convention as amended at the Hague in 1955. 
The Guardian Council of the Constitution, which consists of Islamic jurists, claimed that the Shariah 
regulations have priority over the rules of the Warsaw Convention. They should therefore prevail in 
cases of conflict of laws. However, this point of view may impede the attainment of uniform 
regulation of air carrier’s liability.  
Working for the legal bureau of the Civil Aviation Organization of Iran was an opportunity to be 
closely involved in and therewith learn about aspects of air carrier’s liability. When the author 
decided to pursue a PhD in air law in 2005, he chose to work on the legal aspects of air carrier’s 
liability for death and bodily injury. With this in mind, this thesis aims to investigate and compare the 
principles of liability in private international air law with those of the Shariah. In particular, it will 
critically study the relevant laws in two common law countries (England and the United States) and 
vii 
  
two civil law countries (France and Germany) that have had significant influence on private 
international air law. These will be compared with the Shariah system which underlies Iranian law.  
Since the liability principle for death or bodily injury in the Shariah may be at odds with those 
outlined in international rules, the principal aim of this thesis is to find a way forward that would help 
promote uniformity of international air carrier’s liability. It will be argued that contrary to the views 
of the Guardian Council of the Constitution, in the event of a conflict of laws, it is possible to 
reconcile the Shariah principles of liability with the Warsaw-Montreal regime. Also, Iran may adopt 
the Montreal Convention 1999. Any probable conflict between the provisions of this Convention and 
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1.1 Introduction (Uniformity) 
As the use of aircraft as a mode of general transportation began at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the liability of air carriers and the issue of compensation for injury to passengers and 
damage to goods became two important issues encountered by European States. The concept 
of carrier’s liability, which assumes a prominent position in legal and national systems, was 
extended to the air carrier. Prior to the ascendancy of the international aspect of air transport, 
these States applied their civil law and private law (conflict of laws)1 to legal relations 
between passengers and airlines.2 Only a few States, which were the biggest as well, 
developed their own domestic air law.3  
International flights, however, have introduced political, social, economic and legal 
complications to European States since they face a large number of people and aircraft from 
various nationalities within their territory. Due to the huge increase in international flights 
and the presence of foreign elements in the civil law of international air transport (which does 
not occur to the same extent in any other branch of human activity), a large number of cases 
                                                      
1 Private international law is frequently used in Europe to describe what the Anglo-American system usually 
refers to as conflict of laws, i.e. a response to a problem of which several possible laws apply to a transaction or 
event having more than one geographic element. For instance, the place of registration of an aircraft, the 
nationality, residence, or domicile of passengers; and the origin and destination of voyage; are among the issues 
that international air transportation is presented with. See A.F. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law (1981), 2-6. 
2 International air carrier’s liability which falls within private international law has its own peculiarities. 
Through the presence of foreign elements in civil law relationships, it is connected to the territorial civil law of 
that country. It is simultaneously related to the interpretation of international conventions for the unification of 
some related rules, which intend to complete territorial law rules. At the domestic level, courts therefore face 
two legal rules when dealing with the issue of compensation in air carrier’s liability: 1) Conflict of laws, in that 
the courts of any country, when a case is referred to them, will seek the governing law in that conflict; and 2) the 
rules explained in related international Conventions, which unify some of the civil law rules. See R.C. Horner 
and D.R. Legers, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law Minutes (1975), 19. 
3 Examples include the Air Navigation Law of 1924 in France; the Air Traffic Act of 1922 in Germany; and the 
Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Air Navigation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations of 1922 in England - 
see  D. Goedhuis, National Air Legislation and the Warsaw Convention (1937), 64-66. 
2 
  
related to foreign citizens went to court.4 Therefore court awards for air carrier’s liability and 
damages for passengers differed from one State to another. They were severely placed under 
the impact of national legal systems. Thus a need for uniformity of rules / laws was felt in 
Europe.  
1.1.1 Possibilities 
The establishment of unified international rules enables air carriers in European States to face 
the economic challenges confronting them in a more robust fashion. Similarly, by knowing 
their rights against air carriers and receiving assurances that their rights would be supported 
in different States, passengers and shippers would be encouraged to use this new mode of 
transport, hence helping it to develop further.5 European States had three options open to 
them initially: 
1. Unification, by unifying the rules that govern conflict of laws and the regulations related to 
specific jurisdictions; 
2. Unifying the meaning of legal terms. This could be carried out by developing an 
international agreement about legal regulations which States could then absorb into their 
domestic legal system, thereby leading to uniformity at domestic and international levels; or  
3. Unifying the rules that are applicable to international relations along lines that were similar 
to the Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail 
(CIM) and the International Conditions of Sale (CIV).  
                                                      
4 M. Milde, The Problems of Liabilities in International Carriage by Air: A Study in Private International Law 
(1963), 14. 
5 R. Hill, The Law and Politics of Air Liability (Compensating Victims of Aviation Terrorism) (1991), 11. 
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However, owing to the differences in the legal systems and regulations of individual States, 
only the third option was considered feasible and eventually chosen.6  
Even so, a more practical way in overcoming difficulties in private international law is by 
establishing international agreements with regard to substantive rules, applicable to the 
international relationships.7 Since air carrier’s liability is clearly an issue of private 
international law, at the beginning of the twentieth century European States tended to settle 
this issue by developing international rules in harmony with the then prevailing trends among 
the States. Through this, they therefore attempted to develop international agreements for 
unifying their conflict of laws.8  
This task was accomplished in the 1920s9 when the States concerned developed rules that 
satisfy the legal systems that they were representative of and adopted the Second 
International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law in 1929, i.e. the Warsaw Convention.10 
States thereby recognized the economic, political and technical privileges of the unification 
of some rules governing the liability of air carriers at the international level for the 
development of the air transport industry. This Convention recognized the conditions of the 
early twentieth century and the common economic interests of customers and operators; and 
it determined the limit of liability on the one hand, and harmonized the civil law and common 
law rules on the other hand.11  
                                                      
6 See Milde, supra note 4, at 18. 
7 Private international law here has the following meaning: all laws made by countries are of course public laws 
(as contrasted with the rules of clubs or trade associations), in that they apply to all persons to whom they are 
directed, whether they like it or not.  See Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 7. 
8 See Milde, supra note 4, at 18.  
9 R. David and J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal System in the World Today, Introduction to the Comparative Study 
of Law (1985), 10. 
10 J. Ide, ‘The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts’, 
(1932) Journal of Air Law 27, at 28-31.  
11 With regard to the justification of the limitation of liability, some evidence have been presented by Dr. H 
Drion whereby an analogy had been drawn with maritime law with its global limitation of the ship owner's 
liability and the necessity of protecting a financially weak industry. Likewise, catastrophic risks should not be 
4 
  
Through developments in aircraft technology, air transport expanded rapidly to other States.12 
As the Warsaw Convention successfully attracted attention to the issue of uniformity of 
carrier’s liability, a majority of States adhered to it. This Convention is the most successful 
international instrument for international private air law.13  
Enjoying firm legal foundations, with the threat that change would have compromised the 
whole system of international air carrier’s liability lurking in the background, this Convention 
has remained intact for more than 80 years, except for the changes laid down in the 
amendments. These changes, made within the framework of the Warsaw system, were 
nevertheless deemed insufficient by passengers because of the low levels of compensation 
available. At the same time, these diverse international regulations compromised the 
uniformity which the pioneers had been seeking in air transport regulations. However, since 
they helped to inject more energy and vitality into the regulations and their gradual 
development, they were regarded as reasonable and constructive. Ultimately, member States 
approved a new international convention, the Montreal Convention of 1999, in order to 
assemble all international air transport instruments on air transport liability (based on the 
Warsaw system), and add recent requirements to them.14  
                                                                                                                                                                     
borne by aviation alone. Notwithstanding the desirability that carriers or operators be able to insure their risks; 
there are also the possibilities that: potential claimants could take insurance out themselves; limitation of 
liability could serve as a counterpart to the aggravated system of liability imposed upon the carrier and operator; 
and the avoidance of litigation by facilitating quick settlements. See H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in 
International Law (1954). 
12 The total statistics of international and domestic passenger and freight traffic of scheduled services of airlines 
of ICAO contracting states for the period between 1950 to 2001 show that in 1950, only 31 million passengers 
had used this mode of transport in comparison with 1,623 million passengers who flew in 2002. Likewise, only 
730 million ton-kilometers freight had been carried by these airlines in 1950 compared with the 110,700 million 
ton-kilometers freight carried in 2001. See A.D. Groenewege, Compendium of International Civil Aviation 
(2003), 1281-1282. 
13 The Convention entered into force after the deposit of the fifth ratification in February 1933. Up to 2011, 152 
States ratified it. See http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/wc-hp.pdf. 




If international regulations are not in accordance with the economic, political and social 
conditions of their members, they will gradually lose their effectiveness since the States 
concerned will tend to apply their domestic laws to fit particular situations in spite of their 
international commitments. International conventions for air carrier’s liability are not 
insulated from this phenomenon.  
1.1.2.1 Economic Conflicts 
The new conditions issued after the Second World War challenged the unity and coordination 
resulting from the Warsaw Convention for the unification of air carrier’s liability. One of the 
serious obstacles to unification was the wide gap between the interests of developed countries 
and developing countries. Global unification is achieved through pressure from stronger 
States who were concerned that their standard and cost of living would determine the level of 
compensation for injury, death or loss of goods. Therefore, States whose citizens enjoy higher 
life standards, and earn more income, have higher limits of compensation compared to 
economically weaker countries.15 It is clear that in the former, customer interests take priority 
over the interests of airlines. But in developing countries, it is the interest of airlines which 
take precedence over the interest of customers and the States pay subsidies to airlines to help 
them survive.16 
In the US, for example, lawyers having special interest in the accident expense system backed 
the removal of liability limit, stating that airlines could overcome any attendant financial 
problems by using the insurance system and by distributing the extra expenses through the 
                                                      
15 A.F. Lowenfeld and A.I. Mendelson, ‘The United States and the Warsaw Convention’, (1967) 80 Harvard 
Law Review515, at 555- 565. 
16  ICAO DCW Doc. No.20(1999). 
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tickets they sell.17 But for developing countries, it is not possible to distribute the expenses 
through the tickets, and relevant States have had to invest money in the industry to support 
the operation of air transport as part of national policy. Due to their comparatively lower rate 
of economic growth, they are therefore in favour of low rates of compensation in order to 
help their national airlines.18 
So, although the draftsmen of the Warsaw Convention had initially determined liability in a 
way which balanced the interests of carriers with those of customers, some States, in practice, 
went contrary to it.  
As a result, after two decades of success in unifying limits of liability, the Warsaw 
Convention gradually headed towards a breakdown. In later decades, protocols or agreements 
were amended to move up the limits of liability, while States increasingly preferred to apply 
their own domestic rather than international regulations.19 
1.1.2.2 Different Legal Systems  
Since States follow different legal systems, the main goal of international private law 
conferences had been to bring together the legal principles of States and overlook the 
differences in order to achieve uniformity. As Sir Alfred Dennis, representative of Great 
Britain in the second private international law conference states: ‘As regards the British 
                                                      
17 As stated by W Guldimann, the factual basis of liability problem developed mainly after the Second World 
War when: ‘i) air transport become a mature industry, (ii) air transport become a big business at the forefront, 
(iii) the insurance industry grew as well…(iv) the differences in the standards of living of different countries… 
and the differences in their legal systems become more important, (v) the liability limits established in 1929 
become clearly insufficient for passengers in most of the industrialized countries, and insufficiency was 
aggravated by the impact of the progressive inflation…(vi) in the industrialized countries, the development of 
the claim mentality in the public become more general, more progressive and more aggressive…(vii) the system 
of system civil aviation - airlines, aircraft, airports, air traffic services- and their operation become progressively 
more complex and more interdependent, (viii) the same holds good for the legal relations between the parties 
involved in serious accidents’. W. Guldimann, Air Transport in International Law –Possibilities and Limits in 
International Unification (1982), 164.  
18 Ibid. 
19 See Dempsey and Milde, supra note 14, at 14. 
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government, the sole reason which it has for entering into this convention is the desire to 
achieve uniformity.’20  
However, uniformity of international regulations is subject to the following threats:  
1. The Warsaw Convention includes only some regulations for the substantive rules, 
providing no solutions for numerous other issues. For example, in the case of the death of a 
passenger or the interpretation of damage, the question of who the deceased’s representatives 
are, arises. Which person can claim on his behalf? Does the exemption clause have no effect 
on the representatives’ claim as it is a separate one or his own? The answers to these 
questions will differ in the different States and would depend on national laws21 and their 
interpretation of concepts such as the definition of accident.22 
2. Since the legal systems of contracting parties are different, a clause in a contract would be 
considered valid in some States, whereas in other States it would be considered void. In some 
States where the passenger will have an option to sue in contract or in tort, the exemption of 
liability could be considered valid as far as contractual liability is concerned, but void 
regarding liability for tort.23 
3. The legal rules of private law are dynamic and not static, changing according to the 
economic, social and political conditions of States. Air carrier’s liability is no exception. Due 
to the abovementioned conditions as well as technological advancements, the rules regulating 
this area had undergone changes at domestic level. An example would be the liability system 
in France which is based on fault. Although the burden of proof had previously been on 
claimants, due to the aforementioned conditions and since it had been too onerous for 
                                                      
20 See David and Brierley, supra note 9, at 21. 
21 P.P.C. Haanappel, ‘The Right to Sue in Death Cases under the Warsaw Convention’, (1981) Air and Space 
Law 66, at 69-70. 
22 See Dempsey and Milde, supra note 14, at 61. 
23 See Goedhuis, supra note 3, at 3. 
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claimants to prove fault in industrial cases, and defendants had the upper hand, the burden of 
proof was shifted to defendants to prove that they had not committed a fault. Another 
interesting example would be Germany. Although the basis of tort there is based on fault, in 
some special statutes such as the Road Traffic Act, liability is based on risk or strict 
liability.24  
4. The Warsaw Convention was primarily written with the two main legal systems, common 
law and civil law, in mind. Since the transport industry was then operating and growing 
mostly in developed countries, it was justifiable to tackle the issue of liability according to 
their legal systems. However, the period after the Second World War witnessed the 
emergence of new States, some of whose legal systems differ from the two prevailing 
systems. These legal systems include independent regulations. 
A large part of these new States had been Islamic States, mostly situated in the Middle East 
and North Africa and some in South East Asia. There is an increasing trend in Islamic States 
to apply Islamic law.25 On the other hand international air transport operations are fast 
growing in these States.26 Based on these two facts, it is necessary to study the principles of 
liability in Islamic law and Islamic States in order to clarify their similarities and differences 
with the international system to help achieve the uniformity of international rules in the 
                                                      
24 See Chr 2.2, infra. 
25 In many Islamic countries, Islam has been declared as an official religion and it is the main source of law. The 
Parliaments in these countries have to be sure that the conventions are in line with Islamic rules. For instance, 
see Article 4 of the Constitution of the I.R. Iran, Article 3(2) of the Constitution of Syria, Article 2 of the 
Constitution of Algeria, Article 3 of the Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 7 of the Constitution of Iraq, 
Article 3 of the Constitution of Yemen, Article 6 of the Constitution of Morocco. Article 1of the Constitution of 
Tunisia, Article 2 of the Constitution of Libya, See M. Jabbari and  E. Shoarian, Legal Aspects and Advantages 
for Iran to Ratify the 1999 Montreal Convention with Emphasis on Islamic law, Air Transport, Air & Space Law 
and Regulation Workshop and Conference, April 12-16, 2009, Abu Dhabi (UAE). 
http://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/press/abudhabi2009/. 
26 The strongest international passenger demand growth is forecast for the Middle East where an Average 
Annual Growth Rate (AAGR) of 6.8% will be driven by Gross domestic product (GDP) expansion along with 
significant new routes and capacity.  Within the region, UAE (8.4%) will show the strongest growth. Total 
international passenger numbers are forecast to be around 105 million in 2011, an increase of 30 million over 
2006 levels. See http://www.iata.org/pressroom/. 
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future.27 The majority of Islamic States in the Middle East and a number in Africa and South 
East Asia (e.g. Indonesia) had been under the influence of both civil law and Islamic law. The 
legal system of Iran, for example, has been influenced by these two legal systems with one 
taking precedence over the other at different times.28 The Iranian legal system is therefore a 
mixture of the two and their respective degrees of influence differ from one area of law to 
another. For instance, whilst liability for death or bodily injury follows the Shariah, 
obligation and trade law are under the influence of civil law. This difference between the 
Shariah and civil law or common law is crystallized when the provisions of the Warsaw, and 
later Montreal, Conventions and those of Islamic law were simultaneously applied to 
domestic flights in Iran. In places where rules of the two systems are in conflict, the rules of 
the Islamic system prevail.29  
Hence, it seems that one of the factors impeding the global uniformity of international rules 
governing air carrier’s liability was the tendency to overlook the principles of liability in 
Islamic States that follow the Shariah. Ignoring other legal systems would cause 
inconsistency in air carrier’s liability at the international level in the future.   
It is submitted that the basis of legal liability and compensation in Islamic law are partly 
different from the principles of civil law and common law. So, Islamic law differs from the 
international system of liability governing the international conventions and in particular, 
international instruments of air carrier’s liability.  
Although most States adhere to the international system of air carrier’s liability, it is possible 
for Islamic States to gradually withdraw from the international system by referring to 
                                                      
27  See David and Brierley, supra note 9, at 10. 
28 The Code Napoleon had a great influence on the legal systems of Middle East countries. French law, in 
comparison to other European legal systems (Common law and German law) had been more influential. 
However, the depth and width of this influence varied from country to country.  See R.B. Schlesinger, H.W. 
Baade and P.E. Herzog, Comparative Law: Cases-Text- Materials (1988), 324. 
29 Ibid., at 325. 
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compensation on the basis of the Diyah. The Diyah is discussed in Islamic texts and Islamic 
law under criminal law rather than tort law. This means that compensation in air carrier’s 
liability for death is deemed to be a criminal law matter. It will be discussed how this 
criminal law issue has also been extended to tort law. This topic will be discussed within the 
scope of the Islamic legal system in Iran.30  
This would be particularly relevant where there is a wide gap between the Diyah and liability 
limits under this system, thus causing a huge difference in the compensation levels for 
domestic and international flights. Therefore in order to unify liability rules at the 
international level, it is necessary to pay due attention to the Islamic legal system for which 
the most important concept is the Diyah.  
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
The main question posed in this thesis is as follows. Do differences between the Shariah 
regulations and those of the Warsaw-Montreal Conventions obstruct the implementation and 
application of uniform international regulations? Or, can the Shariah, like common law and 
civil law systems, compromise some of its regulations so as to enable a harmonious and 
fruitful coexistence with the international system?  
The main purpose of the current study is therefore to explore the hypothesis that although 
Islamic law has its independent principles of liability, Islamic States can adopt international 
air carrier’s liability in international flights and allow the two systems to coexist in domestic 
flights, irrespective of the fact that such States have not been active in the drafting of most of 
these regulations. In so doing, the work focuses mainly on the legal system of Iran. 
                                                      
30 See Chr 3.3, infra. 
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The thesis has two further sub-hypotheses. One, that since the principles of liability and terms 
related to air carrier’s liability in international instruments are prescribed in a way that each 
State can apply them according to its own specific system, the principles of liability in the 
Warsaw-Montreal regime are in fact dynamic and flexible. States with different legal systems 
can therefore easily implement those concepts and principles. Secondly, that although Islamic 
law has its own special principles regarding carrier’s liability, since it is a dynamic legal 
system, States that have based their legal system on the Shariah (such as Iran) can join the 
international system of air carrier’s liability and ratify related instruments without facing 
undue obstacles. 
1.3 Methodological Framework of the Research 
The combination of various legal aspects including private international air law and legal 
systems in this work provides the basis for a study which utilizes three different 
methodologies: analytical, descriptive and comparative. However, the overall research is 
predominantly based on a critical legal analysis of the Shariah.  
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 will discuss the prevailing legal systems that 
are the common law and civil law that have affected the Warsaw system. A close study of the 
principles underlying legal liability in these two systems would lead to an appreciation of 
their similarities and differences. This would in turn be very useful in gaining a better 
understanding of air carrier’s liability in private international law especially since 
international commentators desired to use the rules of liability of the two systems in the new 
Convention to make it more comprehensive so as to achieve more uniformity.31 Further, an 
analysis of these two systems provides an important insight into the reasons for the collapse 
                                                      
31  See Ide, supra note 10, at 29. 
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of the Warsaw System. It also helps make clear that in order to achieve uniformity within the 
framework of the Warsaw Convention, States follow these systems. England from among the 
common law States and France from the civil law States adopted principles such as liability 
limitation, invalid contractual conditions, or the presumption of fault for death or bodily 
injuries which had no precedence in either of their pertinent legal systems.  
Chapter 3 will investigate the legal liability under the Shariah and Iranian law. The Shariah 
provides sufficient principles that make it a self-contained and independent system. The most 
important subject will be the Diyah as a legal principle and compensation for death or bodily 
injury. Familiarity with these principles is essential for comparing the principles of liability in 
the Shariah with air carrier’s liability in international instruments in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 also deals with air transport regulation in Iran. To comprehend the air carrier’s 
liability system in Iran, one should understand the State’s legal system and its legislators. An 
appreciation of its air transport system can also offer a clearer view of the overt and covert 
rules governing air carrier’s liability and the way they are implemented in this State. 
Chapter 4 deals with the general principles of liability that govern air carrier’s liability in 
international instruments. There, the author analyses these principles and compares them with 
the Shariah principles. In Chapter 4 it will be argued and demonstrated that the principles of 
air carrier’s liability in international treaties are neither static nor completely dependent on 
the common law and civil law systems. It is a dynamic system that continuously evolves. 
Therefore, States with diverse legal systems including common law, civil law and Islamic 
law, can adapt themselves to the principles of the international system. Chapter 4 explains 
that there are issues in the international system of air carrier’s liability that are designed 
flexibly, so that States with different legal systems may investigate legal cases according to 
the principles of their respective legal systems. 
13 
  
Chapter 4 also deals with air carrier’s liability for death or bodily injury in domestic flights, 
which operate under the influence of the Shariah and the Warsaw system. 
Chapter 5 provides a general conclusion. It addresses the question of whether Islamic States, 
whose independent liability principles for death or bodily injury differ from that of the 
common law and civil law, are in a position to adopt the international system of air carrier’s 
liability? Drawing on the discussion in previous Chapters, this Chapter concludes by 
highlighting that the Shariah is indeed consistent and able to co-exist with the liability 




LIABILITY IN DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
Liability for compensation has its roots in legal systems.1 Although civil law States mostly 
have written laws and common law States have paid a lot of attention to case law, countries 
like France and Germany (which belong to the former system) and England and the United 
States (of the latter) have implemented their specific laws on air carrier’s liability for many 
years.2 The two legal traditions have different systems of categorizing legal relationships and 
may have delicately different understandings of apparently identical concepts such as injury, 
cargo, and carriage of contract.3 The differences may be concealed or apparent. Nevertheless, 
the methods employed in each system are not totally dissimilar and the two systems have 
tended, particularly in recent years, to draw more closely together.4  
The international system of air carrier liability which was established for unifying certain 
principles of air carrier liability through the Warsaw Convention 1929 and through it the 
Montreal Convention 1999 was inspired by the two systems.5 Countries following these 
systems such as England, the United States, Germany and France, disregarded some of their 
domestic principles for the sake of uniformity, in regulations, which are in the interest of 
customers and airlines.6 
                                                      
1 R. David and J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: Introduction to the Comparative Study 
of Law (1985), 11. 
2 A. Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States (1996), 122.  
3 P. Martin, J.D. McClean et.al Shawcross & Beaumont On Air Law, (4th ed.), 2; (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law’) 
4 S. Grundmann, ‘The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach’, (2009) 
107 Michigan Law Review 1583, at 1583. 
5 J. Ide, ‘The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Expert’s, 




In this Chapter, the author outlines the general principles of liability in these systems to 
explore situations where States following a particular system, have changed their principle of 
liability. They have been flexible in modifying liability principles or adopting principles in 
this regard even when these are contrary to their traditional system wherever the situation 
required. The author also demonstrates that these principles of liability have similarities as 
well as differences. On the issue of the carriage of passengers, for instance, the common law 
jurisdictions apply negligence,7 while in civil law jurisdictions the issue of the carriage of 
passengers is principally based on contract of carriage.8 Through a comparative study of these 
two systems, the author intends to display how the systems have been interacting with the 
international system. It investigates their common principles and the places of differences. It 
investigates whether the international system inclined towards the principles of one of these 
systems, or if despite being based on the two systems, it contains dissimilarities with the legal 
principles of the common law and civil law jurisdictions.9 
2.2. The Common Law 
A common law is a legal system that is modeled on English law. It places great weight on 
precedents which are developed by judges who had to resolve specific disputes in trials.10 
The legal rule in this system seeks to primarily provide a solution for a trial rather than to 
formulate a general rule of conduct for the future.11 The general principles of liability under 
the common law jurisdictions are discussed below. In particular, the thesis looks at the legal 
systems of England and the United States. The author chooses England since it is the 
                                                      
7 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 249. 
8 M. Planiol and G. Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law (2005), 467. 
9 This issue will be discussed in Chr. 4.2.1.1 when investigating the international liability regime.  
10 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 122. 
11 R. David and J.E.C. Brierley, supra note 1, at 24. 
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jurisdiction where the common law system originated from and because it played a direct role 
in the drafting of the Warsaw Convention 1929. The United States was also selected because 
most of the important case laws which had a great impact on the enhancement of private 
international air law and are available to the public, also come from this country. 
2.2.1 General Principles of Liability 
The author begins with the common principles of this system and then investigates the legal 
systems of England and the United States, and shows the differences in the liability principles 
of these two countries. 
2.2.1.1 Tort 
(i) Negligence 
In the traditional common law of tort, aviation liability depends on the legal concept of 
negligence, which is more than mere carelessness and includes the idea of a breach of duty. 
Negligence is the result of doing something, but on occasions, it can be the failure to act at 
all.12 Literally, it means the absence of care, neglect, or inattention. The term ‘negligence’ is 
used in this general sense to describe careless conduct in all manners of different contexts 
throughout the law of tort.13 It is a conduct which fails to conform to a required standard of 
care.14  
The concept developed under English law. Although English common law had long imposed 
liability for the wrongful acts of others, negligence did not emerge as an independent cause of 
action until the eighteenth century.15 Another important concept which emerged at that time 
                                                      
12 D. Owles and H. Cockerel, Liability for Defective Services (1985), 2. 
13 J. Cooke and D. Oughton, The Common Law of Obligations (2005), 221-5.  




was legal liability for a failure to act. Originally, liability for failing to act was imposed on 
those who undertook to perform some service and breached a promise to exercise care or skill 
in performing that service. Gradually, the law began to imply a promise to exercise care or 
skill in the performance of certain services.16 
The concept of negligence was exported to the United States when each State adopted the 
common law of Great Britain.17Although there have been important developments in 
negligence law, the basic concepts have remained the same since the nineteenth century. 
Negligence is by far the widest-ranging tort today, encompassing virtually all unintentional, 
wrongful conduct that injures others. At the heart of negligence law is the ‘reasonable 
person’, which provides the standard by which a person’s conduct is judged.18 
In the United States, negligence emerged out of the action on the case around 1825 and has 
since been recognized as a separate basis of tort liability, independent of other causes of 
action.19 Prior to that time, the term had been used in a very general sense to describe the 
breach of any legal obligation.20  
One of the earliest appearances of what is known as the tort of negligence was in the liability 
of those who professed to be competent in certain ‘public’ callings. A carrier was regarded as 
holding himself out to the public as one in whom confidence might be reposed, and hence as 
assuming an obligation to give proper service-the breach of which by any negligent conduct, 
he might be liable for.21 Regarding acts or omissions which may constitute negligence, it 
must be remembered that negligence or non negligence is a question of fact to be decided in 
                                                      
16 Ibid. 
17 Except for Louisiana which adopted the civil law of France and Spain.  




21 See H.G. Beale (eds.), Chitty on Contracts Vol. II (2004), at 551. 
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relation to all circumstances of each particular case, and advances in aviation make some of 
the earlier cases an unreliable guide, especially in cases involving modern airlines.  
In negligence, the four elements that an injured claimant must prove are duty, breach, 
causation, and damage. 
1. Duty of Care 
The defendant must have an obligation to safeguard the claimant. The duty of care is the 
main conceptual device for expressing liability for negligence.22 The traditional approach 
recognizes and formulates duties for specific situations, each exhibiting its own particular 
characteristics. A more modern approach seeks to identify a general principle applicable to all 
circumstances.23  
2. Breach of the Duty 
The defendant must have breached his duty to be considered liable. Where the duty is in 
place, its content is to take care to prevent the harm. The requisite care has to be measured by 
a standard, and that standard is an objective one.24 It is negligent not to take the care expected 
by the community for the activity in question. The personification of community standards 
has long been the ‘reasonable man’.25 
3. Causation 
Causation is an element of negligence.26 In the field of negligence, there must be a causal link 
between the negligent act and the harm or damage. Negligence is only actionable if it causes 
                                                      
22 J.H. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History (1990), 466-7. 
23 See Birks, supra note 14, at 416. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The court defined it as ‘such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such 
circumstances’. Another early formulation of the standard provided that ‘negligence is the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do’. Blyth v. 
Birmingham Waterworks, 156 Eng Rep. 1047 (EX. 1856). 
26 See Birks, supra note 14, at 428. 
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damage.27 In order to prove causation, the breached duty must be the factual and legal causes 
of the harm. In other words, the claimant must not only be able to prove that the action of the 
defendant has caused damage, but that the action was a legally sufficient cause to hold the 
defendant liable. To establish factual causation, it is not necessary to show that the defendant 
was the sole or even the major cause of the damage as long as it is proved that but-for the 
defendant’s negligence, the damage would not have happened.28 Once a party has factually 
proven that the actions of the other party have caused his or her injuries, the question 
becomes one of legal causation.29 One of the key factors influencing legal causation is the 
remoteness of the person’s harm from the negligence of the other. A person’s negligence is 
too remote or not a ‘proximate cause’ of another’s injury or damage if it is of a type which is 
not foreseeable.30 
4. Damage 
When duty, breach, and causation have been established in a tort action, the claimant may 
recover for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses sustained. The measure of damages is 
determined by the nature of the tort committed and the type of injury suffered. Damages for 
tortious acts generally fall into one of four categories: damages for injury to person, damages 
for injury to personal property, damages for injury to real property,31 and punitive damages.32 
Damages place a monetary value on the harm done, following the principle of restoration to 
                                                      
27Ibid.  
28 Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [196] 1 Q.B. 428. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) (No.1) [1961] A.C. 
388. 
31 A. Best and D.W. Barnes, Basic Tort Law: Cases, Statutes and Problems (2003), 127. 
32 Punitive damages can be awarded against a defendant whose conduct has been particularly outrageous. 
Punitive damages go beyond the general common law principle of the compensatory nature of damages and 
become a punishment. Ibid. 
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the original condition.33 Thus, for most purposes connected to the quantification of damage, 
the degree of fault in breach of the duty of care is irrelevant except in punitive damages.34 
Once the breach of the duty is established, the only requirement is to compensate the victim. 
The court’s award of damages aims to bring the claimant back to his pre-tort condition.  
(ii) Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Normally in a negligence case, the burden of proving all the elements of the tort is on the 
claimant.35 However, under a concept known as res ipsa loquitur,36 if the cause of harm was 
under the defendant’s control, and the harm would not normally have occurred without 
negligence or intention, the claimant does not have to prove negligence. It is the defendant 
who has to disprove it.37  
The following conditions must be satisfied in order to apply this general rule:  
1. The instrument or circumstances causing the damage must have been under the exclusive 
control of the defendants or his servants;  
2. The circumstances must be such that the damage does not ordinarily occur in the absence 
of negligence; and  
3. The real cause of damage must be unknown.38 
The defendant will turn away the application of the maxim if he explains the accident in a 
way that is consistent with an absence of negligence on his part, and reasonably distinct from 
                                                      
33 S. Deakin, A. Johnston and B. Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2003), 355. 
34 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996), the Court held that punitive damages must be reasonable, as 
determined by the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that caused the plaintiff's injury, the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, and any comparable criminal or civil penalties applicable to the conduct. 
See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 519, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). 
35 R. Youngs, English, French and German Comparative Law (1998), 243. 
36 This means ‘the fact speaks for itself’. 




a theoretically possible explanation.39 Therefore, the defendant can avoid liability if he can 
show that (a) the harm was due to the fault or consent of the claimant; (b) the damage was 
caused by the act of a stranger (if the defendant can refute the argument that this should have 
been foreseen and prevented); (c) there was statutory authorization; or (d) the cause was an 
act of God.40 
2.2.1.2 Bailment  
The law of bailment was developed in the common law long before the law of contract.41 
Bailment is a legal relationship distinct from both contract and tort. It exists whenever one 
person (the bailee) is voluntarily in possession of goods which belong to another (the 
bailor).42 Common forms of bailment result from carriage of goods, delivery for custody or 
repair, hire, pledge and loan.43  
Bailment involves a delivery of goods from one person (the bailor) to another person (the 
bailee).44 Bailment may stand at the point at which contract, property and tort converge. In its 
standard form, it represents a conveyance of personal property created by contract and 
enforceable in tort. Bailment therefore partakes of all three phenomena, and remedies may 
correspond with remedies available under other forms of action. A bailment may also exist 
                                                      
39 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 249. 
40 See Youngs, supra note 35, at 231. 
41 In Iranian law, there is a notion called amanat which displays similarities to bailment. Amanat exists 
whenever one person (amin) is voluntarily in possession of goods which belong to another. Amanat involves the 
delivery of a property from one person to another person. The primary duties of amin are to take proper care of 
the property and to refrain from converting it. Amin is required to use the care of a reasonably prudent person in 
similar or identical circumstances. Where amin goes beyond the purpose of Amanat, he is absolutely liable for 
damage to or loss of the bailed property although the loss was not due to his negligence. See Chr. 3.4.4.1, infra. 
42 Six forms of bailment are recognized: the custody of goods without reward; the loan of goods; the hire of 
goods; the pawn or pledge of goods; the carrying of goods or the performance of some other service about them 
for reward; and the carrying of goods or the performance of some other service about them without reward. N.E. 
Palmer, Bailment (1991), 3. 
43 See Birks , supra note 14, at 357-8. 
44Ibid. at 19. 
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independently of contract but most bailment arises from a contract between the bailor and the 
bailee.45  
The primary duties of the bailee in common law jurisdictions were to take proper care of the 
property bailed and to refrain from converting it.46 A bailee is required to use the care of a 
reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances, i.e. ordinary care, in caring 
for the property entrusted to him.47 Where the bailee goes beyond the purpose of the 
bailment, he is absolutely liable for damage to or loss of the bailed property although the loss 
was not due to his negligence.48  
The bailee must also take reasonable care of the goods and abstain from converting them. He 
must not deviate from the terms of the bailment, and becomes an insurer of the goods if he 
does so. Where goods are lost or damaged while in the bailee’s possession, the bailee is liable 
unless he can show that the misadventure occurred independently of his fault.49  
The parties in a contract of carriage are usually subject to a contract by which the liability of 
the carrier may be, and normally is, either extended or restricted. However, insofar as there is 
no agreement to the contrary, bailment is the framework for an ordinary carrier’s liability.50 
The carrier is a bailee; he is liable to the bailor if he fails to deliver the goods intact. The 
owner of the goods may succeed against the carrier in an action for damages by reason of the 
loss of, or damage to, the goods, although he cannot allege the existence of a contract of 
                                                      
45 Ibid., at 20. 
46 Ibid., at 44-5. 
47 G.O. Dycstra and L.G. Dycstra, The Business Law of Aviation (1946), 364. 
48 Conventionally, the measure of diligence to be expected of a bailee is governed primarily by the existence and 
location of any benefit or reward. Ibid. 
49 See Birks, supra note 14, at 358. 
50 See Palmer, supra note 42, at 19-20. 
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carriage.51 Therefore, the principles which govern the relationship between bailor and bailee, 
govern that between the owners of goods and a carrier who is an ordinary bailee.52 
2.2.1.3 Contract 
At common law jurisdictions, the rights and obligations of a carrier are defined by contract 
together with the status of the carrier. A distinction between tort and contract is that tortious 
liability is negligence –based, whereas contractual liability is strict.53 No negligence or fault 
need to be proved in order for the victim to obtain judgment. One of the most basic principles 
of contract law is that a breach of contract imports strict or absolute liability, i.e. the victim is 
automatically entitled to judgment, though not necessarily to damages. Strict liability in 
contract means that a breach of contract is not in any sense immoral and does not imply any 
fault on the part of the party in question.54 
The common law jurisdictions approve the insertion of contractual conditions for exempting 
or delimiting liability.55 However, courts and legislatures have recently become increasingly 
concerned with the abuse of bargaining power and the imposition of unfair terms.56 Common 
examples involve the use of the contracts of adhesion, such as tickets, leases and retail sales 
contracts that are forced upon the weaker party.57 In the USA, the Uniform Commercial Code 
empowers courts to deal with the problem directly by refusing to enforce a contract or term 
that the court determined to be unreasonable.58 
                                                      
51 O.K. Freund, The Law of Carriage by Inland Transport (1965), 194. 
52 Ibid., at 195. 
53 See Cooke and Oughton, supra note 13, at 219. 
54 M. Arnheim, Principles of the Common Law (2004), 251. 
55 See Beale, supra note 21, at 4. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 124. 
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Historically, contract actions developed considerably later than tort liability.59 It remained 
possible to maintain the old tort action on a case.60 An action for personal injuries sustained 
by a passenger because of the negligence of the carrier would be barred by the statute of 
limitation if the action were pursued in tort, but not so if it were pursued in contract. A 
claimant, who elects to treat his action as one for breach of contract, would not be barred by 
the tort statute.61  
2.2.1.4 Contract of Carriage  
In common law jurisdictions, the rights and obligations of a carrier are defined by contract 
and the status of the carrier.62 Depending on whether he is a common carrier or a private 
carrier, he enjoys different rights and obligations. A carrier is a person who transports goods 
or passengers or both, from one place to another in a manner agreed with the passengers or 
the owners of the goods to be carried.63  
(i) Common Carrier  
For centuries, the common carrier occupied a special position in common law jurisdictions.64 
A common carrier is a person who publicly professes, orally or by conduct, to undertake for 
reward to all such persons indiscriminately, who desire to employ him, the transportation of 
                                                      
59 Ibid. 
60 A good illustration is Louisville & Nashville R Co. v. Spinks, 104 Ga 692, 30 se. 698 (1898). See Schwartz, 
Kelly, and Partlett, supra note 18, at 404. 
61 Ibid, at 405. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Beale, supra note 21, at 539-543. 
64 In English law, however, the common carrier is practically extinct today. The modern law of carriage is not so 
much enshrined in reported cases as exemplified by the contractual terms by which carriers define the 
conditions on which they are prepared to carry goods, passengers and baggage. Any account of the modern law 
must necessarily take account of these contractual terms, many of which have become standard forms of 
contract. Some of these terms have, of course, themselves been the subject of judicial interpretation. Ibid. 
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goods and passengers, provided that he has room.65 A common carrier therefore chooses to be 
a common carrier for such times, places and goods as he considers appropriate, provided that 
he offers carriage in accordance with the calling of the common carrier and is thereby 
prepared to accept the burden of that calling.66 However, as discussed below, the scope of his 
duty of care is different in England and the United States.67 
1. Common Carrier of Goods 
The liability of a common carrier of goods is distinguishable in two ways: a) liability for loss 
by negligence which is the liability of a bailee; and b) liability for losses by accident or other 
unavoidable occurrences, which is the liability of an insurer for goods.68 Therefore, he is 
liable for all losses of or damage to, those goods while they are in the course of transit. There 
is consequently a rule which makes the common carrier an insurer for the safe carriage of 
goods under the common law.69 
In fact, the law draws a distinction between strict liability and liability for negligence. Where 
a carrier is liable to compensate the owner of goods or the consignor or consignee for loss 
irrespective of the carrier’s conduct, and whether or not he was at fault, he is said to be 
strictly liable. He is not liable if such loss or damage is caused by one of the few exceptions 
recognized by the common law jurisdictions. These exceptions are acts of God, acts of the 
Queen’s or public enemies, inherent vices, and consignor’s fault.70 
However, the common carrier is not exempted from liability merely by proving that the loss 
or damage was due to an excepted danger. He must also show that no negligence on his part 
                                                      
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., at 544.  
67 See Chr. 2.2.4, infra. 
68 L.H. Cha, ‘The Air Carrier’s Liability to Passengers in Anglo-American Law’, (1936) 7 Air Law Review 146, 
at 154. 
69 See Freund, supra note 51, at 199. 
70 Ibid.  
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contributed thereto. It may also be noted that even if the damage has been caused by an 
excepted peril, he will be liable in respect of subsequent aggravation of such damage by his 
negligence.71 
2. Common Carrier of Passengers 
The common carrier of passengers is not subject to the strict form of liability applicable to the 
common carrier of goods. At common law jurisdictions, the carrier’s liability for the safety of 
his passengers is not strict but is based on negligence. His duty is to see to it that reasonable 
care is taken for the safety of his passengers. A carrier’s obligation to his passengers, whether 
it is expressed in contract or in tort, is to provide a carriage that is as free from defects as the 
exercise of all reasonable care can make it.72  
(ii) Private Carrier  
Any carrier who is not a common carrier is a private carrier.73 A private carrier is a person 
who undertakes to perform carriage in a particular instance only, not holding himself out to 
the public ready to act for all who desire his services. He incurs only the responsibility of an 
ordinary bailee for hire, namely that of ordinary diligence.74 The private carrier is liable if he 
has wilfully damaged or lost the goods or if he has been negligent.75  
The private carrier is under no obligation to accept any goods for carriage, but once he has 
done so, usually for reward, his obligations are regulated by the contract, which governs the 
carriage, or by the bailment.76 His duty is to take reasonable care in a way that if the goods 
are lost or damaged, he can exonerate himself by proving that he and his servants took 
                                                      
71 See Beale, supra note 21, at 551. 
72 Ibid., at 571. 
73 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 299-300. 
74 See Cha, supra note 68, at 154. 
75 See Beale, supra note 21, at 551. 
76 Ibid.  
27 
  
reasonable care.77 Typically, the private carrier will operate under the terms of a contract, 
subject to applicable legislation.78  
2.2.2 Liability in English Law  
2.2.2.1 Tort Liability 
In English law, tort law is a collection of causes of action, each made up of three main 
components: an interest protected by the law, conduct affecting that interest which the law 
sanctioned, and a remedy by which the interest is protected and the conduct sanctioned.79 At 
the centre of tort law is the protection of persons from physical injury and to a limited extent, 
from mental injury. Liability in modern English law is generally based on fault, which is the 
general standard of liability in tort. Strict liability in modern tort law is imposed in certain 
situations.80  
Tortious conduct may be an act, a statement, or an omission. Liability for acts which cause 
damage to others is more general than liability for the failure to take steps to prevent harm to 
others. Liability for the failure to act is imposed only in particular circumstances or where 
there is a special relationship between the parties.81  
2.2.2.2 Contractual Liability 
The rights and liabilities between consignors and consignees and the carriers of goods are 
based on a contract of carriage, which does not necessarily mean that there is an express 
contract.82 The mere fact that in the ordinary course of his business a carrier accepts goods 
                                                      
77 Ibid., at 545.  
78 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 299-300. 
79 P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (1998), Chr. 2. 
80 See Birks, supra note 14, at 409. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  
28 
  
for carriage and delivery implies the making of a contract of carriage.83 The carrier is liable 
not only to carry the goods, but to carry them safely and to deliver them intact to the goods’ 
owner or his agent.84 It is still open to the owner of the goods to rely on his right as a bailor 
against a bailee, and to sue in tort rather than in contract, but normally he will only do this if 
for one reason or another he cannot rely on the contract, or chooses not to do so.85 
In English law, the liability of a common carrier of passengers depends on negligence. Where 
the matter relates to death or personal injury, and the carriage falls outside the statutory 
instrument, the carrier’s liability will depend upon proof of negligence. Where liability is 
directly based on negligence, the claimant does not necessarily have to prove fault by positive 
evidence because the circumstances may raise an inference of negligence on the defendant’s 
part.86 This is because of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.87 At one time, there was a tendency 
to regard this as a principle which would, upon the conditions being fulfilled, lead to a formal 
reversal of the burden of proof. Nowadays, however, the general view is that res ipsa loquitur 
is no more than a way of saying that the facts that have been shown by the claimant amount 
to a prima facie case that may be strong or it may be weak and there is no formal reversal of 
the burden of proof.88 
Under the English legal system, a common carrier can avoid the burden of a common 
carrier’s liability, i.e. reject the status of a common carrier, by exhibiting a notice or by 
otherwise reserving the right to accept or reject offers within the carrier’s discretion. The 
carrier, whether serving in a common or private capacity, can deny all liability unless this is 
expressly prohibited by law. In this jurisdiction, the use of contractual terms excludes the 
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84 See Freund, supra note 51, at 194. 
85 Ibid., at 209. 
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liabilities, which normally attach to common carriers. In other words, a major function of the 
standard-form contract is the exclusion or limitation of liability for the benefit of the 
dominant party.89  
The carrier’s capacity to impose terms purporting to exclude or restrict his liability for 
negligence in the case of loss or damage is now restricted in that any contractual terms or 
notice to that effect have to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.90 The carrier may also be subject to obligations implied by other 
law. The Supply of Goods and Services Act 198291 may imply terms92 and the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulation 199993 may prevent the use of certain terms.94 
There is no English case as yet in which an air carrier has been held to be a common carrier. 
In practice, it seems unlikely that this would be so held in the foreseeable future in view of 
the conditions of contract under which such carriers normally operate.95 
2.2.2.3 English Law and International Liability  
The effect of international conventions in the United Kingdom is to limit, to a very narrow 
scope, the applicability of common law principles on carrier’s liability.96 Air carrier liability 
in carriage by air is governed by statutory instrument, which is closely based on the rules of 
international carriage.97 However, if there are gaps in the regime, common law usually 
                                                      
89 See Beale, supra note 21, at 544. 
90 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 301-2. 
91 This Act requires traders to provide services to a proper standard of workmanship. Furthermore, if a definite 
completion date or a price has not been fixed, then the work must be completed within a reasonable time and for 
a reasonable charge. Ibid. 
92 See Beale, supra note 21, at 812. 
93 Ibid., at 854. 
94 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 10- 21. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., at 2. 
97 The effect of the English legislation on carriage by air is that the relationship between passengers and the 
carrier is regulated by statute whether or not there is a contract in many cases, and the rules apply equally to 
protect the servants or agents of the carrier i.e. those governed by the Warsaw-Hague text (Carriage by Air Act 
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applies. Otherwise common law is distinct from the law governing international carriage. 
Internal carriers may have the duties of common carriers at common law.98 
The original version of the Warsaw Convention 1929 was first given effect in the UK by the 
Carriage by Air Act 1932. Although this Act is now repealed, the Warsaw Convention in its 
original from (but with minor changes, principally of terminology) remains part of English 
law by virtue of the schedule99 2 to the Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) 
Order 1967.100 The Hague Protocol 1955 is given effect in English law by the Carriage by Air 
Act 1961 in Schedule 1. Schedule 1, containing the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as 
amended at the Hague in 1955 and the  Montreal Protocols No. 3 and No. 4 in 1975, 
substituted  with saving for Schedule 1 as originally enacted, containing the provisions of the 
Warsaw Convention with the amendments made in it by the Hague Protocol, by Carriage by 
Air and Road Act 1979.101 
The Montreal Additional Protocol No. 1 is given effect in English law by Order in Council.102 
The UK ratified the Protocol No. 1 in July 1984. The Carriage by Air and Road 1979 enabled 
the UK to ratify the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 2 and this instrument of ratification 
was deposited on 5 July 1984. The Montreal Convention 1999 is given the force of law in the 
UK by the Carriage by Air Acts Order 2002 in Schedule 1.103 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1961, Sch 1) Art 25a; Montreal Protocol 4, Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch  1999/1312), Art 
25a; or Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1b 2002/263) and the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977. Ibid., at 304. 
98 See Birks, supra note 14, at 410. 
99In the English Constitutional system, private law conventions are incorporated into national law by an act 
together with the translated treaty text in a schedule. The translated English treaty texts in the schedules are the 
ones applied by the local courts. See P.P.C. Haanappel, ‘The Right to Sue in Death Cases under the Warsaw 
Convention’, (1981) Air and Space Law 66, at 77.  
100See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3,VII 251-255.  
101 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/. 
102 An Order in Council is a type of legislation in the UK. This legislation is formally made in the name of the 
Queen by the Privy Council (Queen-in-Council). http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/. 
103 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, VII 122. 
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The problem which existed in all common law jurisdictions in wrongful death cases, received 
a statutory solution in England. In the civil court, the death of a human being could not be 
complained of as an injury. However, jurisprudence changed in 1846 and England adopted 
the Fatal Accidents Act, known generally as Lord Campbell’s Act. In this law, no action will 
lie in tort regarding the death of a passenger but action will lie under various statutory 
provisions.104  
On the basis of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1934, a claim based on negligence may be brought against a carrier by persons who were 
not directly involved in an aircraft crash, but who suffered emotional or nervous trauma as a 
result of hearing of the involvement of friends or relatives.105 Damages recoverable under the 
1976 Act generally include pecuniary losses and funeral expenses. The provisions of the Law 
Reform Act give certain additional rights of action to the estate of the deceased. According to 
this Act, relatives of the deceased could take action for the wrongful death.106  
Regarding transportation by air, the existence of a cause of action is a pressing issue only in 
wrongful death cases because the common law does not provide a cause of action for them. 
However, in all the other cases which can arise within the scope of the applicable convention, 
there is always a cause of action, be it based on tort, contract, or bailment. Most of the 
difficulties in relation to the cause of action in wrongful death have been removed by the 
                                                      
104 In the case of Baker v. Bolton in 1808, Lord Ellenborough appears to have had neither logic nor history on 
his side, except for some dubious doctrine merging a tort into a felony. His view prevailed and except as 
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(1981), 7-9. 




legislation, which implements the Warsaw Convention 1929 (Carriage by Air Act of 1932 
and Carriage by Air Act of 1961).107  
The Carriage by Air Act of 1961 applies to international air carriage in the spirit of the 
Warsaw Convention 1929. In 1967, the Act, including its provisions on the right to sue in 
death cases, became enforced for almost all forms of carriage by air, be they international or 
domestic, and governed by the Warsaw Convention 1929 or not.108 Where a passenger suffers 
injury as a result of an accident during the performance of the carriage, he can recover 
damages for his injuries and for losses consequent thereon from the carrier, if the accident is 
due to a cause for which the latter is liable to the passenger.109  
2.2.3 Liability in the United States 
2.2.3.1 Tort Liability 
Tort law is chiefly state law rather than federal law.110 Although it is predominantly case law 
rather than statute law, a variety of statutes deal with special problems.111 Common examples 
include the Wrongful Death Acts and survival statutes, which govern rights upon the death of 
the injured party.112 Most torts can be divided into three broad categories depending on 
whether liability is based on intent; negligence; or if it is absolute or strict without requiring 
either intent or negligence. Economically, however, negligence is a more significant basis for 
tort liability than intent. Negligence, under American tort law, is the primary criterion for 
liability in tort. It is established when the defendant acts with the intention of causing harm or 
                                                      
107 This provision reversed vis-à-vis the 1932 Act. Previously, it was the liability under the Warsaw Convention 
which was substituted for any other form of liability. The new provision extends the scope of the Fatal Accident 
Act 1846. Ibid. 
108 English courts practically always apply their own law to the right to sue in death cases arising out of aviation 
accidents. See Haanappel, supra note 99, at 72. 
109 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 3, at 380. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid.  
112 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 125-6. 
33 
  
when his conduct is negligent. There is no fixed limitation on recoverable damages for 
passenger death or bodily injury in the United States.113 
 In aviation accident cases, claims arising from injuries suffered have always been considered 
under the law of torts. The basis of liability was negligence on the part of the defendant,114 
which in an air carriage context is usually the air carrier. In the United States, the law of 
negligence governs the liability of the air carrier for passenger death or bodily injury 
proximately causing the accident in domestic flights. The claimant must prove the negligence 
of the air carrier.  
The jury, who is almost universally employed in tort actions in this jurisdiction, plays a 
central role in negligence cases.115 They will be instructed to decide whether the defendant’s 
conduct met the standard of care expected of a reasonable person under similar 
circumstances.116 But since the jury’s verdict is, within wide limits, conclusive on this issue, 
there is little to prevent them from imposing nearly absolute liability, regardless of 
negligence, upon a defendant who, because of his ability to pay or to insure, can in their eyes 
best bear the loss.117 The jury not only determines liability but also fixes damages.118  
However, in order to recover for personal injury or death, the claimant must establish that: a) 
the defendant was negligent; b) such negligence caused the accident or injury; c) the claimant 
did not by his negligence contribute to the accident or injury; and d) the claimant (i) suffered 
an economic loss as a result of the accident or injury, or (ii) sustained other compensable loss, 
                                                      
113 G. Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as Developed by the Courts in 
the United States from Warsaw 1929 to Montreal 1999 (2010) 21. 
114 See Dycstra supra note 47, at 235.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid.  
118 See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 125-126. 
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such as pain and suffering or grief.119 Nevertheless, the particular formulation or application 
of the rules, on matters of proof, on limitation or computation of damages, and on conflicts of 
laws-vary from state to state.120 
2.2.3.2 Contractual Liability 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines a ‘Common Carrier’ as one which holds 
itself out to a definable segment of the public as willing to transport persons and property for 
compensation, indiscriminately.121 The test is an objective one, relying on what the carrier 
actually does rather than the label it embraces or the purposes, which motivate such activity. 
In the deregulated environment, the carrier need not maintain tariffs in order to be considered 
a common carrier. Nor does the maintenance of separately negotiated contracts or an 
occasional refusal to transport make it a private carrier. What is crucial is that the common 
carrier defines itself through its own marketing efforts as being willing to carry any member 
of that segment of the public, which it serves.122 
In the United States, both common carriers and private carriers must exercise ordinary care 
but what constitutes ordinary care for a common carrier is a higher degree of care than that 
required of a private carrier. The common carrier is required to exercise the highest degree of 
care consistent with the practical operation of its facilities in the transportation of person and 
property, while a private carrier is required to exercise only care.123 
                                                      
119 Ibid. 
120 Compensation for aviation accidents could, for instance, have been governed by federal law, as are virtually 
all other aspects of commercial aviation in the United States. Or aviation accidents might have been treated 
under the law of contracts. Or a uniform body of transportation law might have been developed which 
distinguished railroads, buses, and airplanes from private motorists. See Lowenfeld, supra note104, Chrs. 7-9. 
121 FAA Advisory Circular No. 120-112 A (Apr. 24, 1986), P.S. Dempsey and L.E. Gesell, Air Transportation 
(Foundation for the 21st Century) (1997), 723-4. 
122 Ibid. 
123 See Dycstra, supra note 47, at 300.  
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Common carriers and their crews must comply with the strict requirements of parts 121 and 
135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, while private carriers must comply with less strict 
requirements of part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.124 The policy behind this 
distinction is based on the right of the general public to be confident that the airlines which 
solicit their business operate under the highest standards of safety.125  
While the cause of an injury is rarely disputed in air accident cases, the cause of an accident 
is often not certain, and in many instances it is considerably difficult for a claimant to prove. 
To alleviate this difficulty, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is frequently applied to aircraft 
accidents where the cause of the crash is not readily apparent but the information necessary to 
explain the accident is mostly in the control of the defendant, i.e. the air carrier.126 
A carrier has always had the right to insert reasonable conditions, stipulations and restrictions 
in the ticket,127 as long as they are legal and not prohibited by public policy. It is a well-
settled rule that a common carrier cannot force a passenger to release it from its legal liability 
for its own negligence or that of its servants. Such a provision is void because it is against 
public policy. The carrier can neither limit the amount of its liability for negligence,128 nor 
state on the ticket that it is not a common carrier.129 
Airlines, like in other modes of transport, may be common carriers as well as private 
carriers.130 They may carry either passengers or goods, or both, and their responsibilities 
                                                      
124 Ibid.  
125 Woolsey v. NTSB, 993f. 2d 516(5th Cir. 1993). 
126 L.S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law (2001), 53-71. 
127 The ticket is the evidence of the contract of carriage between the carrier and the passenger. It is regarded as a 
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towards the interests of persons and property are the same as those of other carriers.131 In 
relation to goods, a common carrier is usually permitted to contract for a limitation of his 
liability to a reasonable value, as agreed to by the consignor.132 This value has the dual 
purpose of serving as a base rate to fix the charges due to the carrier and of providing the 
measure for the carrier’s obligation in the case of loss of or damage to the goods.133 
2.2.3.3 The United States and International Liability 
In the United States, only international civil aviation was made subject to a special 
nationwide compensation regime because it was introduced by an international treaty.134 In 
the beginning, the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce were interested in the growth of 
the aviation industry during a depressed economy era. The benefits of limited liability and the 
uniformity of documentation and litigation procedures were allegedly the insurability of 
aviation risks and the attraction of capital investment. Accordingly the senate acted promptly, 
without debate, and gave its consent in an unrecorded voice vote on June 15, 1934; and 
adhered to the Warsaw Convention 1929 on October 26, 1934.135 This became the last 
favorable action on the Warsaw system for 64 years until September 28, 1998, when it 
ratified the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4, on November 5, 1998.  
                                                      
131 A common carrier usually solicits the patronage of the traveling public by advertising its schedule of routes 
with times of departure and arrival, its fare, baggage restrictions and the like. No one doubts that an airline 
company engaged in passenger or cargo service on a regular schedule following a defined route is a common 
carrier. But this procedure is neither essential nor a prerequisite to render it a common carrier. It is sufficient if 
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holding out as serving all without discrimination. Ibid. 
132 Ibid.  
133 G. Miller, Liability in International Air Transport: The Warsaw System in Municipal Courts (1977), 53.  
134 See Lowenfeld, supra note104, Chr. 7. 
135 Paul B. Larsen, Joseph C. Sweeney, John E. Gillic, Aviation Law, Cases, Law and Related Sources, 
Transnational Publishers, at 269 (2006). 
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The United States is a party to the  Warsaw Convention 1929, as amended by the 1955 Hague 
Protocol but only, as of December 14, 2003,136  48 years after  the fact (sic)  and as further 
amended by the 1975 Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4, as of March 4, 1999.137The United 
States has ratified and given effect to the Montreal Convention 1999. The U.S. Senate gave 
its advice and consent to ratification on August 1, 2003, thus becoming the 30th nation to 
ratify the Convention. The United States government is not a party to other related 
instruments (the 1961 Guadalajara Supplementary Convention, the 1971 Guatemala Protocol 
and the 1975Montreal Additional Protocols No 1, 2 and 3).138  
1. Due to the complex structure of the political and judicial jurisdictions which is specific to 
the United States, the issue of the cause of action becomes relevant in a number of situations. 
On the basis of the constitutional system of the United States, courts refer to the language of 
the original text of private international law instruments.139 In other words, if the United 
States becomes a party to an international treaty, that treaty directly becomes the law of the 
land without any enacting legislation. Therefore, when wrongful death cases arose, the 
natural reaction was to ascertain whether the treaty could provide the necessary basis on 
which an action could be brought.140 
                                                      
136 The United States did not formally ratify the 1955 Hague Protocol until July, 2003. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the United States refused to accept the Hague Protocol, because the United States Senate believed that the 
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Board, passengers on participating carriers going to, from, or with an agreed stopover in the United States, 
became subject to increased limitation of liability. In addition, the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement 
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137 See Tompkins, supra note 113, at 5-7. 
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140 See Lowenfeld, supra note 104, Chr.7. 
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2. Wrongful death statutes have taken a variety of forms in the United States.141 In many 
States, the statutes had limitations on the amount recoverable. However, in others there were 
restrictions on who could apply in a wrongful death action, i.e. certain dependents but not 
others, or only dependents but not relatives who received no support (or whom the deceased 
was not obligated to support). Some states did not enact wrongful death statutes that way, but 
instead adopted ‘survival statutes’ planned to preserve the cause of action vested in the victim 
at the moment of the death.142 Some jurisdictions have both survival and wrongful death 
statutes.143 However, in all jurisdictions, courts and legislatures have faced the problem of 
how an equation can be drawn putting a person’s life on one side and a sum of money on the 
other.144 And regarding the right to sue in fatal accidents, each state applies its own relative 
law.145 
3. The independent cause of action for passenger death and bodily injury created by the 
Warsaw Convention 1929 began to be recognized and accepted by United States courts in 
1978. Earlier in the case of Komlos v. Comagnie Nationale Air France, the court decided that 
the Warsaw Convention 1929 did not create a right of action for wrongful death146 and in 
many subsequent cases that had been endorsed.147 So the answer to the question of whether 
the Warsaw Convention 1929 creates a cause of action was negative. The courts had to 
                                                      
141 After 1846 when England adopted the Fatal Accidents Act (Lord Campbell’s Act), every state in the United 
States adopted some form of legislative reversal of the common law rule. Congress also adopted the Death on 
the High Seas Act providing a remedy in admiralty for death resulting from wrongful act on the high seas. Ibid. 
142 In a survival act, the actions of the deceased’s dependants are not personal, but are in their capacity as heirs 
to the estate of the deceased. See Haanappel, supra note 99, at 77. 
143 The theory of recovery under a wrongful death statute; based on a loss to survivors statute, is to compensate 
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Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.1962). 
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examine the Convention itself to see whether it created the cause of action without which no 
action for wrongful death was to be allowed. It was important to find which law would 
determine who could bring the suit, which had a right or interest in the suit, and what 
damages could be recovered. Therefore this procedure accompanies conflict of laws and 
jurisdiction problems and the applicability of the law of Death on the High Seas Act 
(DOHSA) to aviation cases. 
In Benjamins v. British European Airways, the Federal Appellate Court was the first Federal 
Appellate Court that held that the Warsaw Convention 1929 creates a cause of action.148 In 
1996, in Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action arising from the 
Convention.149 Finally, the Supreme Court held in El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng in 1999 
that where the Convention creates the cause of action, it is exclusive of all local and national 
laws.150 The court made clear that a choice of law analysis must be made by the court in 
which the case is filed to determine who has the right to bring the action and what damages 
are recoverable, all in accordance with Article 24(2) of the Convention.151 
4. The Supreme Court in Zicherman restricted recoverable damages to pecuniary losses 
only.152 In the light of Zicherman, non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable where a 
passenger death occurs on the high seas within the meaning of the United States Death on the 
High Sea Act, or during the course of international transportation by air, within the meaning 
of the Warsaw Convention 1929.153 The Montreal Convention 1999 preserves the 
interpretation made by the court in the Zicherman case.154 It expressly excludes the recovery 
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of any punitive, exemplary "or any other non-compensatory damages" in any passenger, 
baggage or cargo action for damages to which this Convention is applicable.155 
2.2.4 American Law and English Law: A Comparative Analysis 
States that follow the common law share the same general principles of liability. However, 
each State may deviate from these principles in accordance with its pertinent circumstances. 
This accounts for a number of differences between the duties and obligations of a common 
carrier in English law and the law of the United States. These include the following:  
1. In English law, the passenger may claim damages for breach of contract or for negligence; 
but he cannot claim both. In English law, it makes no difference which of these alternative 
legal routes he chooses to take.156 However, in the United States, it is possible to maintain an 
action both in contract and tort.157  
This being the case, a number of questions may arise as to which different rules of law are 
applicable to the two actions. For example, a particular court may have jurisdiction over one 
type of action but not the other. There is also the issue of the remedies available as well as 
which statutes of limitations may apply.158 Likewise, different rules on damages may prevail, 
especially in regard to punitive damages or for emotional harm. Defences such as infancy or 
the statute of frauds may also be set up against one action and not the other.159 
In the United States, the passenger may claim damages for breach of contract or for 
negligence.  In the United States, two different lines are pursued in such situations. One is to 
permit the claimant to choose his course of action and to dispose of the particular question 
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accordingly. Another one is not to permit the claimant this latitude. Rather, the court will 
determine the gist of the action, which is to say the essential facts on which the claimant’s 
claim rests.160  
2. The law of the United States draws distinctions that are not found in English law between 
the degrees of care required of common, private and gratuitous carriers. The common law 
rule of imposing a higher duty of care upon a common carrier is of an ancient origin.161 It 
found wide application against railroads in the 19th century.162 Common carriers have to hold 
the strictest responsibility of care, vigilance and skill, on behalf of themselves and all persons 
employed by them, and they are paid accordingly. The rule is based on the expediency of 
allocating the risk upon those who can best guard against it.163            
In English law, the carriers without being absolutely liable have a duty to use the greatest 
amount of care and forethought which are reasonably necessary to secure the safety of the 
passengers whom they undertake to carry. The failure, on their part or that of their servants 
who were acting within the scope of their employment, to use such care and forethought 
would amount to negligence and they would be liable in damages if injury was caused.164 
Whilst the liability of a common carrier of passengers depends on negligence under English 
law, the law on this point is different in the United States. In most United States jurisdictions, 
a higher standard of care is required of a common carrier of passengers than of a private 
carrier. A common carrier of passengers, though not an insurer, is under a duty to use the 
highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of the aircraft.165 Courts have 
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held that this duty is higher than that of reasonable care.166 Common carriers owe the highest 
strict duty of care, vigilance and skill both on behalf of themselves and that of all persons 
employed by them. Underlying this is the expediency of throwing the risk upon those who 
can best guard against it.167 Common carriers are therefore liable for the slightest negligence 
which caused injury to their passengers.168  
3. In English law, causation proves a direct link between the defendant’s negligence and the 
claimant’s loss and damage. For these purposes, liability in negligence is established when 
there is a breach of the duty of care owed by the defendant to the claimant that causes loss 
and damage, and it is reasonable that the defendant should compensate the claimant.169 In the 
United States, the breach of duty to act with care, or the failure to act as a reasonable and 
prudent person would, fall under similar circumstances. For a claimant to be able to recover 
for damages, this action or failure must be the ‘proximate cause’ of an injury, and actual loss 
must occur.  
4. In English practice, the use of contractual terms excluding the liabilities which normally 
attach to common carriers has led to the extinction of the common carrier.170 Such contractual 
terms are excluded on public policy grounds in the United States, where the common carrier 
category is much used in case law and statutory regulation.171 The released value doctrine in 
the United States’ federal common law prevents a common carrier from limiting liability in 
the carriage of goods to an amount less than the actual loss unless the carrier provides an 
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option of paying a higher charge to avoid the limitation.172 A carrier has nevertheless always 
been recognized as having the right to insert in the ticket such reasonable conditions, 
stipulations, and restrictions as it may deem necessary so long as they are legal and not 
prohibited by public policy. It is a rule that a common carrier cannot compel a passenger to 
release it from its legal liability for its own negligence or that of its servants. Such a provision 
would be void as it goes against public policy. It has also been held that the carrier cannot 
limit the amount of its liability for negligence.173 
5. In English law, the common carrier may by a special contract restrict his insurer’s liability 
at common law without losing his status as a common carrier. To the extent that the 
provisions of the contract do not modify them, he is still subject to the liabilities and entitled 
to the rights of a common carrier. The common carrier may modify the obligations, which 
rest on him by virtue of his public status via the contract with the consignor or owner of the 
goods. In such a case, his liability will be determined by his special contract.174 Owing to the 
common carrier’s heavy liability, they have always tried to balance liability by inserting some 
conditions in the contract. In England, unlike the United States, no limit has been introduced 
in this regard.175 
6. English law does not in general enforce gratuitous promises. It enforces bargains rather 
than agreements.176 However, the modern usage most readily relies on the language of 
promise.177 Further, legislation of the European Union has now had a very considerable effect 
on English contracts.178  
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In the United States, contract law is largely state rather federal law, but it usually differs only 
in detail from one state to another.179 Some rules laid down by statute or case law are 
mandatory and cannot be avoided by the parties, while others are supplementary and depend 
on agreement.180 Not all promises are enforceable and several criteria must be met before the 
law gives a remedy for breach of a promise. The important ones are the requirement of 
writing and the requirement of consideration. However, most contracts to furnish services are 
not included and they are enforceable even if there is no writing.181  
7. Thus, although England and the United States are both common law States and their legal 
systems follow the same rules, each has disregarded certain rules and changed them to suit 
specific circumstances. For instance, they have both disregarded the common law rule on the 
insertion of exemption conditions by carriers.182 Regarding carrier’s liability towards 
passengers, the United States accepts the highest strict care in this regard whilst the common 
law only based it on negligence.183 This therefore proves the hypothesis that common law 
States may in some respect distance themselves from the legal system that they follow 
because of the conditions of their pertinent State. Now that the common law system had been 
studied, the civil law jurisdictions in France and Germany will be investigated below. 
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2.3. Civil Law 
The civil law system (Romano-Germanic)184 refers to the entire system of law that currently 
applies to most Western European countries, Latin America, countries of the Near East, large 
parts of Africa, Indonesia and Japan. It is derived from ancient Roman law, and originated in 
Europe on the basis of the Roman jus civile.185 
In civil law jurisdictions, the central source of private law is a code or a series of codes. A 
code is an authoritative, comprehensive and systematic collection of general clauses and legal 
principles, divided into books or parts dealing in a logical fashion with the law relating 
thereto. Therefore, civil law codes are regarded as the primary sources of law to which all 
other sources are subordinate and they are often the only sources of law on a particular 
matter.186 
The fundamental concept in all civil law countries is obligation. Tort and contract are treated 
in nearly all civil law countries as an aspect of the law of obligations which itself is a branch 
of civil law, i.e. that part of law covered by the Civil Code. 
Under Napoleon, France adopted five codes: a Civil code, a Commercial code, a Penal code, 
a code of Civil Procedure and a code of Criminal Procedure. Most civil law countries 
followed this example though in some cases, two of the codes namely Civil Code and 
Commercial Code were combined.187 Also, some countries adopted certain specialized codes 
concerning subjects such as transportation (for example the Italian Code of Navigation). The 
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first civil code of the modern era was the French Civil Code of 1804.188 With regard to the 
sources of law, the term ‘Civil liability’ is used in France as a comprehensive term covering 
contractual and tortious liabilities. 
The German Civil Code (BGB)189 provides the legal basis for all sorts of relationships 
between private individuals whether their concerned areas of business and professions are 
contracts of sale, services etc. The BGB is divided into five books, of which book two (241-
853) deals with the law of obligations (tort and contract).190  
The author intends to investigate the general principles of liability in France and Germany 
since they are the founding parents of civil law on the European continent and they had also 
been influential in discussions on the drafting of private international law instruments of air 
carrier liability. An analysis of the system will then be provided. 
2.3.1 General Principles of Liability 
2.3.1.1 Tort 
Almost the entire French law of tort (delict and quasi-delict) rests on five Articles in the Civil 
Code (Articles 1382-1386). They have been unchanged since 1804, with exceptions, which 
are not relevant here. Two of these (Articles 1385 and 1386) address special cases of owners 
of animals and owners of buildings that collapse. Thus, the development of the law of 
liability has been based on the other three Articles. In contrast to the German Civil Code, 
which has developed the theory of fault in numerous Articles, the French Civil Code contains 
only a summary and a vague disposition on the subject.191 
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Germany and many States of the nineteenth century developed their codes based on the 
French codes. However, when Germany was unified in 1871, a German Civil Code 
developed on January 1, 1900. The German Civil Code became the model for some countries 
in Europe and Asia.192 
In Germany, the basic rules on contractual as well as tortious liability are mainly contained in 
the BGB of 1900. The Code clearly distinguishes between contractual and tortious liability. 
Generally, it is less difficult for claimants to get compensation when they can establish 
contractual liability.193  
2.3.1.2 Contract  
Contract, in civil law countries, is any agreement giving rise to a legal duty. The notion of a 
contract also includes agreements aiming at a transfer of rights.194 Breach of contract includes 
non-performance of the contract and every case in which the performance, which was in fact 
rendered, falls short in some way of what was promised in the contract. Civil law 
jurisdictions, in principle, do not treat every contract as containing a guarantee.195 If the 
defendant fails to do what he promised, he is liable in damages for ‘breach of contract’ 
considering fault.196  
Civil law jurisdictions separate and systematize the various causes of non-performance of a 
contract; as German law does with its careful distinction between impossibility, delay, and 
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positive breach of contract.197 It is a matter of importance whether the defendant has entirely 
failed to perform as promised, or has performed too late, or has performed unsatisfactorily.198  
2.3.2 Liability in French Law 
2.3.2.1 Tort Liability 
Tort liability in French Law is based on fault.199 The first law referring to it is the general 
clause of Article 1382 of the Civil Code, which is supplemented by Article 1383. Article 
1382 provides that: ‘All human conduct of any kind which causes harm to another requires 
the person by whose fault it occurred to redress it’, and Article 1383 adds that: ‘Every one is 
responsible not only for the damage which he has caused by his own act but also for that 
which he causes by his negligence or imprudence.’200  
Three conditions must be established under Article 1382 for a claim of damage to be 
successful: a) the victim should have suffered injury (damage), b) the injury must be 
attributable to the behavior of the defendant (fault), and c) there must be a causal relation 
between the conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by the claimant (cause).201 
In French Law, the presumption of fault is not unknown. In certain determined cases, instead 
of obliging the injured person to prove the fault committed by the author of the damage, the 
law establishes a presumption of fault which dispenses with the need to provide such a proof. 
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These presumptions apply in cases of liability for: a) the act of another person (Art. 1384); b) 
damage caused by an animal (Art. 1385); and c) damage caused by a building (Art. 1386).202 
Article 1384 which has been the principal focus of recent development in French tort law 
provides that: ‘A person is liable not only for injury which one causes by one’s own deed, but 
also for that which is caused by the deed of persons for whom one is responsible, or of things 
which one has in one’s keeping.’203 
Apart from the standard rules on tortious liability under Article 1384, the French liability 
system adopted an additional rule which establishes tortious liability for a keeper of a thing 
‘gardien’ for damage done by the thing.204 This particular liability proceeds from a 
presumption of the keeper’s fault. Therefore, the claimant does not bear the burden of 
proving the keeper’s fault. A person who merely uses a thing (e.g. borrowers and tenants) 
might be liable for the improper use of the thing ‘garde du comportement’, whereas its keeper 
may be liable for any damage arising from the faultiness of the thing ‘garde de la 
structure’.205 A keeper of a thing can only exonerate himself by showing  force majeure and 
he may reduce or even exclude his liability by establishing  the claimant's own contributory 
fault.206 
It is evident that the legislator intended to cover, at the same time, persons and things under 
the surveillance and direction of others, who could be a source of danger to third parties.207 
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The basis for this liability is the duty of surveillance.208 One can or cannot infer from the text 
of Article 1384 the concept of liability without fault, depending on the particular culture in 
question.209 
In a series of decisions between 1919 and 1930, the Supreme Court established the rule that 
an injured person need not prove fault to recover from someone who had ‘guard’ of a thing. 
The thing need not be a dangerous object but could include ordinary objects like automobiles, 
which is just what the presumption of liability under Article 1384 means in the context of 
transportation.210 
Although liability for things under Article 1384 is strict when the thing is defective, it takes 
the form of a presumption of liability in other cases.211 It is presumed that the thing is the 
cause of injury, unless the defendant can show that there is a force majeure.212 If the thing 
was stationary or did not make contact with the claimant or his property, the presumption 
does not apply and the claimant must prove that the thing caused the damage.213  
Article 1384 established a general rule of liability for the acts of things and the jurisprudence 
based all liability on fault.214 The fault of the guardian of a thing is presumed because the 
existence of damage due to the act of such thing suffices to establish that a fault has been 
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committed by him who assumed the care of it and was not able to prevent the damage.215 
However, regarding liability based on the risk theory,216 French jurisprudence never admitted 
it, and some recent doctrine is less favorable to risk theory with compared to presumed fault 
theory. 217 The mere idea of causality between things and the occurrence of destruction 
cannot by itself constitute a general principle of liability. However,  a general principle of 
liability is constituted when  the fault has been committed by the guardian of a thing who 
assumed the care of it and was not able to prevent the damage . There can, in certain cases, be 
legal liability to make reparation without there being any fault. However, in such cases, the 
obligation is not based on the idea of strict liability or liability based on the risk theory . In 
fact, there is no act of the thing. Instead, there is always the act of a person and the thing is 
the instrument and not the cause of damage.218 Therefore, as noted by Haanappel: ‘French 
doctrine, as usual, is extremely elaborate. They speak of subjective / fault liability, with the 
possibility of presumptions, by law or by fact.’219  
2.3.2.2 Contractual Liability 
In the French Civil Code, the relevant provision relating to contractual liability is Article 
1147. French law places great importance on the definition of the obligations of the 
contracting parties and makes a distinction between three types of obligations: the obligation 
to give, the obligation to do, and the obligation to not do. In this system, contractual liability 
as well as tort liability is based on fault, i.e. the most prominent common factor of contractual 
liability is the requirement of fault.220 A claim for damages in a contract will only succeed if 
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the circumstance which prevented the performance of the contract is ‘imputable’ to the 
defendant.221  
Fault, in modern law, is presumed in contracts. Under contractual law, the creditor will have 
to prove the fact that the debtor fell short in the performance of the contract. This failure is 
then considered to be the fault. Such proof, once furnished, establishes the debtor’s fault. The 
debtor is condemned to pay damages without the creditor having to prove the fault in a 
special manner. Injury of a passenger because of an accident occurring during carriage must 
be considered as a fact constituting a presumption of breach of the carrier’s obligation.222 
Therefore, the passenger will not have to prove that the carrier was negligent; but only the 
contract of carriage, the injury, and the connection between the injury and the carriage.223 
Contractual liability requires a valid and enforceable contract.224 It arises in the event of the 
non-performance of a contractual obligation and if the other contracting party sustains 
damage.225 Furthermore, it demands causation between fault and damage. Moreover 
causation must be evident between the damage claimed and the defendant’s fault, i.e. the 
non-performance of his contractual obligation. The requirement of directness is seen by 
doctrine as the necessary casual link between the non performance or the defendant's fault, 
and the damage. The requirement of foreseeability , on the other hand, is confined to contract 
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and is a mitigation of the full rigour of the requirement of directness in favour of the 
debtor.226 
In contractual matters, the jurisprudence admits the validity of non-liability clauses, which 
exonerate one of the parties from the consequences of his fault, except in the cases of fraud 
and of gross fault.227 Such clauses always become null in offences because the legal duties 
sanctioned by Article 1382 are a matter of public order.228  
The content of a contractual obligation is the performance of what has been undertaken. All 
obligations are grouped into two categories. The French legal system distinguishes between 
contracts which oblige the debtor to merely provide his services to the best of his knowledge 
and belief (obligation de moyens) and contracts according to which the debtor owes a 
particular result (obligation de résultat).229 The distinction between these two categories is 
the role to be played by the fault element in the case of breach of contract. This refers to the 
contractual fault, i.e. the non-performance of (a) contractual obligation(s). The proof of such 
fault is brought differently depending on whether we are dealing with an obligation of means 
or an obligation of result. 230 
 (i) Obligation de moyens 
Contractual liability is fault-based when the duty is obligation de moyens. The victim must 
prove the fault. If it appears from what was agreed or from the thrust of the contract that the 
debtor was not promising a given result but only to use his best efforts in that regard, it is 
simply an obligation de moyens.231 If a debtor is bound to it, he is obliged to serve the obligee 
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with all the means he can dispose of and to apply all necessary diligence whilst exercising the 
contract and to use his best efforts.232 Contractual liability claims might be asserted if either a 
contractual obligation is not performed at all or performed partially; according to which the 
debtor is to exercise the care of a reasonable, prudent businessman. Contractual liability also 
arises in case of bad execution or late execution. 233 
The only possible interpretation to be put on the contract of carriage is that the carrier 
concluding a contract of carriage undertakes to carry by a means commonly used with regard 
to the carriage. The carrier undertakes to take all the measures, which a good carrier must 
take. The defendant should be able to exempt himself from liability by proving that he 
committed no fault. This is because, the contract puts him under an obligation to carry by a 
means commonly used in carriage and to be a good carrier, the defendant has not committed 
fault if he proves that he has taken all the measures, which a good carrier must take. In 
contractual matters, the fault is therefore an objective notion.234 
(ii) Obligation de résultat 
Obligation de résultat means that the debtor has promised to obtain a certain result emerging 
from the contract. In such a case, the notion of fault of the defaulting party is immaterial.235 
There is a contractual liability for non-performance if the result has not been achieved, 
irrespective of whether the defaulting party has committed a fault or not. In this case, the only 
defences open to the defaulting party will be the act of a third party, an act of the injured 
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party, or force majeure.236 Contractual liability is strict when the breached duty is an 
obligation de résultat. Such are the obligations of the carrier to keep the goods or cargo safe 
and deliver them to the proper destination.237 
It is also possible to find an intermediate solution. The defendant may be under a third kind of 
duty, called either obligation de moyens renforcée (aggravée) or obligation de résultat 
allegée (ou atténuée). In this case, the victim does not have to prove fault and from this point 
of view, he stands in a better position than the beneficiary of a mere obligation de moyens. 
Still, he does not enjoy the same privilege as the beneficiary of an obligation de résultat, 
since the defendant may rebut the presumption of fault.238 
In a contract of carriage, the carrier promises to accept goods and passengers for carriage at a 
given point and to deliver them at another point. If he does not do so, that is if damage or loss 
occurs, he is presumed liable.239 However, Planiol in his book says that sometimes courts 
have changed jurisprudence and established the obligations of the carrier as that of keeping 
the goods or passengers safe and deliver them on time to the proper destination. The mere 
fact that a passenger is injured, or that goods are lost or damaged during the transportation, is 
an evidence of a breach of duty and contract. Therefore, a presumption of fault on the part of 
carriers has been recognized and they are under a strict contractual duty to safely transport 
passengers and goods. The law asserts that they have the duty to achieve a result- an 
obligation de résultat - which is to carry passengers and goods safely.240 
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and the carrier in carriage contracts. It provides presumed fault liability so the claimant does not need to prove 
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Fault or neglect is presumed provided that the claimant proves, first, that a contract of 
carriage exists between him and the carrier, and secondly that he or his goods have suffered 
damage during the carriage.241 As a result, a real presumption of liability rests upon the 
carrier; it is not only presumed that he has been negligent, but also that his negligence 
actually caused the damage. The carrier can only rebut this presumption by proving that one 
of the exceptions enumerated in the law applies to his particular case.242 
(iii) Force majeure  
Force majeure is an external cause, which can prevent the existence of the causal link. Thus, 
it completely exonerates a defendant who successfully proves that the damage was in reality 
attributable to a cause, which was not imputable to him.243 Force majeure, defined as an 
irresistible and unforeseeable event outside the control of the defendant, constitutes such a 
‘cause étrangère’, as do the fault of the victim himself and the behavior of a third party 
which could not normally be foreseen by the defendant.244  
Force majeure in contract law is dealt with under Article 1148 of the Civil Code. The Civil 
Code provides that force majeure excuses a person from paying damages for non-
performance of the obligation affected, but it does not define force majeure. In contract, the 
essential effect of force majeure is that the debtor is released both from his obligation and his 
liability for the breach of this obligation. The concept is also recognized in tort but it has not 
received any mention in the Civil Code. In tort, force majeure can only be used as a defence 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the fault of the defendant. This is identical to the position of the carrier in French law. However, the carrier can 
prove that the loss or destruction of goods has been because of the goods’ inherent defects or it has occurred 
because of the fault of the consignor or the consignee. In such cases, he is not liable. See Chr. 3.4.4.4.4 for 
details and references, infra. 
241 R. De Witt, Multimodal Transport (1995), 34. 
242 Ibid.  
243 See Planiol and Ripert, supra note 8, at 475. 
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in the case of liability for the guardianship of things. Although a guardian of things can not 
escape liability by showing that he was not at fault, he can do so by showing force majeure. 
The effect of the proof of force majeure is to break the presumption of liability, which is 
otherwise upon him, for damage caused by the thing under his guardianship.245  
The typical case of cause étrangère is a force majeure, which will relieve all carriers from 
liability. Beyond that, carrier’s liability is governed by specific rules.246 When damage is 
caused to goods in contrac of carriage, it usually is admitted that there was contractual fault 
on the part of the carrier.247 The carrier is responsible unless he can prove that it was an 
accident. The carrier of goods can be exempted from liability by showing that the force 
majeure caused the damage. If the carrier can prove that he is not guilty of fault, which is 
usually caused under such circumstances, or rather if he indicates the precautions he has 
taken which gives the proof its positive aspect, the judge will have to conclude that a case of 
force majeure has caused the damage.248 In the French view, if the judge finds a case of  force 
majeure, he may reduce the amount of damages by an appropriate amount.249 However, in the 
case of injured passengers, there has been some hesitation. 250 This is because,  carriers are 
under an obligation to carry their passengers safely to their destinations. 251  
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2.3.2.3 French Law and International Liability  
France has ratified and given effect to the Warsaw Convention 1929,252 the Hague Protocol 
1955,253 the Guadalajara Protocol 1961,254 the Montreal Convention 1999,255 and the E.C. 
Regulation on Air Carrier Liability 2027/97 (amended version). France, in accordance with 
Articles L 321-3 and L.322-3 of the Civil Aviation Code in air transport accidents of 
domestic flights, applies the provisions of the above-mentioned E.C. Regulation and the 
Montreal Convention 1999.256  
According to French law, the action brought against the carrier is contractual where actions in 
liability against carriers in general cannot be anything but contractual when they are brought 
by passengers and consignors alleging faulty performance. The parties cannot refer to 
tortuous action and resort to features that may be more advantageous to them. This is a rule 
which plays an important role in the general framework of civil liability in France. 
Difficulties arise in cases of death, where the parties want to have their action considered 
outside the scope of contract. They may bring a tort action based on the violation of their 
personal right. The advantages of tort action are considerable if the contract contains 
limitation or exclusion clauses, which become inapplicable because the public order 
characteristic of rules of tort liability makes such clauses null and void.  
The French courts, insofar as the remoteness of harm is concerned, take the view that harm 
calls for compensation only if it is a direct and immediate consequence of the event in 
question. This is inferred from Article 1151 of the Civil Code, which by its terms applies to 
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the law of contract.257 The right to sue in death cases is left to the general rules of the law of 
obligations.258 In this relation, courts are restrictive in awarding moral damage. In transport 
cases, each contract of transport of passengers contains an implicit stipulation for third 
parties. The stipulation entitles them to a contractual action against the carrier for personal 
damage.259 
In carriage by air, the cause of action will in most cases be provided by the contract of 
carriage which can provide a basis for any action, be it wrongful death, delay or damage to 
baggage or cargo. If, for whatever reason, a claimant could not rely on the contract of 
carriage, he could turn to Article 1382 of the Civil Code. However, this renunciation is not 
allowed for death actions arising from the international air carrier liability.260 
2.3.3 Liability in German Law 
 2.3.3.1 Tort Liability 
Torts under German law are characterized by the degree of fault. The basic principle and the 
most common category is the traditional fault liability of Articles 823 and 826 of the Civil 
Code (BGB).261 It has a general statement of liability for intentional or negligent injury to 
persons or property subject to a somewhat restricted definition of vicarious responsibility,262 
also subject to the principle of co-responsibility, which means reduction in recovery by 
reason of contributory fault.263  
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Three types of torts are recognized under German law, which are explored below, together 
with the basis of liability.264 
1. Article 823(1) of the BGB provides that: ‘A person who, contrary to the law, deliberately 
or negligently, causes harm to the life, health, liberty, property, or other rights of another 
person must compensate that person for any damage arising there from.’  
Liability for causing injury in an unlawful and culpable manner only arises if the injury 
affects the victim in one of the legal interests enumerated in the text.265 The requirement of 
unlawfulness is satisfied by any invasion of one of the legal interests specified in this Article. 
The requirement of ‘deliberately or negligently’ is satisfied if the injury is inflicted either 
intentionally (that is, accompanied by the intention to invade the protected legal interest), or 
negligently.266 
The person whose unlawful and culpable behavior violates one of the legal interests listed in 
Article 823(1) must pay for all the harm, which the victim suffers as a consequence of the 
invasion. The only limit to the extent of compensation is a legally relevant causal connection 
between the behaviors, which renders the defendant liable for the consequential harm.267 
2. Article 823(2) provides that: ‘The same obligation [as in Article 823(1) BGB, i.e. to 
compensate for harm caused] is placed upon a person who violates a statute intended for the 
protection of others. If, in accordance with the provisions of the statute, a violation is possible 
even without fault, the duty to compensate arises only in the event of fault.’  
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Liability under this section arises when a statute designed to protect others is wrongfully 
broken. Protective statutes in this sense include all the rules of private and public law, 
especially criminal law, which are substantially designed to protect an individual or a group 
of individuals rather than the public as a whole.268 
3. The third type of general tort liability can be found in Article 826. Under this provision, a 
person is liable if he intentionally causes harm to others in a way that is contrary to public 
policy (unreasonable, contra bonos mores).269 This provision is used to impose liability in 
diverse types of cases where one party has caused harm to another by a conduct considered 
offensive and improper so as to incur strong disapproval from the average person in the 
relevant section of society.270 
4. Regarding the basis of liability, normally a claimant must prove all the elements of his 
claim.271 However, this is subject to two kinds of exceptions: a) where the judge applies the 
concept of prima facie proof, i.e. events take place in the way experience would suggest. This 
can be presumed unless the defendant shows that there were some abnormal factors; b) the 
subjective and objective burdens of proof. The former means that the party with the burden of 
proof needs to present evidence to prove his argument, otherwise he will lose. The latter 
means that if a court cannot reach a conclusion in a case, the party with the burden of proof 
will lose. In some cases, these subjective and objective burdens are transferred to the 
defendant.272 
                                                      
268 Ibid., at 83. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid., at 885. 




5. A number of specific, but important, statutory provisions, establish strict liability.273 This 
liability is based only on the control of a particular dangerous activity, which causes 
damage.274 It is independent of any fault on the part of the tortfeasor and is based only on his 
control of a particular dangerous activity, which caused damage.275 In Germany, risk-based 
liability has its origins in the rise of industrial enterprises in the late 19th century.276 Although 
there is no general provision on strict liability in German civil law, the common rationale 
underlying these statutes is that consequences of certain risks should be borne by those who 
control and take advantage of them.277 In 1922, Germany adopted an Air Traffic Act. 
Modeled on the Road Traffic Law, it provided for liability without fault up to stated amounts. 
Unlike the law applicable to road and railway accidents, however, the Air Traffic Act did not 
contain the defences of force majeure or unavoidable external accidents. The limits were 
made applicable both to persons and goods carried for hire, and to persons and property on 
the ground. 
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2.3.3.2 Contractual Liability 
A major focus of the German Contract Law is the principle of fault.278 As a rule, it is 
necessary that the defendant was at least negligent in causing the damage.279 Moreover, the 
claimant must have suffered a recoverable loss. The BGB has no unitary concept of breach of 
contract, and does not deal generally with the rights of a contractor who has not received the 
promised and expected performance.280 It concentrates instead on the case where non-
performance is due to impossibility, delay, and insufficiency; regulating them in great detail 
for the circumstances where for whatever reason, the promisor is late in performing.281 The 
notion of positive performance is used in breach of contract where breach of contractual 
duties of care has caused personal injury or property damage to the other party, for example 
where a passenger is injured while travelling in a vehicle.282 
The contractual duties have to be fixed by the parties to the contract.283 The parties’ 
agreement, together with a reasonable construction of the agreement, determine the contents 
of the obligations and in particular whether the defendant is obliged to achieve a certain result 
or whether he is ‘only’ obliged to act with reasonable care but cannot and should not be 
expected to guarantee the result.284 If the parties have not fixed their respective duties, even if 
the conclusion of the contract is certain, then the objective law, i.e. statute and case law, have 
to step in.285  
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However, the BGB does foresee as a general duty only the duty to act in good faith, and 
duties relating to the place and time of performance.286 How far this duty extends, and what 
its precise contents are, depends very much on the terms, purpose and interpretation of the 
respective contract.287 In any event, a contract is always void if at the time it was formed, the 
promised performance was objectively incapable of being rendered by anyone (impossibilium 
nulla obligato).288  
The Code seeks to modify this result by making the contractor who knew or should have 
known of the initial impossibility, pay compensation to the innocent party for any harm that 
he has suffered in reliance on the validity of the contract.289 Subsequently, the important 
question is who is blameworthy for the obstacle to performance. In all cases, the general rule 
is inferred from the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’, i.e. the defendant who fails to perform is 
liable unless he proves that he was not answerable for the obstacle to performance.290 Each 
party is answerable for any obstacle to performance, which occurs because of a lack of proper 
care on its part or on the part of those who were helping them to perform.291  
Contractual liability, in general but also with respect to personal injury, presumes a 
contractual duty which has been violated and whose violation has caused the claimant’s 
loss.292 If a contracting party injures the other during the course of the performance of the 
contract, it implies that the duty is violated unless the injury has no connection with the 
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performance of the contract. The burden of proof lies generally with the claimant who must 
prove that a contractual duty existed and had been violated.293 
Provisions of the Civil Code do not rule out the waiving of liability in connection with the 
carriage of passengers by aircraft. Indeed, German jurisprudence has confirmed that carriers 
are allowed to exclude their liability by special agreement.294 
2.3.3.3 German Law and International Liability 
Germany has also ratified and given effect to the Warsaw Convention 1929,295 The Hague 
Protocol 1955,296 the Guadalajara Convention 1961,297 and the Montreal Convention 1999.298  
According to §§ 44 I 1 , 2 and II , 46 I, II, 47, 35, 38 Luftverkehrsgesetz (LVG) and 425 I, 
429, 431 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), in air transport accidents involving domestic flights, the 
provisions of the E.C. Regulation and the Montreal Convention 1999 apply.299  
As mentioned above, Germany has a special law on aviation (Luftverkehrsgesetz) that has 
provisions on the right to sue in cases involving death and on recoverable damage that is alike 
to the general rule, which has come in Article 844 (2) of the Civil Code.300 In cases involving 
death, the obligation of the person liable is to support the dependents of the deceased in the 
manner and to the extent that the deceased would have maintained them.301 
Following the adoption of the Warsaw Convention 1929, the Air Traffic Act was amended to 
achieve conformity with the Convention. This resulted in a distinction being drawn between 
passengers and third parties who are entitled to resort to other remedies (as under the Civil 
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Code) only in cases of grave misconduct and subject in most cases to substantially lower 
limits than other traffic victims.302 
Apart from aviation, German accident compensation law features compulsory liability 
insurance up to the limits of the relevant special laws, direct action against insurers, and 
relatively little litigation. However, damages are generally payable in periodic instalments 
rather than in a lump sum.303 German courts only apply their own law on air carriers and 
claimants. At first, courts applied the lex fori to cases of the Warsaw Convention 1929. Later 
on, some cases were governed by the law of the principal residence of the air carrier.304 
2.3.4 French Law and German Law: a Comparative Analysis 
In investigating the liability principles in France and Germany, the following observations 
can be made. 
1. In Germany, if liability is created by a breach of contract, but in a situation where either 
tort or contract is applicable, the injured person can have recourse to tort liability and ignore 
the limits of contract. However, in French jurisprudence, where there is an overlap between 
tort and contract liabilities, a party injured in contract is not allowed to apply the rules of tort 
liability.305  
2. A person is liable in civil law jurisdictions provided that the other conditions of liability 
are fulfilled. That is, if his conduct is not in conformity with what could reasonably be 
expected from him. The German BGB establishes a general clause for liability based on fault, 
comparable to the general provision, which exists in several important continental codes, like 
Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. In a broader perspective, the German BGB (Article 
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823), notwithstanding its different structure, pursues the same goal as the common law (if one 
subsumes intent and negligence under a general concept of fault).306 
3. Although the liability principle in French Law and German law is based on fault, in the 
event of damage or loss, presumed fault is the general rule for the carrier’s contractual 
liability in the modern civil law jurisdictions. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by 
the carrier. The general nature of defences in civil law jurisdictions is less severe than the 
common carriers in common law jurisdictions.307 
4. In most civil law jurisdictions, strict liability seems to be based on individual rules rather 
than general or at least broader clauses.308Although French law has a clause which introduces 
general liability for ‘deeds of the things within one’s keeping’,309 and courts, furthermore 
seem to be open for an extensive application of other rules,310 German law has so far denied 
the possibility of extending its statutory regimes in this way.311 
5. Strict liability in traditional German law deserves special attention. This is because, first, 
strict liability was introduced there only by specific enactments, whilst traditional French law 
remained faithful to the fault principle. Secondly, the vast majority of German strict liability 
statutes contain similar clauses on the monetary limits of liability per damage. Thirdly, the 
compensation available under the strict liability statutes are subject to limits so that if 
unlimited liability is claimed, recourse to the ordinary rules of tort is permissible.312  
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6. In Germany, strict liability may be imposed on carriers for claims arising out of an accident 
in domestic law.313 However, in France, the legal liability may be based on fault.314  
2.4 An Analysis of the General Principles of Liability under the Two Legal Systems  
Studying the legal approaches in both systems contributes to a better understanding of the 
foundations of the Warsaw-Montreal Convention’s regime, which will be looked at in 
Chapter 4. Since the 1920s, the international community has tended to provide regulations for 
air carrier liability in private international air law, based on common grounds in the two 
major legal systems of the common law and civil law. In Europe at the time, aircraft began to 
cross several borders to get to their destinations, and airlines and customers had a variety of 
legal systems and regulations to contend with. This situation gave rise to legal problems, 
which made European States eager to establish uniform international regulations.  
In order to balance the interests of both air carriers and customers (especially passengers), the 
drafters of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and Montreal Convention 1999 provided principles 
such as the presumption of liability, limitation of liability, exclusion of exemption conditions, 
and strict liability with a focus on protecting the carriers. However, they inclined towards 
protecting passengers. Criteria of the legal liabilities that were derived from the two legal 
systems and their similarities and differences will be discussed below. 
2.4.1 Tort Liability  
Tort is generally understood as a civil wrong, which takes place outside a contractual 
relationship.315 There are three main categories of torts: intentional torts, negligence or fault 
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and strict liability.316 In this study that focuses on air carrier’s liability, intentional torts were 
ignored since the majority of potential tort situations arising out of transportation by air are 
not intentional torts.   
It can generally be claimed that the main liability principle in both the common law and civil 
law jurisdictions was based on fault or negligence. However, in cases of transport, it 
gradually inclined towards liability based on presumption of fault, presumption of liability or 
strict liability. This author is of the opinion that liability in the international system, which is 
affected by this trend, has gradually proceeded from presumption of liability, which can be 
rebutted by the defendant by proving absence of negligence / fault, towards strict liability. 
Thus, each of these principles will be analyzed below. 
2.4.1.1 Liability Based on Fault or Negligence  
The word ‘fault’ comes from faute, which has its etymological root in the Latin verb fallere. 
The original meaning of that word was ‘to deceive’, but it later came to express the notion of 
failing in some way.317 Fault usually means that the infringement in question was committed 
intentionally, recklessly, or negligently.318 Fault is a breach of a pre-existing obligation, for 
which the law orders compensation, when damage is caused to another. Violation of a rule 
which is of either a juridical or practical order is necessary.319 
To justify fault in the context of tort, it has been said that the case for preserving some notion 
of fault results from its moral logic, since it is generally accepted that a person should be 
accountable for the damage he has caused.320 There is a strong moral content to such a 
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principle and, indeed, fault derives from the canon law notion of sin and the need to atone for 
one’s sins.321 Fault also seems necessary to reflect social expectations and deviations from 
socially accepted standards of behavior.322 
Fault was not defined by either French law or German law. However, the general basis of 
liability in the civil law system is fault. Under civil law jurisdictions, liability based on fault 
arises when a number of general elements are met.323 The legal interests protected by fault 
liability may be different but their main elements, namely unlawfulness, fault, damage, 
conduct, and causation (i.e. a causal connection between the act and the damage), are 
comparable.324 In French law, faute is interpreted not merely as culpa, in the sense of 
negligence, but in the sense of wrongfulness.325  
In English law, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 defined fault as to mean 
negligence, or the breach of a statutory duty or other act or omission, which gives rise to a 
liability in tort.326 The duty of care component, which is an integral part of the common law 
tort of negligence, is not explicitly stated in the civil law system. The main elements of 
negligence in common law jurisdictions are duty of care, breach of duty, causation, damage, 
and the defences that can be invoked by alleged tortfeasors.327  
Fault is therefore a question of law in civil law jurisdictions, much as duty of care is under 
English law, so that judges in both systems have the discretion to delimit the scope of liability 
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for damage resulting from a failure to act with reasonable care. Crucially, any fault which 
causes damage is actionable irrespective of whether it is a delictual or contractual obligation 
that has been breached. 
The legislators in Iran have provided no definition for fault. In order to find a definition for it 
in Iranian law, one should resort to instances where the Civil Code bases liability on fault. 
Following the Shariah, the Civil Code has used the two terms of ta’addi and tafrit in this 
regard for tasbib and amanat contracts.328 
Ta’addi consists of conduct surpassing the permitted limits or ordinary usage, in relation to a 
thing or a right belonging to (an)other person(s).329 It means doing something that should not 
be done but is subject to the act going beyond legal or customary limits, and causing damage 
to life, property, or the rights of others. The criterion for ta’addi is that a person conducts an 
act that according to law or custom, he is not supposed to do. In most cases, a person harms 
the other party by a positive act.330 As a result, ta’addi is an illegal act, which is (personally 
or customarily) reproachable.331 Tafrit consists of an omission to act which legally, 
customarily or because of an agreement, the act is necessary for the protection of another’s 
property.332 Therefore, tafrit is also a type of fault.  
2.4.1.2 Fault ‘Rebuttably Presumed’ 
In both civil law and common law jurisdictions, as a general rule, the burden of proving fault 
/ negligence lies on the claimant.333 Normally, a claimant has to prove each element of his 
case. Sometimes, however, the law assists him by allowing certain elements to be presumed. 
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It is up to the defendant to disprove them, and if he fails to do so, the claimant wins the 
case.334  
The civil law and the common law jurisdictions have sometimes revised the burden of proof 
in tort and contract law.335 As mentioned above,336 in French law they speak of subjective / 
fault liability.337 In English law, for example, a bailee of goods is liable if the goods are lost, 
damaged or destroyed by his fault while in his charge but he bears the burden of showing that 
the loss etc. was not his fault.338 In respect of passengers, even where liability is directly 
based on negligence, the claimant does not necessarily have to prove fault by positive 
evidence where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.339 This is because, the circumstances 
may raise an inference of negligence on the defendant’s part. In the literature one can speak 
of presumption of liability or a presumption of fault.340  
It is worth mentioning that in drafting the Warsaw Convention 1929, countries such as 
England, France and Germany played important roles as representatives of the two systems of 
common law and civil law jurisdictions. In their respective systems, liability was based on 
fault / negligence and the burden of proof was on the claimant. However, due to the specific 
nature of the air carriage, the Convention preferred to speak of a presumption of liability 
which can be rebutted by the defendant by proving absence of negligence / fault.341 This 
principle was pursued in all amendments of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal 
Convention 1999. 
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It cannot be claimed that fault is the exclusive basis of liability in Iranian law. In addition to 
the etlāf rule,342 in some cases because of the necessity to remedy an illegal act, or due to the 
hazardous environment or business that a person has initiated for his own interest, legislators 
have accepted civil liability without fault. For example, the liability of carriers is based on the 
presumption of fault in carriage contracts. He can be relieved by proving force majeure.343  
2.4.1.3 Liability Based on No–Fault (Strict or Absolute Liability) 
It is accepted in tort law that in most circumstances there must be some degree of 
blameworthiness on the part of the defendant, i.e. not merely that the act or omission was his, 
but that it was also intentional, reckless or negligent.344 However, in some cases, this element 
of fault is not required. It is a tort law concept that imposes liability for harm suffered without 
requiring proof of fault or negligence.345 
In civil law and common law jurisdictions, liability based on fault has been marginalized by 
the emergence of a number of statutes introducing liability based on no fault. The operators 
of activities, holders or owners of goods and materials are made liable independently of any 
blame of having been negligent or violating a duty of care, particularly in those national 
systems which have enacted such forms of liability in the transport sector.346 
Liability based on no–fault has received different names such as strict, absolute, based on risk 
in different jurisdictions. French doctrine speaks of objective liability with two forms, one 
based upon an obligation of result (defence of ‘force majeure’). The defendant, as soon as he 
proves that he was not at fault for the occurrence of damage, would be exempted. Another 
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form is based upon an obligation of warranty (no such defence). German doctrine speaks of 
Gefährdungshaftung (based on risk) more or less corresponding to the French doctrine.347 
Common law doctrine speaks of strict or absolute liability. In common law, the concepts of 
strict or absolute liability are often used synonymously and it is difficult to distinguish them 
in practice. Nevertheless, there are differences between strict liability and absolute liability. 
As noted by Haanappel:  
'Common law gets more “fuzzy” when it comes to absolute or strict liability. For 
most, absolute liability is a form of liability (for instance, for nuclear damage) where, once 
there is damage and causation, the defendant has no defenses at all (the opinion, for instance, 
of Mircea Matte). Strict liability then is no-fault liability where, nevertheless, the defendant 
has defenses available such as Act of God / fortuitous event, and own fault of the victim. But, 
where the defense of Act of God / fortuitous event is not available but the defense of own 
fault of the victim is.'348 
The major common law area of strict liability was created by the House of Lords in the case 
of Rylands v. Fletcher (1866). The remit was broader than just ‘rebuttably presumed’.349 
Strict or absolute liability is also created by statute in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in a number of other specific circumstances, e.g. oil pollution at sea, storage of gas 
underground, personal injury and property damage arising from nuclear material, and 
material damage.350 He who causes a new risk to be borne becomes responsible for the 
damage caused, if damage occurs. This is an objective liability, which analyzes the fault of 
the author of the act.351 
                                                      
347 Strict liability in German law is the imposition of liability on a party regardless of the existence of fault or 
negligence. In Germany, strict liability has been introduced only by specific enactments, while French law 
remains faithful to the fault principle. In French law, strict liability has evolved from Article 1384 of the Civil 
Code. See Viney, supra note 202, at 249. 
348 See footnote 219,  supra. 
349 H. Osterhout, ‘The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation’, (1931) Air Law Review 3 at10. 
350 See Youngs, supra note 35, at 231. 
351 Some believe that this new doctrine, far from being a step forward, constitutes a regression which goes back 
to barbaric times, and prior to the lex aquilia. Ibid., at 466. 
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Strict liability can be removed by resorting to certain defences. In common law, if a 
defendant can prove that firstly, damage has been caused by one of the exceptions, which 
were not related to him,352 and secondly, that he was not at fault for the occurrence of the 
damage, he will escape from liability.353  
Therefore, strict liability without exceptions becomes absolute liability. It is a liability 
independent of wrongful intent or negligence. Absolute liability is stricter than strict liability 
and industries involved in hazardous activities cannot take any plea. It gives a background of 
support to certain liabilities where compensation is given even without fault. Its application 
is, however, limited to hazardous activities, and too much emphasis is placed on enterprise 
liability. 
As mentioned above, due to the specific characteristics of airplanes and the inability of the 
claimant to prove fault / negligence on the part of the defendant, at first it was the 
presumption of liability that was adopted. Then, because of developments in air transport on 
the one hand, and the attractions connected with the protection of passengers on the other 
hand, this was replaced by strict liability.  
Strict liability has been accepted in Iranian law. It is present in tortuous liability and statutes, 
and obvious examples include etlāf, usurpation and the responsibility of land motor vehicle 
owners.354 This liability is also present in definite contracts like reward, fiduciary and sale 
contracts.355 In Iranian law, the one who destroys an object or the property of others is liable. 
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The element of fault is not a condition for liability.356 If a person destroys a thing, he is liable 
even if he can prove that he has not been at fault in his conduct. However, there should 
undoubtedly be a causal link between the destruction and the defendant’s behavior.357 
 Therefore, as mentioned above, liability regimes have received different names in different 
jurisdictions such as presumption of fault, presumption of liability or strict liability, absolute 
liability, liability based on risk, and even within a single jurisdiction one author may use a 
name, term or expression that differs from another author such as strict liability and absolute 
liability. However, as noted by Haanappel, ‘it is not the name that counts, but the liability 
regime as laid down in a law or treaty.358 This proposition applies as well in the case of the 
Warsaw-Montreal regime for air carrier’s liability.’359 
2.4.2 Contractual Liability 
One of the issues that must be explored here is liability in contract. Carriers are usually liable 
on the basis of contract for damage to goods or injury to passengers, and for breach of 
contract. However, in England and the United States, liability may sometimes arise on the 
basis of tort or bailment.360 
The legal liability of a carrier in contract of carriage is distinguishable from tort. The latter is 
essentially a civil wrong and arises where a person is in breach of a legal duty owed to 
another.361 These rights and duties exist by virtue of the law itself and are owed to persons in 
general, but a breach of contract arises out of rights and duties agreed between, and 
enforceable by, parties to the contract. Therefore the law of contract, in its application, is 
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potentially much narrower than that of tort.362 By comparing liability in carriage contracts, 
the author has come to the following conclusions.  
2.4.2.1 Similarities  
1. In most extra-contractual liability cases, it is an injured person who has to prove that the 
defendant was at fault.363 But, in contractual liability, it is the defendant who has to prove that 
he was not at fault in relation to the performance of the contract.364 In the contemporary era, 
especially in the USA, legislators and commentators tend to find and make contractual roots 
for important obligations to exempt injured persons from having to prove fault. This approach 
is a technical device for establishing liability without fault.365  
2. In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, the law of contract would be the primary 
basis of liability for the carriage of goods. In both legal systems, the contract of carriage 
between the shipper and the carrier usually defines the responsibility undertaken by either 
party.  
3. Carrier’s liability in common law and civil law systems is remarkably similar in nature for 
goods from one aspect. In common law, air carrier’s liability is strict, with a limited number 
of exceptions exonerating the carrier. In civil law, carrier’s liability is based on presumed 
fault.366 Generally, the same concept of a rebuttable presumption of liability is applied in both 
legal systems. If the carrier succeeds in proving the existence of one of the enumerated 
exceptions, he rebuts the presumption of negligence.367 If the carrier does not succeed in 
delivering such evidence, the inevitable conclusion is that he must have been negligent, or 
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otherwise the loss or damage could not have occurred. Therefore, the claimant is not required 
to prove actual negligence.368  
Thus the contractual liability of carriers appears to be the same in both legal systems. 
Whether one says that a rebuttable presumption of liability is set up with the burden of proof 
of liberating circumstances resting upon the carrier, or that a strict liability exists with the 
burden of proof also resting upon the carrier, makes little practical difference.369 In both 
systems, a carrier cannot escape his liability by proving one of the excepted perils if he has 
contributed to the loss or damage by his own negligence.370 
4. Both legal systems require full compensation, while both of them accept contractual 
conditions for limiting or exempting liability. However, countries such as France and 
Germany, in their earlier statutes on air carriage in the 1920s, intentionally limited liability 
and accepted different conditions such as the condition for exemption from liability. It seems 
that these measures have been taken in order to balance the interests of air carriers and 
customers.371 
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There are differences in the general principles of liability in these two systems. Among them 
are the following differences regarding carrier’s liability in carriage contracts:  
1. Bailment does not exist in civil law jurisdictions unlike the common law jurisdictions. The 
fundamental difference seems to be that when no express contractual provisions about 
liability are made, carrier’s liability may, in the common law, be established in accordance 
with the rules of bailment. Under continental law, on the other hand, this must be established 
in accordance with the rules of the general law of contract provided that a contract can be 
implied.372  
In Iranian law, following the shariah, carriage in the civil code is based on amanat principles, 
which has similarities with bailment principles in common law. If contract of carriage does 
not conform to the Commercial Code, amanat provisions in the Civil Code will apply.373  
2. The nature of contractual liability is different in the two legal systems. Carrier’s liability in 
civil law jurisdictions is principally based on fault or negligence. The fact that the burden of 
proving a certain exception is on the carrier does not change the nature of liability.374 In the 
common law jurisdictions, carrier’s liability is basically strict. It is essentially objective in 
nature. If a number of conditions are fulfilled, liability will follow automatically. There is no 
question as to his conduct in the matter, not even the carrier’s presumed conduct. It is from 
this characteristic that the comparison with an insurer of goods comes.375  
The scope of exceptions in both legal systems is not the same. French law provides two 
additional exceptions: the act of a third party for whom the contracting party is not 
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vicariously liable for, and the loss of thing which had to be delivered without any fault on the 
part of the debtor.376 However, at common law jurisdictions, these exceptions are rather 
narrowly limited. For instance, acts of the Queen’s enemies do not pertain to robbers on land 
or to piratical or traitorous subjects.377 The common law concept of an act of God is less strict 
than its continental counterpart is in the classic non-attributable impossibility theory. 
Whereas a rule, extraordinary circumstances are required. However, the common law 
doctrine is limited by its clearly set out exceptions.  
In Iranian law, the exemptions are not limited to the common law defences and as soon as the 
carrier proves that the accident has been out of his control, he will be exempted from liability.  
3. A general and common characteristic of carriage contracts is that they are normally for 
reward, both in the common law and civil law jurisdictions. No reward means either free 
transportation or transportation by courtesy. In the common law, this would amount to a 
gratuitous bailment with probably a different standard of care for the bailee and a different 
rule on vicarious liability.378 In the civil law jurisdictions, there is some dispute as to whether 
gratuitous carriage may still constitute a contract for the carriage of goods. This is answered 
in the negative in France where one reverts to tortious liability.379 In Germany, it is suggested 
that a contract of carriage may well exist, but that each case turns on its facts.380  
4. If liability is created by a breach of contract, can the injured person have recourse to other 
rules of liability (i.e. tort) and ignore the limits of the contract? There are divergent views in 
this regard.381 No one should be exempted from the protection that the law extends to him 
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and be made to suffer the damage since he has been a party to the contract.382 This is possible 
under common law jurisprudence and in Germany where courts allow the application of one 
of these two devices. However, in French jurisprudence, where there is an overlap between 
tort and contract liabilities, a party injured in contract is not allowed to engage with rules of 
extra-contractual liability.383  
Regarding Iranian law, it can be stated that if there is a contract for cargo, the claimant cannot 
refer to tort. But, as for the Diyah, since it is a property of the inheritor(s), inheritors who 
disregard contract may claim the Diyah based on tort.384 
5. In French law, not every contractual term, expressed or implied, is a warranty in law.385 
However, the common law principally treats every contract as containing a guarantee. If the 
debtor fails to do what he promised, he would be liable for damages for ‘breach of contract’ 
regardless of whether or not he himself, or any of his servants or subcontractors has been at 
fault.386 
2.4.3 Interaction between the Two Legal Systems and the International Regime  
1. All the four countries under examination; the United States, England, France and 
Germany, apply the applicable conventions of the Warsaw system and the Montreal 
Convention 1999 on their international flights. The liability provisions of the Warsaw 
Convention 1929 and the Montreal Convention 1999, regarding their exclusivity, enjoy 
priority over domestic regulations and courts have to observe them and cannot refer to their 
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domestic tort and contract laws.387  Except for the United States, they apply the international 
system on their domestic flights too. The United States applies its national and local law on 
domestic flights and courts refer to tort, bailment and contract laws.388 As a result, the author 
is of the opinion that this is an indication that the international system has influenced the legal 
systems of individual countries.  
2. Civil law and common law systems follow a nuanced approach with a mixture of strict 
liability and fault liability elements.389 This approach is based on the both legal systems to 
balance elements of strict liability and fault liability.390 A comparative law survey shows that 
international air carrier’s liability systems do not opt exclusively for fault liability or strict 
liability, but adopt a more nuanced approach in accordance with civil law and common 
law.391 
3. The Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal Convention 1999’s provisions do not 
require a claimant to prove the fault of a carrier for passenger death or bodily injury, the same 
as contractual liability in civil law.392 However, in common law this principle is closer to the 
common carrier’s liability for carriage of goods than to his liability for passenger’s death or 
bodily injury.393 
4. Jurisdiction in the United States for passengers’ death and bodily injury as well as for 
goods, progressively imposed more severe requirements on the air carrier to prove non 
fault.394 The presumption of liability under the WC29 was practically, and in courts, treated 
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as strict liability.395 On the one hand, the air carrier was strictly liable for goods in the 
common law.396 On the other hand, it also had a duty to exercise the highest due care and 
diligence on passengers’ carriage.397 Thus, the air carrier was treated strictly liable in cases 
following an aviation-related accident. Consequently, liability in international regimes found 
a similar position as in the United States’ common law where air carriers are strictly liable for 
passenger’s death or bodily injury, and for goods sustaining damage.398 Therefore, 
international air carrier’s liability in case law practically found a similar position as in 
common law and the courts applied it to international flights as well as domestic flights.  
5. In the Warsaw Convention 1929, the carrier of goods would be exonerated if he can prove 
due diligence which means an absence of fault. If the carrier could show that a particular 
situation was unforeseeable and insuperable for damages, he can remove the liability.399 
However, in the Montreal Convention 1999, the carrier is not liable if and to the extent it 
proves that the destruction, or loss of, or damage to, the cargo resulted from an inherent 
defect, quality or vice of that cargo; defective packing of that cargo performed by a person 
other than the carrier or its servants or agents; an act of war or an armed conflict; and an act 
of public authority carried out in connection with the entry, exit or transit of the cargo.400 In 
fact, the Montreal Convention 1999 introduces strict liability on carriers, the same as the 
common law.401  
6. Both the legal systems of the common law and civil law require full compensation in the 
case of death or bodily injury, while both of them accept contractual conditions for limiting 
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or exempting liability in the case of damage to goods.402 The Warsaw Convention 1929, in 
contrast to the two legal systems, applies a limitation of liability for passenger’s death or 
bodily injury.403 The WC29 went far beyond a common point of principles in the legal 
systems of the common law and civil law since it imposed uniform limits of liability.404 
However, the Montreal Convention 1999 approves unlimited liability for passenger’s death or 
bodily injury in accordance with the two legal systems.405  
7. The international regime created an exceptional system against air carriers, because in the 
civil law and common law jurisdictions, the carrier is traditionally free to insert clauses in the 
carriage contract which exclude or reduce his liability.406 Of course, common law and civil 
law jurisdictions gradually moved to restrict contractual conditions exempting, delimiting, or 
designed to reduce the liability of the provider of services. Therefore, the courts have, in 
recent years, tended to reject these conditions for the benefit of passengers.407  
8. Regarding the influence of the common law and civil law jurisdictions on Iranian law, it 
should be mentioned that basically Iranian law has been under the influence of the Shariah 
but in modern issues such as civil liability, carriage contract and the liability of a carrier, it 
has been under the influence of civil law jurisdictions. Among the writers of the Civil Code 
and Commercial Code, there were those who had academic backgrounds in European 
universities. They adopted the provisions on contract of carriage, and the presumption of 
liability from the civil law jurisdictions.408 Nevertheless, Iranian law was not affected by the 
common law jurisdictions in the abovementioned areas. Although carriage and liability 
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provisions such as bailment principles in the common law jurisdictions have similar 
counterparts in Iranian law, it cannot be claimed that in areas of liability or contract of 
carriage, Iranian law has been under the influence of the common law jurisdictions.  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
As discussed above, all legal systems have their own liability principles. The main principle 
in the common law and civil law systems is based on the fault / negligence principle, which 
in modern law has been changed to the presumption of liability. Apart from the principle of 
fault, both systems have accepted strict liability as an exception in certain cases. In England 
and the United States (i.e. representatives of common law countries) or Germany (a civil law 
country), there are specific statutes for strict liability in accidents. In French law, this 
principle is accepted in tort under Article 1384 of the Civil Code. 
When liability in contract law is studied, it is clear that these changes have taken effect and 
contract of carriage is today based on a presumption of liability. For instance, in the United 
States, the liability is strict and as soon as a breach of contract occurs, the defendant’s 
liability is presumed. Therefore, the legal systems of States have inclined towards a 
presumption of liability and strict liability in order to balance the interests of stakeholders. 
The principle of compensation in legal systems requires full compensation and the removal of 
damage. However, this principle has created problems for both air carriers and passengers in 
air accidents. Therefore, in order to support the development of air carriage and 
compensation, countries have ratified statutes that enabled air carriers to accept the lowest 
insurance. In this way, the parties to a contract of carriage become aware of the probable 
damages and compensation.  
The exemption condition as applied to air carriers has been accepted as a rule in both legal 
systems. Due to air carrier’s highly onerous duty, carriers were allowed to insert exemption 
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conditions to limit or eliminate their liability. However, when economic conditions inclined 
towards the interest of passengers, gradually exemption conditions which were not in favor of 
passengers were recognized as being contrary to the public order. They were held void in the 
United States. In France, they were considered as illegal conditions and were thereby rejected 
by the courts. In England, they were held void by special statutes.  
This shift occurred in private international air law for air carrier’s liability. It can be claimed 
that although the Warsaw Convention 1929 was based on the principles taken from the 
common law and civil law jurisdictions, it provided principles that subsequently affected 
these two systems. As will be discussed, the international system of air carrier’s liability was 
the result of collaboration between member States from the common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a balance between the interests of customers 
and air carriers, member States  disregarded certain principles (on matters such as the 
insertion of exemption conditions, the fault principle and unlimited liability), and accepted 
the international principles (such as the presumption of liability , limited liability and the 
nullification of exemption conditions). This illustrates that the drafters put aside some of their 
own legal principles in order to achieve uniformity in the liability principles for air carriage. 
Now it is clear that the respective legal systems had been flexible enough to accept principles 
that were more suitable for the transportation system and passengers such as the delimitation 
of liability or the nullification of exemption conditions although these were against their legal 
systems. Also they were ready to re-accept principles such as unlimited liability when the 
transport industry gains enough strength. 




1. As the systems distanced themselves from common principles of liability based on fault 
and proceded towards liability based on the presumption of liability, and in some cases 
accepted strict liability through specific Acts, this trend had an impact on air carrier’s liability 
in international instruments such as the Warsaw system and the Montreal Convention1999. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, States had initially accepted the presumption of 
liability instead of fault liability. However, this principle was later developed to the point 
where the States accepted strict liability in the Montreal Convention 1999.  
2. A difference in some of the principles adopted also proves the hypothesis that states 
sometimes neglected their own specific principles for the sake of uniformity in international 
regulations. From this hypothesis, it can be understood that not all international principles are 
similar to those from one legal system, but that in international circumstances, States should 
neglect some of their principles.  
The next chapter will discuss the general principles of liability in the Shariah and Iranian law 
to clarify their similarities and differences with the liability principles in private international 
air law. It discusses the possibility that Iran, in certain cases, can neglect her specific 
principles for the sake of uniformity in international regulations. In other words, although 
Iranian law has its own independent constant principles on compensation that sets limited 
liability for death and bodily injury, these rules may be ignored for the sake of international 
uniformity. This would be in conformity with other jurisdictions that have adopted the same 




LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN IRANIAN AIR TRANSPORTATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Iranian law was codified according to the Shariah and under the influence of the civil law 
system. Before the Civil Code of Iran was written in 1928, the Iranian courts applied the 
Shariah principles and customary law to cases, and there was no written code.1 Since 1928, 
the rules and principles of the Shariah have been applied to civil affairs including tort and 
contract, and have been codified in the Civil Code.2 It was later supplemented by the 
Commercial Code and the Civil Liability Act 1960 which were adopted from civil law.3 
Accidents involving domestic or foreign flights had been governed by these codes, since they 
had been the only enforced laws in this country. Thus if an air accident involving 
international flights was referred to an Iranian court, the court would have to adjudicate the 
case in line with the regulations of the Civil Code for liability and conflict of laws. For issues 
like nationality and personal affairs (such as when determining claimants and their 
beneficiaries), conflict of laws would refer to the claimant’s domicile.4 
In 1985, Iranian legislators passed the Specific Act of 1985 entitled ‘Determining the Scope 
of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights’ that extended limited liability under 
the Warsaw-Hague Convention to domestic flights.5 However, after the Islamic Revolution, 
certain principles that were adopted from the Shariah were also applied to compensation for 
death or bodily injury in the territory of Iran under the Islamic Criminal code.6 This law 
conflicted with limited liability in the Warsaw-Hague provisions when applied on air carrier 
                                                      
1 S.H. Amin, History of Iranian law (Iranashenasi), (1382 A.H. 2002), 346.   
2 Ibid., at 343. 
3 H. Sotodeh Tehrani, Ghanoun -e- Tejarat Vol. V (1385 A.H. 2005), 77-78 
4 See Arts.5-7 of the Civil Code. 
5 Collection of Law and Regulations of Civil Aviation of Iran (1375 A.H. 1996), 125. 
6 See Arts.294-407 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
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liability for death or bodily injury.7 In order to find a solution to this conflict, the principles of 
liability in Iranian law is firstly studied as it is not be possible to understand Iranian law 
without comprehending the Shariah. This chapter therefore begins with a general exploration 
of the Shariah before investigating Iranian law and the impact, which the Shariah has on it 
through codification and the attempts made by the legislatures to make the law Shariah-
compliant. 
It then investigates liability principles in Iranian law. Chapter 3 ends by explaining 
international liability and Iranian law in order to lay the foundation for a discussion of 
liability principles under the Shariah and the Warsaw-Montreal regime in the next Chapter. 
Chapter 4 is designed to understand the conflict between the Shariah and the Warsaw–Hague 
Convention in Iran. 
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Table1. Persian and Arabic transliteration of technical terms 
Arabic Persian 
‘aqd (s) uqūd (pl) aqd (s) uqood (pl)  
āqil (s)‘uqala (pl) āqel (s) uqala (pl) 
‘āqilah Āqele 
‘aql aql  
‘ibādah (s)   ‘ibādat (pl) ebādat (s)  ebādāt (pl)   
‘ilm al usūl elm-e-osul 
āfāt samawiyah afāt-e-samāvi 
al-ahkām al-taklifiyah ahkām-e-taklifi 
al-ahkām al-waz‘iyah ahkām-e-vazei 
Ali ibn abi Talib Ali-ebn-e-abi Taleb 
al-ijara ejāreh 
al-itlāf mubasharatūn etlāf -be-mobāsherat 
al-itlāf tasabbūban etlāf -be-tasbib 
al-qatl al ‘amd Qatl-e-amd 
al-qatl al-khata’ Qatl-e-khataii 
al-qatl shibh amd Qatl-e-shebh-e-amd 
amanat       amānat   
amin amin 




Diyah diyeh  





hukm (s)  ahkām (pl) hokm (s) ahkām (pl) 
ijma‘ ejmā  
ijtihād ejtehād 
Ithna ‘Ashariah Esnā Ashari 
itlāf etlāf 
J‘fari Jafari  
Jaf‘ar al-sadiq Jafar-e-Sadeq  
makrūh (s) makrūhūn (pl) makrouh (s) makrouhāt (pl) 
mandūb or mustahab mostahab 
mubāh (s) mubāhāt (pl) mobāh (s) mobāhāt (pl) 
mubashrat (s) mubasharatūn (pl) mobasherāt 
mughallazah moghallezeh 
muğtahid or mujtahid     mojtahed  





qisas   Qesas 
Qur’ān Qorān   
ra‘ y Ray 
Safawi  Safaviyyeh  
Shafi‘i Shāfei  
Sharī‘ah  Shariyat   
Shi‘a  Shieh  
sunnah sonnat  
Sunni Sonni  
surah  sureh  
talaf talaf  
usūl al-fiqh Osul-e-feqh 
vecalat vekalat 
wāğib (s) wāğibat (pl) vājeb (s) vajebāt (pl) 
waqf vaqf  
wasiyat vasiyat  
 
Since this study focuses on the Iranian legal system, the legal terminology and certain proper names will be 
transliterated from Persian to how they are pronounced by the legal community in this country. Although these 
terms come from the Shariah and the Arabic language, they have undergone changes in the Persian phonetic 
system. In spite of the fact that both languages use the same writing system, i.e. Aramaic alphabet, their sound 
systems are different. For instance Arabic has a [‘] sound for letter (‘ayn) in words like Sharī‘ah and Shi‘a that 
does not exist in the Persian sound system.  Therefore although this letter (‘) exists in the written form of 
borrowed words from Arabic, it does not have a phonetic representation in the articulated words in Persian. 
There are, of course, other features like their vowel systems that distinguish the Persian and Arabic sound 
systems. 
For the sake of those who might be familiar with Arabic pronunciation of these terms, the author provides a 
transliteration of Persian and Arabic pronunciations in table 1. However, he preserves the English spelling for 
Quran, Shariah, Diyah, Shia and Sunni throughout the study since these are more familiar to the western 




3.2 The Shariah  
Muslims differ as to what exactly the Shariah entails. Different schools of Islamic thought 
hold different views of the Shariah.8 Two major branches of Islam are Sunni9 and Shia,10 
which have their followers in different States 11. In this research, the Shariah is only studied 
from the perspective of the esnā-ashari jurisprudence (Twelver Shia school) because this is 
the tradition followed in Iran. 
According to the constitutional code of Iran, firstly, the official religion of Iran is Islam and 
the Twelver Jafari school,12 and this principle will remain eternally immutable.13 Secondly, 
all civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other 
laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and 
generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations.14 
Thirdly, the Parliament cannot enact laws contrary to principles and regulations of the official 
                                                      
8 M.H. Kamali,  Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (1990), 6-15. 
9 There are four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (feqh). These are Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanbali. The 
modern scholars look at these schools as jus commune. In terms of methodology, two schools of thought 
existed. First, there were those who maintained that the free use of human reasoning to develop the law was both 
legitimate and necessary. These jurists were called the people of ray or methodologists and later came to be the 
Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools. Secondly, there were those who advocated the exclusive authority of precedents and 
traditions of the Prophet. They were called the traditionalists, who later represented the Maliki and Hanbali 
schools. See W. B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005), at 157; C.G. Weeramantry, 
Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (1988), 49-54. 
10 The Shias are those who followed Ali ebn -e- abi Taleb, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. Its name derived 
from the Arabic for shiat Ali, i.e. ‘the party of Ali’. Shia has three major subdivisions as well as numerous 
offshoots. The majority is called Esnā Ashari (Twelver Shia), because they recognize 12 Imams, beginning with 
Imam Ali. It is believed that the 12th Imam disappeared in 873 but will return as the Mahdi (literally meaning 
guide). Twelver Shia became the state religion of Persia (Iran) under the Safaviyyeh dynasty in the 16th century. 
Imam Jafar -e- Sadeq, the sixth Shia Imam, in rejecting the Abbasid political sponsorship, put forward his own 
ideological and philosophical viewpoint as the Shia school, and asserted that the leadership of the Muslim 
community was vested in Imams personally, as direct descendents of the Prophet. Therefore, the Iranians 
consider themselves Twelver Jafari School. M.B. al-Sadr, The Emergence of Shi‘ism and the Shi‘ites: in  
http://www.islamicecenter.com. 
11 H.P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. (2007), 199-201. 
12 See footnote 10, supra. 
13 See Art. 12 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
14 See Art. 4 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
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religion of the country.15 Fourthly, the judge is bound to endeavor to judge each case based 
on the codified law. In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgment 
based on authoritative Islamic sources and authentic opinions of prominent foqahā (learned 
Islamic Jurists). He, on the pretext of the silence of or deficiency of law in the matter, or its 
brevity or contradictory nature, cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases and 
delivering his judgment.16 
3.2.1 Definition of the Shariah 
There are diverse and overlapping definitions in the way the term Shariah is used in the 
scholarly literature. They have delicate differences that need to be clarified. For the purposes 
of this study, three technical terms will be elaborated. These are the Shariah in general, the 
Shariah as Islamic jurisprudence, and the Shariah as Islamic law. 
1. Generally, the Shariah is the code of conduct or religious law of Islam and is deemed as 
God’s law.17 The Shariah is derived from the holy text revealed to the Prophet Mohammad, 
known as the Quran. Muslims, from two verses of the Quran, believe that it is necessary for 
those who desire to obey God and to be loved by Him to follow the Shariah as introduced 
and practiced by the Holy Prophet and his true followers.18 Muslims use the term ‘Shariah’ to 
refer to these divinely inspired spiritual and worldly commandments, which cover actions of 
worship and behavior, as well as social and commercial transactions.19  
2. Islamic jurisprudence as the Shariah is an effort to comprehend God’s law with great 
precision by foqahā. Islamic jurisprudence is a chain of things that must exist, rather than a 
                                                      
15 See Art. 72 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
16 See Art. 167 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
17 M. Motahari, Jurisprudence and Its Principles: An Introduction to Islamic Sciences (1368 A.H. 1989), 21. 
18 In the holy Quran, the holy Prophet is told ‘then we appointed you the religious-law (the Shariah) guide under 
our command, so follow the command.’(45:18) and in another place the prophet is told to convey to his 
followers: ‘if you truly love Allah, then follow me in order that Allah be affectionate to you.’ (3:31). 
19 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 21 
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chain of things, which already exist.20 Islamic jurisprudence, which includes Islamic sources, 
the principles of jurisprudence (osul-e-feqh) and Islamic science (feqh),21 is the field of study 
that fulfils this purpose.22 
Since it is possible to refer, in particular ways, to the documents or sources of Islamic law 
and extract erroneous deductions, as opposed to the actual view of the Shariah, essentially 
there should be a special field of study that enables scholars to discern the correct and valid 
method of using the sources of Islamic law.23 Islamic jurisprudence therefore becomes the 
reference point for deducing and extracting the laws of Islam by means of reasoning and 
through the guidance provided by God through the Prophet.24 The Shariah as Islamic 
jurisprudence not only involves clear and explicit Quranic text and the Prophet’s example,25 
but also includes the intellectual efforts of the foqahā in deducing or finding rulings 
whereupon the foundational text is silent or has not been explicit.26  
3. Islamic law as the Shariah includes laws and regulations that are codified by Islamic States 
as contemporary legal terminology requires. The broad scope of the Shariah and Islamic 
jurisprudence makes it impossible for the concept to be compared with the term ‘law’ as used 
and understood in contemporary legal scholarship. If law is thought of as a body of binding 
rules for a community, the Shariah includes law and much else besides law. It would 
therefore be misleading to equate the Shariah with law.27 Hence, in order to compare the 
Shariah with law, this needs to be narrowed down to topics that cover the social and 
commercial relations in a State. For the purposes of this study, the above limited topics are 
                                                      
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., at 22. 
22 H. Modarressi Tabatabaei, An Introduction to Shia Law (1984), 6-9. 
23 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 23. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 N. Coulsom, Conflicts and Tension in Islamic Jurisprudence (1961), at 23. 
27 B. G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (1998), 17. 
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termed as Islamic law. Therefore, this thesis explores the Shariah from the perspective of 
contemporary legal scholarship, i.e. the Shariah as applied by Islamic States in codifying 
their laws. 
3.2.2 Islamic Jurisprudence  
Adopting the above definition, this thesis will explore the Shariah from the perspective of 
Shia jurisprudence. For this purpose, it refers to the main Islamic sources and books of the 
prominent Shia scholars. It introduces the four main sources of Islamic law before explaining 
the principles of jurisprudence and the classification of jurisprudence. It is worth noting that 
they are the main tools for judges and Islamic legislatures. This discussion will lead to a 
better understanding of the subject matters of subsequent chapters.  
3.2.2.1 Islamic Sources  
There are four main sources of Islamic law, with varying degrees of emphasis, common to all 
schools of law. These four sources of Shia jurisprudence are the Quran; the Sunnah; ejmā; 
and aql.28  
(i) The Quran 
There is no doubt that the Holy Quran is the primary source of Islamic laws and regulations.29 
However, the ayat or verses of this book are not limited to laws and regulations. Further, 
although it covers certain substantive legal rules, the Quran does not concern itself with all 
the diversified and detailed requirements of the law.30 It comprises 114 chapters (surehs). 
Each chapter is made up of a different number of verses. Hundreds of different types of 
                                                      
28 M.R. Muzaffar, usūl -e- Fiqh (1365 A.H 1986), at 104. 
29 Ibid., at 42-60. 
30 Ibid, and See M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The Islamic Criminal Justice System (1982), 129. 
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issues were introduced in them but only a part of the Quran, about five hundred verses from a 
total of six thousand six hundred and sixty (i.e. roughly a thirteenth of the Quran), pertains to 
laws.31 
(ii) The Sunnah (Tradition) 
When there was no explicit Quranic verse on a particular point, Muslims resorted to the 
Sunnah, which was originally taken as the prevailing Arabian customary law. As time passed, 
the notion of Sunnah became more restricted and it was finally taken to be confined to the 
traditions of the Prophet. In this way, the second source of law, i.e. the Sunnah developed. 
The Sunnah means the words, actions and assertions of the Prophet.32 That is, where a certain 
law had been verbally explained by him, or how he performed certain religious obligation, or 
where others had performed certain religious duties in his presence in a way, which earned 
his blessing and approval. Foqahā would consider the action to be the actual law of Islam.33 
The traditions, having received the status of a source of law, were preserved in writing. In 
Islamic law, the Sunnah ranks second after the Quran as a source of law.34 
(iii) Ejmā (Consensus of Opinion) 
Consensus means the unanimous view of the Islamic jurists on a particular issue.35 Consensus 
is binding, because if all Muslims have one view, there is a presumption that the view has 
been received from the Prophet. It is impossible for all Muslims to share the same view on a 
                                                      
31 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 26.   
32 S.H. Amin, Islamic law and Its implications for the Modern World (1989), 2. 
33 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 26. 
34 See Amin, supra note 32, at 10-11. 
35 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 28. 
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matter, thus their consensus proves that the origin of that view is the Sunnah of the Prophet or 
an Imam.36  
If at any time a consensus is reached on a particular issue among all Islamic jurists, with no 
exception, it will bind people of that time era. However, it is not binding on subsequent 
Islamic jurists.37 Thus, consensus is not genuinely binding in its own right. Rather, it is 
binding inasmuch as it is a means of discovering the Sunnah.38 
(iv) Aql (Judicial Reasoning) 
What is reasonable is law and what is law is reasonable, i.e. every individual rule of law has 
its own rationality.39 When in a given instance there is not any authority either in the textual 
source or in consensus, the subject of the law is required to do what human reasoning 
commands in the circumstances.40 An Islamic jurist has to first search the Quran, then the 
Sunnah, and only afterwards the consensus to find out the rules applicable to a case before 
him. If there is not an appropriate legal authority or the texts are not clear enough, he is 
authorized to apply an accepted principle or an assumption, which according to his wisdom 
and knowledge might fit the problem best.41 Aql is accepted as a supplementary source of 
law.42  
The binding testimony of reason means that if in a set of circumstances reason has a clear 
rule, then that rule, because it is definite and absolute, is binding. The true and divine points 
of Islamic law exist independently in the divine knowledge, and Islamic jurists may or may 
                                                      
36 See Amin, supra note 32, at 21. 
37 Ibid. 
38 A.H. Mohammadi, Osul-e- Estenbat -e- Hoqooq -e- Islami (1385A.H. 2006), 201. 
39 See Amin, supra note 32, at 11. 
40 Such instances of using human reasoning in the course of making judicial decision include the case where if 
textual sources demand a given performance, the human reasoning would resolve that all the prerequisites for 
such a performance are also obligatory. Ibid., at 12. 
41 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
42 Ibid., at 32. 
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not arrive at the same.43 Closely connected to the notion of human reasoning is the unity 
between aql and the Shariah as a whole. They are necessarily linked, especially in the sense 
that legal rules made by aql must be regarded as parts of the Shariah and people must obey 
them. The task of jurisprudence is mainly the vindication of the conviction of full agreement 
between law and reason, rejecting disagreement between them.44  
As mentioned above, aql is a supplementary source of law in Islam. Where there is no 
explicit discussion about a particular matter in the Quran and the Sunnah, Islamic legislators 
and foqahā use this source to develop legal rules in accordance with the Quran and the 
Sunnah, to regulate social relations. Thus, its function is limited either to interpret the exact 
meaning of the Quran on the one hand, or to work out appropriate legal solutions when there 
is no provision in other sources of Islamic law on a specific issue.45  
Islamic legislators and foqahā should observe the Quran and the Sunnah when providing 
their opinions. For instance, because there is no specific rule in the Quran for carriage by air, 
they who establish rules in this regard need to observe Islamic resources. Since air carrier 
liability principles are derived from general liability principles, the following section will 
discuss the general rules governing liability in the Shariah.46 
3.2.2.2 Principles of Jurisprudence (osul -e-feqh) 
The osul-e-feqh assists the study of the rules used in theorizing the Shariah.47 Since it is 
possible to refer, in particular ways, to the documents or sources of Islamic law and extract 
erroneous deductions, as opposed to the real view of the Shariah, essentially there should be 
                                                      
43 M. Ansari, Farā’id al-Usūl Vol. I (1407A.H. 1986), 270-271. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Believing in human reasoning (ejtehād) as a supplementary source of law, the Shia jurists utilized their 
juristic reasoning continuously. See Motahari, supra note 17, at 44. 




a special field of study that enables the foqahā to discern the correct and valid method of 
using the sources of the Shariah.48 Therefore, the principles of jurisprudence is, in reality, the 
study of the rules to be used in deducing the Shariah and it teaches us the correct and valid 
way of deducing from relevant sources in jurisprudence.49 
The most prominent person in Shia school, to have compiled books on principles and whose 
views were discussed for centuries is Mortaza’ Alam al Huda (who died in 436 A.H.). His 
most well-known work was the al-Dhariyah.50 The approach introduced by him has been 
followed by the foqahā to the present day. 
3.2.2.3 Classification of Jurisprudential Issues (feqh) 
Feqh as such is the end product of osul-e-feqh. It is concerned with the knowledge of the 
detailed rules of the Shariah in its various branches, in other words, it is the law itself.51 The 
domain of jurisprudence is extremely wide. It contains all issues for which Islam provides 
instructions. The term ‘feqh’ is the extensive, profound knowledge of Islamic instructions and 
realities and has no special relevance to any particular division.52 However, it gradually came 
to be especially applied to the profound understanding of the Shariah.53  
Shariah teaching has been divided into three parts: 1) the realities and beliefs, 2) morality and 
self-perfection, and 3) the law and issues of actions. Islamic jurisprudence has termed this last 
division feqh. Since the early days of Islam, the laws have probably attracted the most 
attention and queries.54  
                                                      
48 See Kamali, supra note 8, at 12. 
49 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 22. 
50 Ibid., at 12. 
51 See Kamali, supra note 8, at 12. 
52 Ibid. 




Foqahā have divided divine laws into the law of human duty (ahkām-e-taklifi) and the law of 
human status (ahkām-e-vazei). The laws of duty include those duties, which contain 
obligations (vājebāt), prohibitions (moharamāt), desirables (mostahabat), undesirables 
(makrouhāt), and permissibles (mobāhāt). The laws regarding status differ from the laws 
regarding duty. The former consists of ‘do's’ and ‘don'ts’, commands and prohibitions, or the 
giving of permissions; while the latter concerns status like marriage and ownership and the 
rights thereof.55 
The famous Shia books classify all issues of jurisprudence into four parts: worship, unilateral 
and bilateral contracts one-party contracts, and ahkām. If they are of the first type, like prayer 
and fasting, they are termed in jurisprudence as worship (ebādat).56 If an act depends upon 
the execution of a contract, the contract could be unilateral or bilateral. Bilateral contracts 
like selling and hire, deposit are called aqd.57 Acts that do not depend upon the execution of a 
special contract, like inheritance, punishments, and compensation are termed ahkām.58 The 
basis of liability for death or bodily injury and damage should be studied under principles and 
regulations of ahkām in Twelve Shia school. Ahkām regarding liability in the Shariah in 
Iranian law will be discussed below. 
3.3 Iranian Law  
The Constitutional Code is the most important legal text that establishes Iran as an Islamic 
Republic that implements the Shariah.59 An Islamic government is not like any other 
government in the contemporary era. It is a regime of Caliphate and Imamate exclusively 
                                                      
55 Ibid. 
56 See Kamali, supra note 8, at 42. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Motahari, supra note 17, at 36. 
59 See Art. 4 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
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defined by the Islam. Although its people exercise their right by participating in the shaping 
of legislature power, God’s right is observed by accepting Islamic principles as the base of 
government.60  
On the one hand, God created people and send Messengers to guide them. On the other hand, 
people have the free will to choose the right path or not.61 The Islamic government receives 
its legitimacy from the people. Constitutionally, therefore, people are at the top of the power 
hierarchy pyramid in Iran. Thus, the nature of legislation and sovereignty in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is based on divine and human foundations.62 
The Constitutional Code has accepted the separation of powers among the Legislature, the 
Judiciary, and the Executive. Each is responsible for a part of government and implements its 
duties through its related organizations.63 Although it seems that power should be restricted to 
those three bodies, a close look at the other articles of the Constitutional Code reveals other 
sources that are independent of the three powers.64 In addition to the three powers, those 
sources also have a right to draft legislation.65 
3.3.1 The Multiplicity of Islamic Legislatures 
Before the Islamic Revolution, there were solely two legislative bodies: the National 
Parliament and the Senate. However, since the Shariah became a fundamental principle in the 
Iranian jurisdiction for all laws and regulations after the revolution,66 the Constitutional Code 
consequently envisaged different means of supervision in its aim to make the law Shariah-
                                                      
60 See the Preamble of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
61 The holy Quran, Sureh 76:2-3. 
62 See Art.56 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
63 See Arts.57, 58, 60, 61, 156 and 174 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
64 These bodies are the Councils, the national radio and television organization, the national Security Council 
and the Expediency Council (See Arts. 7, 75, 176 and 112 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran). 
65 M. Nasiri,Tafkik -e- Ghova dar Jomhouri -e- Islami -e- Iran (1380 A.H. 2002), 35-72. 
66 See Art.4 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
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compliant. This is because, in the post-Revolution era, in addition to the fact that laws had to 
be in conformity with the Shariah, other entities were established alongside the Parliament 
that have rights equal to legislation and their opinions affect existing laws.  
Due to the structure of the Constitutional Code, several legislatures have key roles in the field 
of air transport industry. Some of them are directly involved in the legislative process such as 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) which enacts necessary regulations for the 
operation of air transport in Iran. Others, such as the Guardian Council of the Constitution, 
the Leader (velayate faqih), and foqahā, have crucial and key roles in the process of 
codification and interpretation of laws and regulations, especially those relating to air 
transportation and air carrier liability. Indeed, their impact has always been greater in these 
areas than in ordinary laws. This led to a multiplicity of legislative bodies.  
In order to understand the process of making the law Shariah-compliant, it is necessary to be 
acquainted with the multiplicity of Islamic legislatures in the post-Revolution era.  
3.3.1.1 The Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Parliament) 
The State’s legislature works through the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Its enactments, 
after fulfilling legal procedures, are submitted to the executive and judiciary for 
implementation.67 The Constitutional Code has set specific duties for the Legislature. These 
can be summed up as legislation and supervision.68 The Parliament, together with the 
Guardian Council, makes up the Legislature. The former has the responsibility to enact laws 
and regulations. The latter is responsible for supervising the compatibility of these laws and 
regulations with Islam and the Constitutional Code.69 
                                                      
67 See Art.64 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
68 See Arts.58, 71, 88 and 89 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
69 J. Madani, Hoqooq- e- Asasi (1382 A.H. 2000), 16. 
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Chapter 5 of the Constitutional Code deals with Legislature through the Parliament.70 The 
Parliament cannot enact laws, which are contrary to the principles and rules of the Shariah or 
the Constitution.71  
By referring to Islamic jurisprudence, the Parliament paraphrases these principles into 
contemporary language with a formal format, in order to provide clear and straight forward 
regulations applicable to daily life. Thus, besides the public interest, the Parliament should 
observe Islamic principles and the Constitutional Code, which are regarded as the most 
important public interest. Observing these limits is obligatory, as the enactments cannot 
otherwise be put into practice.72 
In relation to its general duties and the heavy workload involved in enacting laws and 
regulations, the Parliament has established permanent and temporary commissions. 
Representatives for these commissions are selected based on their backgrounds and 
specialties, and the State’s priorities at any particular point in time.73 There are different 
commissions in the Parliament. Every commission consists of a number of representatives 
who carry out the preliminary research for the codification of regulations on different issues, 
and present them to the general sessions of the Parliament for final discussions and 
approval.74 The Transport and Civil Commissions are responsible for air transport. They 
affect the transport industry in two ways:75  
                                                      
70 Another legislative method is through a referendum but this rarely happens. See S.M. Hashemi, Hoqooq -e-
Asasi Jomhouri Islami Iran Vol. II (1371 A.H. 1993), 105. 
71 See Art.72 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See Art.34 of the Assembly’s Internal Code of Conduct. 




1. The Transport commission has a pivotal role in the approving or disapproving of Bills 
related to air transport such as bilateral air transport agreements, and laws relating to air 
carriers. 
2. In the case of an air accident, the Civil Commission instantly participates in and supervises 
the procedure of the investigation. The commission is diligent in finding the causes of 
accident, and follows up with payment of compensation to injured parties. 
3.3.1.2 The Leader (velayat-e-faqih) 
The Leader stands above the three organs of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
Constitutional Code clearly recognizes his power over all the aforementioned three powers in 
all sectors and organizations, and explains his rights and responsibilities.76  
These rights and responsibilities reflect the system and its approach towards leadership. In 
Iran, the Leader, as a religious leader, enjoys enormous power. He is at the pinnacle of the 
governmental pyramid,77 and, as the Constitutional Code makes clear, his orders are legally 
binding.78 The Leader has executive, legislative, confirming, and judiciary dominance over 
the affairs of the society through the three organs of power and other entities. In other words, 
the governing powers in the Islamic Republic of Iran act under his control.79 
Therefore, the Leader can apply his opinion to the society directly or indirectly. Based on the 
Shariah and the Constitutional Code, the Leader enjoys such a superior position that he can 
shape laws and regulations, and instructs the three organs of power to carry out their duties, 
                                                      
76 See Art.110 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran 
77 The Leader is a clergy (faqih) who is just and pious, and possesses a clear political vision to lead the Muslim 
community. See Art. 109 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
78 See Hashemi, supra note 70, at 57. 
79 See Art.157of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
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in accordance with his opinion. This has supposedly affected air carrier liability through one 
of the following ways: 
1. The Leader directly appoints the head of the judiciary, whereas the Islamic scholars are 
sitting in the Guardian Council for specific periods. He also issues decrees for legislative and 
political referenda, and asks the National Expediency Council to resolve national problems 
which cannot be solved in the ordinary manner.80  
2. When the Leader issues a governmental order, the three organs and other entities in Iran 
have to obey it. The order is considered as a guarantee for preserving Islamic social order and 
ranks as basic orders. The Decree for the establishment of the Expediency Council and the 
decree for the revision of the Constitutional Code, although earlier disqualified by the 
Guardian Council, are instances of governmental orders issued by the present Leader of 
Iran.81 
3. The Leader can also indirectly affect the judgments of courts through his opinion. 
According to Islamic jurisprudence and the Constitutional Code of Iran, the Leader issues his 
decrees or opinions (fatva) for his followers.82 When a case is referred to a court, the judge 
refers to ordinary law and regulations. However, when there is no clear-cut law in that regard, 
the court issues a judgment in accordance with authentic Islamic sources or authoritative 
religious decrees. As a result, although judges have the freedom to refer to any decree, they 
would usually prefer the opinion of the Leader, as he is considered highly knowledgeable of 
the requirements and circumstances of the time.  
The case of equality or inequality for compensation payable to Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the Islamic Criminal Code for death or bodily injury caused by air accidents is one such case. 
                                                      
80 See Art.110 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
81 See Art.109 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
82 M.B. al-Sadr, The Renewal of Islamic Law (1993), 59-79. 
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This is a matter which is not directly mentioned in the law, i.e. there is no decisive source in 
Islamic jurisprudence in this regard. There is one opinion saying that compensation for 
Muslims and non-Muslims is different, in that the compensation for non-Muslims is half of 
that for Muslims.83 However, there is another opinion, which coincides with the Leader’s 
opinion, which states that there is no difference between the compensation for Muslims and 
non-Muslims, and they should be paid equally. In such cases, the courts prefer to apply the 
decree of the Leader when issuing their orders.84  
3.3.1.3 The Guardian Council of the Constitution 
The Constitutional Code introduced the Guardian Council and defined a crucial role for it to 
monitor the conformity of laws with the Shariah. Laws and regulations that are approved 
through the parliamentary process are officially sent to the Guardian Council.85 The main 
difference between this Council and other institutions, which are responsible for supervising 
the conformity of ordinary laws with Constitutional Codes, is that the Guardian Council, in 
addition to carrying out this duty, also ensures that they comply with Islamic principles.86  
The Guardian Council has a dual composition.87 It consists of six Islamic scholars (faqih-e-
adel) who are just and aware of the present needs of the society and are selected by the 
Leader; and six legal experts who are qualified in different branches of the law and are 
chosen by the Parliament from among the law experts introduced by the head of the 
judiciary.88 This dual composition therefore enables the Guardian Council to ensure that the 
                                                      
83 Ibid. 
84 J. Boshehri, Hoqooq - e- Asasi (1382 A.H. 2004), 15. 
85 See Art. 94 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
86 See Arts.72, 85, 94 and 96 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
87 See Art.4 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 




legislations passed by the Parliament conform to both Islamic principles and the 
Constitutional Code.  
If the Guardian Council finds an enactment do not conform with the Shariah, the Council 
returns it to the Parliament for review. As long as the Parliament has not modified the 
legislation according to the comments received from the Guardian Council, it is not 
considered a law.89  
It is believed that Article 4 of the Constitutional Code covers all laws and regulations in the 
country, both past and present. The phrase ‘all laws and regulations’ has no limitation, either 
from the perspective of legal hierarchy (constitutional, ordinary, regulations) or time 
framework (past, present, future).90 By applying this broad interpretation, the Guardian 
Council can revise pre-Revolution laws and regulations. Hence, the council is able to declare 
which laws and regulations are contrary to the Shariah in case they are referred to the 
Council or when the Council itself investigates them.91 However, the author is of the opinion 
that it is possible to infer that this Article does not cover past laws and regulations because 
the Article is a general one which makes no reference to previous legislations. Therefore, the 
scope of the Article had to be limited to subsequent parliamentary legislations. 
According to the Constitutional Code, the Guardian Council is responsible for interpreting 
the Constitutional Code as well as to ensure that laws are in conformity with it. However, the 
Council has interfered with many ordinary laws, rules and regulations by providing its 
interpretations. Although an interpretation of the law is not legislation, any interpretation has 
its own consequences. Besides, the text of law can be interpreted differently. Whilst 
                                                      
89 F. Hedayatnia and M.H. Kaviani, Barresi Hhoqooqi -e- Shoraye Negahban  (1375 A.H. 1997), 56. 
90 S.M. Khamenei, ‘Asl -e- Chahar -e- Ghanon -e- Asasi’, (1369 A.H. 1990) IX Kanon Vokala Journal 145, at 
152. 
91 The Opinion of Guardian Council No.1360/2/8-1983. 
109 
  
interpretations offered by the Guardian Council on articles of the Constitutional Code or 
ordinary law do not play a direct role in legislation, new rules may be established or the 
applicability of an existing one can be limited or expanded, which is in fact the establishment 
of a right or a responsibility or a special rule.92 
Even after the Parliament ratifies a law and it enters into force, the Guardian Council may 
interpret parts of that law by issuing notes or questions to parliamentary members or 
governmental bodies. For example, when the Council examined the Act, which determines 
the liability of air carriers against the Islamic Criminal Code, it implicitly noted that the Act 
was contrary to Islamic principles. As a result, some courts accepted this interpretation as law 
and made their decisions accordingly.93  
The author is of the opinion that these interpretations can reverse legal cases, and cause non-
uniformity in judicial decisions on air carrier liability for passenger’s death or bodily injury.94 
Some courts still apply laws that were declared by the Guardian Council to be contrary to 
Islamic principles, arguing that the overturning of a law is the right of the Parliament, while 
others refer to the Council’s interpretation in their decisions. Accepting the interpretation as 
law is contrary to the explicit text of several articles of the Constitutional Code. It therefore 
seems that the limits of Article 4 of the Constitutional Code are vague and are in need of 
clarification.95 
                                                      
92 M. Rahnama, Maraje Ghanongzari dar Iran (1380 A.H. 2002), 132-138. 
93 Ibid. 
94 See Chr. 4.3.2, infra. 
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After the Revolution, laws that were not in conflict with the Shariah were left intact. 
Prominent among these is the Civil Code whose regulations related to carriage and the 
principles of liability, and had most of its contents adopted from the Shariah in any event. 
The same is true for the Commercial Code and the Civil Liability Act; while they have been 
adopted from secular Western codes they fulfill the demands of technological developments. 
The following section discusses private laws and regulations including liability; it has two 
parts. 1) Laws directly adopted from the Shariah such as the principles of liability in tort and 
contractual liability in the Civil Code and compensation in the Islamic Criminal Code, which 
includes air carrier liability; 2) other laws such as the Commercial Code and the Civil 
Liability Act, which was adopted from the civil law system.  
3.3.2.1 Laws Directly Adopted from the Shariah 
(i) The Iranian Civil Code 
The Civil Code in Iran has been ratified during three legislation rounds.99 Since the first 
drafters were familiar with the French culture, they called it the Civil Code. Generally, the 
Civil Code of Iran is based on the Shariah and many parts (such as liability and contract of 
carriage) are direct translations of Islamic source books.100 Although the Civil Code was 
codified before the Revolution, it is based on principles that cannot be easily understood 
                                                      
99 Articles 1 to 955 were ratified in May 1928; articles 956 to 1206 were ratified in the 9th period; and articles 
1207 to 1335 were ratified in the 10th period. Some of these articles were amended in 1982 by the Judiciary 
Commission of the Parliament.  M.J. Langeroudi, Terminology of Law, (1377 A.H. 1998), 268. 
100 The main references of the Civil Code for the special contract section had been the famous Shia books such 
as al-Sharai‘, Sharh al-Lum‘ah, Javahir al-Kalām and al-Makasib in Shia Jurisprudence, and their 
interpretations. For foreign laws, they especially had an eye on the French civil law. Therefore the article related 
to special contracts was almost entirely adapted from Shia Jurisprudence and most of the articles from 
introduction and property division into movable and immovable, benefit, exploitation and easement rights and 




unless the Shariah is closely studied. Hence, in addition to the Islamic Criminal Code, one 
should refer to the Civil Code, which is also based on Islamic jurisprudence. 
The Civil Code was the most popular law in Iran, and most of its provisions respect its 
religious basis and the country’s custom.101 However, it was recognized that the Shariah 
alone was not sufficient for the Civil Code, as there are needs that arise in society that would 
benefit from the experiences of other systems. The Civil Code was influenced by continental 
law. It adopted legal principles from France, Switzerland and Belgium especially those 
relating to the formal issues of codification.102 
The Civil Code contains two articles about transport under the title of rent of carrier.103 This 
title has a historical background. In the past, people let their vehicles out to businessmen, so 
transport in the Shariah and the Civil Code is discussed under this title. This study focuses on 
two issues in contract of carriage and the basis of carrier liability in the Civil Code104 because 
although these were modified in subsequent laws, these articles are still in force. 
(ii) The Islamic Criminal Code (ICC)105 
After the Islamic Revolution in 1978, the first piece of law, which was passed by the 
Parliament in relation to liability for death or bodily injury in 1982, was the Criminal Code. It 
                                                      
101 According to article 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, the courts in Iran are obliged to pass judgments in 
conformity with the law. Where existing laws are unclear, ambiguous, and contradictory or no law applies to a 
particular case, the court must decide according to the spirit of the law as determined by custom. Custom is a 
practice that is habitually followed over a long period. It may be practiced in a particular locality, country or 
countries; Custom in Iranian jurisprudence is a practice that is habitually followed over a long time in Iran. Ibid., 
at 422. 
102 N. Katuzian, Maseoliat -e- Madani dar Moqararat -e- Hoqooqi -e- Akhir (1381 A.H. 2003), 18-20. 
103 See Arts. 516 and 517 of the Civil Code. 
104 See 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.4.1, infra.   
105 After the Islamic Revolution, the first Code with regard to Islamic punishment was passed by the Assembly 
on October 13, 1982. That was a tentative Code for a period of 5 years. Then, in 1996, the period was extended 
for another 10 years - the Discretionary Punishment Code was ratified on May 27, 1996 and was added to 




was revised in 1991.106 It contained 497 Articles. The Discretionary Punishment Act was 
ratified in 1996 and added to the Islamic Criminal Code. Ever since, the Islamic Criminal 
Code has been applied to matters concerning compensation and liability for death or bodily 
injury. This Code has benefitted from the view of a majority of the foqahā.107  
The Islamic Criminal Code of Iran consists of two parts. The general part deals with common 
aspects of crimes with a first chapter called ‘General Criminal Act’.108 The second part, which 
deals with crime classifications and their punishments, is called the Exclusive Criminal Act. 
The provisions of the Exclusive Criminal Act are in accordance with the Shariah principles 
such as prescribed punishment, retaliation, compensation, or discretionary punishment.109 The 
Act explains each crime separately. It outlines their definitions, interpretations, legal 
characteristics, exclusive elements and respective punishments.110 Crimes dealt with under 
this Act include murder, manslaughter and unintentional homicide. 
Undoubtedly, the worst crimes involving bodily injury are those that result in the death of a 
victim. When an (air) accident causes death or bodily injury to passengers, the case will be 
referred to the criminal courts. The Exclusive Criminal Code will be applied in the case of 
death or bodily injury.111 The Code deals with issues such as the principles of civil and 
                                                      
106 The first exclusive criminal regulation was the law of retaliation and its regulation of 1982 that were passed 
by the Judiciary Commission of the Parliament. After careful and lengthy examinations and discussions, this law 
was approved in July 1991.It replaced the regulations in Chapter one of Book Three of the General Criminal 
Code 1925. 
107 See Sadeqi, supra note 105, at 15.  
108 This branch of law includes the general field of criminal law and deals with issues and rules covering all 
crimes such as the limits of criminal liability, mitigation and suspension of punishment, probation, and 
recidivism. See I. Golduzian, Hoqooq -e-Jazay -e- Ekhtesasi (1375 A.H.1996), 7-10. 
109 See Art.1 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
110 See Sadeqi, supra note 105, at 15.   
111 See 4.3, infra. 
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criminal liability in the event of death or bodily injury, and the types of compensation 
available.112 
In Iran, carrier’s liability for passenger’s death or bodily injury is discussed under a specific 
kind of homicide called quasi-intentional killing (ghatl dar hokm-e-shebh-e-amd). This new 
term, is in fact a mixture of civil liability (compensation) and consolidated Islamic criminal 
liability (quasi-intentional homicide and unintentional homicide). This kind of killing (or 
bodily injury) occurs because of negligence, carelessness, or non-observance of related 
regulations, in such a fashion that if the regulations would have been observed, no accident 
would have happened.113 
3.3.2.2 Laws Not Directly Adopted from the Shariah. 
(i) The Commercial Code  
The development of various means of transportation and the expansion of trade relations 
require rules so that while transactions are done faster and with fewer formalities, fraud is 
strictly avoided. Whereas the Civil Code was not accountable in this regard, a Commercial 
Code was codified.114 The Commercial Code was ratified in 1932. This law emphasizes some 
provisions of the Civil Code on carriage contracts. On the other hand, it also follows the 
commercial codes of European States, especially France. 
The Commercial Code consists of 16 chapters and includes regulations on different 
commercial affairs such as commercial transactions, transport, and the liabilities and duties of 
                                                      
112 Classification of the act of offender, distinguishing civil liability and compensation from criminal liability, 
and different types of killing will be introduced to determine those issues that merely require civil liability and 
compensation. See 3.4.5.1, infra. 
113 See Art. 295 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
114 Before the Revolution, the Iranian economy was based on capitalism and most of the present trade laws had 
been prepared on that basis. The Islamic Republic respects individual ownership, free trade, and the non- 
interference of the state in commercial affairs. Although some of the old regulations have been amended and 
new ones have been ratified, the original trade law is still in force. See Sadeqi, supra note 105, at 15.   
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carriers. Since the Code should be accountable for new changes, in many cases the legislation 
ratified regulations to respond to the new trade needs.  
The Commercial Code’s Book Eight about transportation contains 18 articles.115 They deal 
with carriage of goods but the book is silent about the carriage of passengers. The legislator 
at that time has not paid attention to the issue of air and maritime carriage.116 However, the 
principles of liability in the Commercial Code are general principles that can be applied to all 
forms of carriage in Iran. The Code explains the duties, obligations, and liabilities of carriers. 
Courts, when dealing with claims relating to all modes of carriage (road, rail, sea and air), 
resort to these provisions if there is no specific statute to that effect.117  
(ii) The Civil Liability Act 1960 
The Civil Liability Act 1960 was adopted from the Civil Code of Germany.118 It contains 16 
articles. The main reason for its codification was that the related laws were not sufficient for 
civil liability and for compensating the losses sustained by people according to socio-
economic demands.119 As a result, the drafters of the Civil Liability Act intended to improve 
tort liability in the Civil Code.120  
The Civil Liability Act 1960 was in fact an attempt to complete the Civil Code. Firstly, the 
Act altered the basis of liability in favor of fault theory.121 Secondly, this Act endorses 
unlimited liability, and recognizes mental injury in the case of death or bodily injury.  
                                                      
115 See Arts.377-394 of the Commercial Code. 
116 See Sotodeh Tehrani, supra note 3, at 77. 
117 See Arts.377-394 of the Commercial Code. 
118 R. Barikloo, Maseoliat -e- Madani ( 1385 A.H. 2007), 31. 
119 E. Shafei Sarvestani, ‘Diyah va Khesarathay -e- Nashi as Sadamat -e- Badani’, (1379 A.H. 2001) Vol. VII 
Pagohesh Va Hozeh 35, at 16. 
120 See R. Barikloo, supra note 118, at 32. 
121 Article 1 of the Act provides that any person who intentionally or negligently hurts life, health, property, 
freedom, reputation, trade fame, or any other right that the law confers on people, in a way that causes material 
or immaterial damage, is liable for his act. Anyone who intentionally or due to his negligence injures or harms 
116 
  
There are two opinions in this regard. Firstly, that this Act was to be abolished by the Islamic 
Criminal Code after the Islamic Revolution. Secondly, that this Act is highly specific and 
complements the Islamic Criminal Code on the principles of liability and compensation.122 If 
the abolishment of the Act is accepted, there is no possibility for unlimited liability and 
recognition of compensation of mental injury for passenger’s death or bodily injury in Iran. If 
the second view were adopted, this would create claims for unlimited liability and 
compensation of mental injury. The former opinion prevails over the latter since the Guardian 
Council declared that compensation for mental injury is contrary to the Shariah. Referring to 
this opinion, courts are reluctant to award damages according to the Civil Liability Act 
1960.123  
It is arguable that this Act is still in force. It was never explicitly abolished by the legislature. 
On their face, provisions of compensation in the Civil Liability Act 1960 are not similar to 
the compensation provisions in the Islamic Criminal Code since the former approves 
unlimited liability, which is closer to justice. It can nevertheless be argued that through other 
general principles of the Shariah such as the la zarar principle,124 which will be discussed in 
the next sub-section, there would be no conflict; hence, unlimited liability could be accepted. 
3.4 Principles of Liability 
 Liability does not feature as an independent topic in Islamic jurisprudence. However, foqahā 
have talked about liability while discussing different contracts such as renting, buying, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
life, health, property, freedom, prestige, the commercial fame of others, or any other right established for 
individuals by virtue of the law, and as a result of that harm the victim sustains material or spiritual loss(es), the 
wrongdoer is liable for compensating damages arising out of his act. See Art.1 of the Civil Liability Act 1960. 
122 See Barikloo, supra note 118, at 55. 
123 See Opinion of the Guardian Council, No. 1168 (1994). And Case No. 245-31-22.3.1366 The Appeal Court. 
124 See 3.4.1, infra. 
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selling and tort such as destruction.125 A review of the liability principles in Islamic law 
shows that foqahā have not followed as a single basis for liability in all cases. They have 
adopted different bases of liability such as, fault, presumed fault, or strict liability. In Islamic 
jurisprudence, human relations are made up in such a variety that it is impossible to gather all 
of them under one principle like fault. For liability to arise, one should have done something 
incorrect or wrong, and sometimes there is no need for there to have been any fault.126 A 
liable person is responsible when a damage or injury occurs in a contract or under tort, and he 
should necessarily compensate it.127 
One of the most important rules in the Shariah is the la zarar principle, which prevails over 
tort or contract principles. Foqahā always observe this general principle. It will therefore be 
discussed before delving into liability issues. This section discusses the liability principle in 
Islamic jurisprudence. It also explains how far Iranian law has been influenced by this 
principle or if the former has modified the principle. The Shariah has provided this flexibility 
for Iranian law to adopt secular law whenever required and to give them the status of Islamic 
law. 
  
                                                      
125 S.J. Zehni Tehrani, Tashrih al-Matalib (1371 A.H.1992), 421. 
126 N. Katuzian, Zeman Qahri (Masoliyat -e-Madani ) (1369 A.H. 1990), 186. 
127 A. Moqaddas Ardabili, Majma al-Faideh (1417A.H.1996), at 140. 
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3.4.1 La Zarar (The Principle of No Harm) 
This is one of the most famous principles of Islamic jurisprudence.128 Based on the Sunnah,129 
this principle is extracted from the prophetic saying ‘la zarar wa la zerara fi al Islam’ which 
means that there is not any harm in Islam.130 Foqahā have resorted to the Quran, the Sunnah, 
and aql for proving the la zarar principle.131 The firmest reason for its authority is aql. This 
principle is based on the order of wisdom, satisfying the interests of people and human 
society. This principle generally provides that no one unlawfully or unjustly may enjoy either 
his property or the property of others.132 A person who endeavors to achieve his right should 
be careful not to cause loss or damage to his neighbors, be they people, or a private or public 
infrastructure.133 
The principle of la zarar is very broad and it is applicable to any situation. This principle is 
not confined to a given situation but prevails in any contractual or tort liability. It prohibits 
people from causing loss to others and from misusing the rights, which affect other members 
of society. It aims to regulate order and justice in the social and economic relations of the 
members of society. It also solves the legal conflicts between people, and limits the right of 
ownership where others suffer a loss.134 
Wherever judgments result in an illegitimate or disproportionate loss, this principle 
moderates those judgments and provides a right to the injured party to break the contract and 
                                                      
128 Compensation is one of the oldest concepts retained from civil liability. All other rules originated from it. 
The principle of la zarar has the same role in Islamic law.  M.H. Mosavi Bojnourdi, al-Qawa‘id al-Fiqhiah Vol. 
IV (1413 A.H. 1992), 214-215. 
129 M.K. Khorasani, Kifayat al-usūl (1415 A.H. 1994), 431. 
130 Customarily, zarar means causing any defect in property or harming the life of a person or whatever belongs 
to him. Zerar means inflicting harm repeatedly, and a mozar is the person who inflicts the harm repeatedly and 
insists on inflicting it. M. Esmaili, Teori -e- Jobran -e- Khesarat (1384 A.H. 2005), 61. 
131 The holy Quran: Surehs 2: 232 – 283; 5:16 and 9:109. 
132 S.H. Amin, Remedies for Breach of Contract in Islamic and Iranian Law (1984), 33. 
133 See Esmaili, supra note 130, at 66. 
134 See Ansari, supra note 43, at 234. 
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claim compensation.135 Above all else, the la zarar principle is a governing one, i.e. when 
there is a conflict between this principle and other principles; it is la zarar, which prevails.136 
The la zarar principle also covers immaterial damages.137 There is no doubt that immaterial 
damages are considered as a loss and there is no reason for limiting this principle to material 
damages. As mentioned, the Prophet had used two words to explain loss and damage: zarar 
and zerar. The former refers to material damages and injuries to persons. The latter refers to 
immaterial damages.138  
The author is of the opinion that whereas in the Islamic texts there is not a direct reference to 
air carrier liability, this principle can be used to achieve total compensation for (air) 
passengers. Therefore, in chapter 4 where he analyzes the conflict between the Warsaw 
Convention 1929 and the Shariah principles, he uses this principle for proving the legitimacy 
of unlimited liability and air carrier’s liability for death and bodily injury in Iran.  
3.4.2 Tort Liability  
3.4.2.1 Etlāf (Destruction)  
If a person destroys the property of another person, he would be held liable and would have 
to replace it with an identical item or pay its price, regardless of whether the destruction has 
been made intentionally or unintentionally, or whether he has destroyed the property itself or 
its interests; or if the destroyer makes the property imperfect or defected.139 Therefore, the 
person whose act or omission causes damage to baggage and cargo is liable whether he is at 
fault or not.  
                                                      
135 M.M. Naeini, Muniat al-Talib fi Sharh al-Makasib Vol. I (1418 A.H. 1997), 201- 294. 
136 M. Ansari, Kitab al-Makasib (1407 A.H. 1986), 273. 
137 M.A. Serag, dhaman al-udwan fi Fiqh al- Islamyyah (1414 A.H. 1993), 117-8. 




In Islamic jurisprudence, talaf, māl and sabab are elements for the actualization of etlāf: 
1. Damage (talaf). Talaf is sometimes considered with the property. This is called actual 
talaf. Sometimes, it is considered with the value of the property without destruction of the 
property itself.140 
2. Property (māl): it is whatever people need in their life for their well-being or while they are 
sick or on their deathbeds, the money that they use, and the interests and profits of affairs that 
satisfy the needs of people, or things that these affairs are attained by.141 
3. Causation (sabab): a causal relation between loss or damage and action is essential.142 One 
way for substantiating the etlāf principle is to see ‘what a reasonable man thinks’. If a person 
destroys, uses or damages the property of someone else, he would be liable if he has deviated 
from the standard of the reasonable man, even if the property still exists.143 
When something is damaged, the wrongdoer shoulders the compensation, and he is liable for 
returning its equivalence to the owner.144 Actual liability is also called the liability of identical 
items or price, and there is no non-actual liability such as punitive damage. This liability is 
compensatory damages that provide a claimant with the monetary amount necessary to 
replace what was lost, and nothing more.145 If the exact property exists, it should be returned 
to the owner. If the exact property is destroyed, an identical item or its price should be given 
to the owner. In this kind of liability, there is total compensation and unlimited liability for 
damaged property.146 
                                                      
140 See Mosavi Bojnourdi, supra note 128, at 19. 
141 Ibid., at 63. 
142 Ibid. 
143 R. Khomeini, Kitab al-Bay‘ (1368 A.H. 1989), 341. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Langeroudi, supra note 99, at 135. 
146 A. Gorji, Maqalat -e- Hoqooqi (Legal Essays) Vol. II (1375 A.H. 1996), 247. 
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The Civil Code has used the principles of the Shariah to define etlāf and the liability of the 
destructor.147 In etlāf, the existence of a customary causal relation between the act of a person 
and the destruction of property is sufficient for liability.  
In order to understand etlāf, the principles of liability of mobāsherat and tasbib should be 
discussed.148 Foqahā have divided liability for damaged property to direct causation of 
destruction (etlāf-be-Mobāsherat or Mobāsherat) and indirect causation of destruction (etlāf-
be-tasbib or tasbib).149  
 (i)   Mobāsherat (The Direct Causation of Destruction) 
If a wrongdoer directly destroys a property or its interests, he has to return the same property 
or its price to the owner.150 According to this principle, the wrongdoer is liable for 
compensating what he has destroyed even if he was not at fault. 
A wrongdoer is considered as a direct causer of a destruction where custom sees a close 
causality relation between the destruction and that act.151 To distinguish the direct causer from 
others involved in the destruction, the criterion is objective.152 Events are so complex and 
diverse that it is difficult to examine them with a single principle.153 Therefore, in proving 
damage, it is sufficient that a causal relation be established between the act of a person and 
the destroyed property.154 It is not necessary to prove the fault of the destructor, since in some 
                                                      
147 See Art.328 of the Civil Code. 
148 K. Jalili, Hoqooqh -e- Maseoliat -e-Madani (1383 A.H. 2004), 25. 
149 A. Gol Bararzadeh, Osul-e- Hoqooq -e- Neveshte dar Feqh  (1383 A.H. 2004), 30-40. 
150 N.M. Shirazi, al- Ghava‘id al-Fiqhyyah Vol. II (1411 A.H. 1990), at 193. 
151 See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 55. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Shahid Thani (al- Amili), Masalik al-Afhām Vol. II (1413 A.H. 1992), 321. 
154 M. Najafi, Javahir al-Kalām Vol. VI (1394 A.H. 1973), 636. 
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cases it is possible to cause destruction without being at fault.155 As a result, strict liability is 
applied.  
If someone forcefully causes another person to destroy something or deceives him to do so, 
the direct causer cannot be considered liable. This is because customarily the attribution of 
destruction to someone who has caused something is more appropriate than to the one who 
has been the direct causer.156 Therefore, the liability of the direct causer is limited to cases 
where his action in destruction is stronger than that of other causers are.157 
(ii)  Tasbib (The Indirect Destruction) 
If a person does not destroy a property himself but arranges a setting for its destruction, his 
act is called tasbib. For instance, when someone digs a well in the public passage and people 
or animals fall in it,158 he is liable for the compensation of damage. A causer performs an 
action that makes a setting ready for destruction, in a way that if that act would have not been 
done, the destruction would not have happened. There is no direct causality between that act 
and the occurrence of destruction,159 but since custom has attributed damage to it,160 he is 
therefore liable.161 
In case of indirect causation, the person who has destroyed the property and caused damage 
to others is liable if he has been negligent.162 A person is also liable if he has not taken any 
necessary precautions and the damage has occurred because he has not paid attention to the 
                                                      
155 See Art.329 of the Civil Code. 
156 R. Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasilah Vol. II (1384 A.H. 2005), 189. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., at 190. 
159 Mohaqiq Hilli, al-Sharai‘ al-Islam Vol. III (1411 A.H. 1990), 76. 
160 Here, the custom means the custom of the ‘uqala (reasonable people). According to the Shariah, the custom 
of the ‘uqala is a practice which reasonable persons habitually follow. The custom of the ‘uqala is permanent 
and comprehensive. Langeroudi, supra note 99, at 423. 




foreseeable results of his action or in spite of being aware that his action might create 
damage.163 
The Civil Code defines tasbib as a case when a person prepares a cause for destruction and 
another person directly destroys the property. In such circumstances, it is the destroyer who is 
liable and not the causer, unless the cause is stronger than the destruction.164 In tasbib, a 
person does not directly destroy the property of another, but he prepares the scene for 
destruction, i.e. he commits an action, because of which the property is destroyed.165 
Customarily, a causer is the one who has created the loss so he is liable. Here the existence of 
fault is a condition for determining liability.  
In order to explain the differences between direct and indirect causation in destruction it can 
be stated that wherever a person commits what would customarily result in the destruction of 
a property (making a cause for destruction) his act is deemed etlāf.166 By contrast, if the 
committed act is not the cause of destruction, but it has provided the setting that could 
probably result in the destruction, it is called tasbib.167 Therefore, etlāf and tasbib differ in 
that:  
1. Fault is a condition for liability in tasbib, but not in etlāf, 
2. A wrongdoer directly causes damage in etlāf, whereas a wrongdoer arranges the setting for 
destruction in tasbib and it is possible that no destruction occurs at all because of that 
arrangement.168 
                                                      
163 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 106. 
164 See Art.332 of the Civil Code. 
165 See Art. 331 of the Civil Code. See also Art. 318 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
166 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 94. 
167 Although digging a well in a public passage attracts liability, the same if carried out on one’s land or other 
permitted places, do not give rise to liability. See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 76. 
168 S.H. Emami, Hoqooq -e- Madani Vol. I (1357 A.H. 1978), 39.   
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3.4.2.2 Fault  
The civil liability regime in Iran is influenced by the Shariah169 on the one hand, and the civil 
law system on the other. Drafters of the Civil Code have based liability principles on Islamic 
jurisprudence and have explained etlāf.170 However, in the Civil Liability Act 1960, the 
legislators disregarded Islamic jurisprudence and based liability on fault. Article 1 of the 
Civil Liability Act 1960 provides: ‘Anyone who, intentionally or due to his negligence, 
injures the life or health or property or freedom or prestige or commercial fame or any other 
right established for the individuals by virtue of law, as a result of which another person 
sustains materially or spiritually losses, shall be liable to compensate the damages arising out 
of his action.’ It puts aside the liability principles of the Civil Code and caused 
incompatibility with the etlāf provisions adopted from the Shariah.  
Iranian jurists such as Safaei and Ghaem Magham Farahani mention that the Civil Liability 
Act 1960 based liability on fault, implicitly nullifying strict liability provisions in the Civil 
Code, and recognized the fault principle as the only basis for liability. It indicated that in the 
case of direct destruction, the causality relation between the destructor and the destruction of 
property should not be considered sufficient for imposing liability. It emphasized that only 
fault should be considered as a condition for bringing liability.171 As a result, after the 
approval of the Act, liability based on fault became the main and exclusive rule in Iranian tort 
law and strict liability was nullified.  
The author is of the opinion that Iranian law, depending on the subject matter, recognizes 
both fault liability and strict liability. According to the general rules in the Civil Code and the 
                                                      
169 See Art.167 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
170 Islamic jurists usually discuss civil liability (zeman) resulting from etlāf, tasbib and usurpation (Ghasb) in 
one book since many of their regulations are identical. However, the Civil Code has distinguished them and 
discussed usurpation separately. See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 134. 
171 A.M. Ghaem Magham Farahani, Hoqooq -e- Taahodat Vol. I (1378 A.H. 1999), 161- 215. See also S.H. 
Safaei, Hoqooq -e- Madani (1351A.H. 1974), 543-553. 
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Civil Liability Act 1960, individuals are liable when they commit a fault.172 However, strict 
liability regime that was laid down in the Civil Code and special statutes such as the 
‘Compulsory Liability Insurance for Motor Cars Act of 1966’,173 makes wrongdoers strictly 
liable. 
Furthermore, in the case of death or bodily injury that will be discussed later, legislators 
provide strict liability within the Islamic Criminal Code174 and special statutes. For instance, 
according to the laws passed in 1968 and 2008, civil liability arising from the ownership of 
motor vehicles is strict, and the owner of the vehicle should compensate for damages in all 
circumstances and he cannot discharge his liability by proving that he is not at fault.175  
Therefore, these laws and regulations have not been nullified by the Civil Liability Act 1960 
and it can be presumed that the legislature has overlooked the principle of fault in the Act and 
has adopted other principles such as strict liability to meet Iranian social and economic 
circumstances.176 
3.4.3 Contractual Liability  
There are certain general rules for specific individual contracts in the primary sources of the 
Shariah.177 Foqahā have devoted the greatest part of their scholarly writings to specific 
contracts.178 However, there is sufficient discussion of the general principles of contract, and 
there are rules and principles, which are generally and universally applicable to all types of 
                                                      
172 See Arts.50, 493, 516, 556, 577, 584 and 640 of the Civil Code. 
173 The Compulsory Liability Insurance for Motor Cars Act of 1966 provides that any person, natural or legal, is 
strictly liable for harms and damages that his motor vehicle or goods impose on others. 
174 See 3.4.5, infra. 
175 See the Compulsory Insurance for Owners of Engine Vehicle (Ground and Sea) Act 2008. 
176 See Arts.333 and 335 of the Civil Code. 




contract.179 One of the general principles governing the law of contract is the Quranic 
commandment to ‘fulfill your obligations’.180 Accordingly, all private arrangements mutually 
agreed upon are enforceable, as long as they are not contrary to the Shariah. These rules 
should be considered as the general principles of contract in the Shariah. In fact, legal 
literature is almost exclusively concerned with specific contracts.181 It covers not only mutual 
contracts but also unilateral obligations such as gratuitous dispositions and endowments.182 
The breach of contract may give rise to liability.183 Contractual liability is the liability of a 
person who has undertaken an obligation under contract, resulting from either specific 
contracts or nonspecific contracts.184 The wrongdoer or obligator is liable for remedying the 
non-performance or delay in the performance of his obligations.185 Contractual liability is 
established where an obligation is delayed or breached through the fault of the obligator, 
unless he can prove that the cause is external to his control, and the non-performance of 
obligation is not attributable to him.186  
For a fault to be considered as a contractual liability, three conditions must be met: 
1. There must be an authentic contract. In other words, the contract must be legal, as illegal 
contracts do not impose contractual liability as they are null and void and then claimant can 
only claim liability under tort according to laws and regulations.  
                                                      
179 The Quranic principle: ‘ufu bi al uqud ’ (perform your contracts) covers all agreements which may be 
reached between parties, regardless of how diverse and different they may be, because there is no limitation to 
the application of this maxim, except what the holy Quran itself has provided to be void or unenforceable. See 
Khomeini, supra note 156, at 191. 
180 See Amin, supra note 132, at 82-84. 
181 The term used in Islamic law for the concept of contract is aqd (which literally means a knot or bond). 
182 See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 77. 
183 S.M.K. Yazdi Tabatabaei, al- Urwat al- Wusqā (1404 A.H. 1983), 640. 
184 Ibid. 
185 See Emami, supra note 168, at 39. 
186 See Katuzian supra note 126, at 56. 
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Moreover, there must be a contractual relation between the claimant and the defendant. 
Therefore, where a person inappropriately withdraws his offer or the contract becomes void, 
the fault of one side should not be considered as a contractual fault.  
2. There must be a breach of a contractual obligation. That is, one of the parties must have 
breached an obligation resulting from the contract. 
3. There must be a causal relationship (link) between the breach of contract and a sustained 
damage.187 The mere existence of a contract is not sufficient for contractual liability. If a 
party undertakes to perform or abstain from an act, he is liable where he has not carried out 
his undertaking provided that compensation for such loss has been provided for in the 
contract, or that it is implied in the contract according to customary law, or that such 
compensation is taken for granted by law.188 
In contractual obligations, if a party refuses to perform or delays the performance of his 
obligation, the innocent party has the right to claim for compensation.189 The wrongdoer is 
liable for breach of contract, unless he can prove that his failure to perform was caused by 
external causes outside his control.190  
The Shariah recognizes the theory of changed circumstances in a very general and 
comprehensive way. Not only can contractual obligation be set aside because of an ‘act of 
God’ (afāt-e-samāvi), but also the rescission of a contract is justified when unforeseen 
developments make the obligation more burdensome and difficult.191 It seems, therefore, that 
force majeure and changed circumstances are deemed as valid reasons for the rescission of 
the contract. According to foqahā, the legal basis for this rule is the required balance between 
                                                      
187 N. Katuzian, Ghavaed -e- Omomi -y- Gharardadha (1385 A.H.), 10-12. 
188 See Art.221 of the Civil Code. 
189 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 106. 
190 Ibid., at 28. 
191 Ibid., at 26-28. 
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the rights and undertakings of contracting parties, and the prohibition of unfair loss in the 
Shariah.192 
If non-performance of a contract is caused by force majeure, the obligator is not liable for 
damages from such time when the execution of the contract was frustrated.193 The external 
cause of the frustration must be outside his control.194Force majeure relieves the obligator 
from his liability of performance or payment, only in circumstances where he cannot avoid or 
negate those forces, which cause the impossibility of performance.195 Hence, if he is able to 
remove these causes and does not take the necessary steps to do so, he will be liable for 
damages.196 
In Iranian law, breach of contract always imposes liability unless it is caused by force 
majeure in which case the wrongdoer is exonerated from liability.197 The Civil Code does not 
use terms such as force majeure. However, it does refer to ‘external cause’, a term that 
includes all causes, which are external to the obligor.198 
The author is of the opinion that the regulations on force majeure are not part of public 
policy. If the contractual parties agree on liability even in the event of a force majeure, the 
obligor is liable for not performing his obligations,199 and he cannot be relieved from liability 
by resorting to the defence of necessary measures.200 The contracting parties can determine 
the scope of their rights and obligations as long as these are not contrary to the Shariah and 
the public order. 
                                                      
192 Ibid. 
193 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 107. 
194 See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 79. 
195 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 551. 
196 M. Esmaili, Force Majeure (2002), 24-26. 
197 T. Erfani, Hoqooq -e-Madani dar Qarardad -e-hamle Jaddei va  Reili (1385 A.H. 2006), 238. 
198 See Amin, supra note 32, at 55. 
199 See Esmaili, supra note 196, at 123. 
200 See Art.230 of the Civil Code. 
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3.4.4 Contract of carriage  
After exploring contractual liability in general, the author investigates the contract of 
carriage. In order to obtain a sound understanding of the contract of carriage in Iran, the 
liability of carriers in the Shariah which are explained in the Civil Code and the Commercial 
Code, will be discussed below. 
The Civil Code and the Commercial Code are two main laws. The rules and regulations on 
contract of carriage in the Civil Code and the Commercial Code explain the general 
principles of carrier liability to include rail, road, sea and air carriers. The legislators have 
dealt mainly with carrier liability for damaged goods in both Codes.201 As for the liability 
principles for passenger’s death or bodily injury, these are also discussed in the Islamic 
Criminal Code, in addition to the general rules in the Civil and Commercial Codes.202 These 
will be discussed in the next section. 
3.4.4.1 Amanat or Wadiyah (Bailment or Deposit) 
The principles of the contract of carriage are inferred from Islamic jurisprudence,203 following 
the rules of amanat.204 Amanat in the Shariah is a specific contract (uqūd-e-mo’ayyane) 
whereby one person entrusts a thing belonging to him to another in order that the latter should 
retain it for him free of charge. The person entrusted with the thing is called an amin.205 In 
                                                      
201 See Arts.183 and 300 of the Civil Code. 
202 The Civil Code applies the principles of carrier liability in ejāreh (Hire) and discusses the related provisions 
of carriage under that title. However, the Commercial Code defines ‘carrier’ as a person who carries goods for 
remuneration and considers it as a vekalat (agency). Notwithstanding this, the principles of carrier liability 
contain similarities because the rules of amanat in the Shariah are applied in ejāreh and vekalat.  B. Akhlaqi, 
‘Barresi -e- Mahiat -e- Hoqooqi -e- Qarardad -e- Haml dar Hoqooq -e- Madani’, (1371 A.H. 1992) Majelleh 
Hoqooqi Vokalay -e- Dadgostari 1, at 4-11. 
203 When discussing the hire of objects in an ejāreh, drafters of the Civil Code have provided the definition, 
general rules and consequences, just as they are found in the famous Shariah books but with small 
modifications. 
204 See Art. 607 of the Civil Code. 
205 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 107. 
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Islamic jurisprudence, an amin206 is not liable for the damage or loss to the property entrusted 
to him. His possession does not make him liable, and if the property entrusted to him is 
damaged because of external events or by a third party, he is not liable.  
Since the carrier’s liability is like that of an amin’s in amanat, his liability is not presumed. 
He would only be liable if his extravagancy or negligence is proved.207 An amin should 
exercise the utmost care in maintaining the property, as if it belongs to him. If the property is 
damaged or lost, provided that the amin has done his duty well, he will be absolved from 
liability. This legal protection continues until such a time that the amin chooses to dissolve 
the attribute of amanat from him.208 If he was negligent and the property sustained damage, 
or if he acts in a way to possess it, the attribute of amanat will disappear and he will be liable 
as a traitor.209 
The intention of an amin for doing things out of the permitted limits is not necessary.210 The 
criterion for determining fault is not by analyzing the mental conditions and the intentions of 
the amin.211 His knowledge or awareness of the fact that an act is negligent is not a condition 
for his liability since his knowledge or ignorance does not change the effects of liability 
assigned to negligence. Liability is objective. ‘A reasonable man’s behavior’ is the criterion 
for determining fault.212 
                                                      
206 In all bailment contracts, in which one of the contracting parties possesses the property of the other, the 
possessor is regarded as an amin, and the reason is the permission of the owner. With the satisfaction and 
awareness of a specific purpose which is agreed to by the two parties, the owner hands over his property into the 
possession of the other party, just like when passengers leave their property with air carriers. Ibid. 
207 See Art.516 of the Commercial Code. See also M. Shahidi, Gharardad -e- Haml dar Ghanoon -e- Madani va 
Ghanoon -e- Tejarat (1378 A.H. 2000), at 70. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Shahid Thani (Al Amili), al-Rozat al-Bahiyya’ (Sharh al-Lum‘ah) (1365 A.H. 1986), 385. 
210 See M.A. F. Husaini Maraqi, al-Anāwin Vol. II  (1417 A.H. 1996), at 486. 




In amanat the burden of proof is on the claimant. He has to prove the amin’s fault. When an 
amin claims that he has not committed negligence with regard to the property entrusted to 
him, that claim is sufficient to exempt him from liability.213 This is subject to the consensus of 
foqahā and legal scholars, and it has been developed into a principle.  
If, in the contract, there is a condition in favor of possession (amin) and the removal of 
liability, even upon proving fault, the owner cannot ask for compensation. Vice versa when 
sometimes the owner of goods adds a condition in the contract that just upon proving the 
damage even without a fault, he can claim compensation.214 
(i) Exemption 
Delimiting an amin’s liability to a value less or more than that of the property entrusted to 
him can be made through conditions of liability. According to this condition, all of the 
liability or part of it is dissolved.215 This condition is valid if the amin has been acting duly.216 
It can be concluded that the Shariah, like common law and civil law, accepts exemption 
conditions in contract of carriage. Islamic jurisprudence considers the correctness and validity 
of exemption conditions in contractual liability as a clear well-established principle except in 
two cases: a) when damage was intentional, and b) when the conditions are against public 
order.217 
                                                      
213 It seems that most scholars have asked for proof of the nonexistence of negligence from the amin. As it is 
mentioned in the Sunnah that an amin is clear of liability only if he is from among reliable persons, or elsewhere 
it is said that an amin should take an oath that he has not committed any fault. 
214 See Mosavi Bojnourdi, supra note 128, at 4-6. 
215 See Langeroudi, supra note 99, at 383-4. 
216 M. Gharavi Ashtiani, Ejareh  dar Sharh al- Lum‘ih  Vol. I (1309 A.H. 1930), 34. 
217 See Yazdi Tabatabaei, supra note 183, at 332. 
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(ii) Condition of Strict liability 
The carrier’s strict liability may be inserted in the contract of carriage in favor of the 
customer.  An amin may accept liability for the property entrusted to him even in the case of 
non negligence. In Islamic jurisprudence, there is no objection to accepting the correctness 
and validity of strict liability in amanat.218 For example, a carrier may accept by contract   
liability for damage caused by an act of God. According to the general principles of 
amanat,219 the carrier is not liable in such cases. However, due to this contractual condition, 
he would be liable. It has extended the domain of his liability.220  
3.4.4.2 Ejāreh (Hire)  
In the Civil Code, a contract of carriage is a kind of ejāreh and it is therefore a kind of 
specific contract (uqūd-e-mo’ayyane).221 The legislature has prescribed obligations on carriers 
similar to the obligations of an amin in amanat, which has been extended, to ejāreh to 
preserve and take good care of the goods vested in him.222 A contract of carriage is 
considered identical to the amanat in terms of the responsibility, duty and obligation of an 
amin (carrier).223 
A carrier is liable for preserving the property vested in him. There is a general rule in the 
Civil Code that says that a carrier is responsible for keeping goods diligently and in the case 
                                                      
218 Ibid. 
219 In amanat, an amin is not liable for the damage or loss to the property entrusted to him. His possession does 
not make him liable, and if the property entrusted to him is damaged because of an act of God, he is not liable. 
220 See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 313-837. 
221 Ejāreh is a contract whereby the hirer becomes the owner of the profits resulting from the item hired. The 
person who lets out an item on hire is called the Mujir (lessor); the person who hires is called the Mustajir 
(lessee) and the item which forms the subject of the hire is called an Aain -e- musta’jareh (the item hired). See 
Arts. 466, 509, 513 and 514 of the Civil Code. 
222 Art. 516 provides that contracts for carriage involve same engagements with regard to the protection and care 
of objects entrusted to carriers similar to those laid down for contracts of bailment. Therefore, if excessive usage 
or abuse takes place, a carrier is liable for the destruction or damage to the object he receives for transport. 
223 See Arts.607 to 634 of the Civil Code. 
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of fault, he is liable for making compensation.224 If he delegates the operation to another 
person, and during that operation the goods sustain damage, the carrier is liable for 
compensation.225  
The carrier is liable for the destruction, loss or damage of goods only in the case of 
extravagancy or negligence.226 Therefore, the good’s owner and consignor can claim against 
him for compensation solely in the case of extravagancy or negligence, since the basis of 
possession is amanat.227 The Supreme Court branch 16 held that Article 614 of the Civil Code 
on the obligations of an amin indicates that if extravagancy or negligence is not proved, the 
amin’s statement should be accepted and he is not liable.228 In another decision, the Supreme 
Court branch 30 held that based on Articles 614-615 of the Civil Code, an amin has civil 
liability where the extravagancy or negligence in relation to the goods vested in him is 
clear.229 The mere loss of entrusted property cannot be considered as carelessness to impose 
liability on an amin.230 
Therefore, the Civil Code treats the contract of carriage as a kind of ejāreh and the carrier is 
liable for his extravagancy or negligence (fault).231 As a result, the carrier is not liable, unless 
the claimant proves that he is at fault.232  
                                                      
224 See Art.221 of the Civil Code. 
225 See Art.388 of the Commercial Code. 
226 See Art.614 of the Civil Code. 
227 Confirmation Judgment No. 2808, 05.6.1950 of the General Committee of the Supreme Court, in ‘The 
Collection of Judicial Procedures from 1949 to 1963’ in the Book on Liability in Ground Transport (1973), 129. 
228 Judgment No 29/54024. Y. Barzigar, Hoqooq – Madani dar Ahkām -e- Dadgah -e- Ali(1379 A.H. 2001), 
247. 
229 Judgment No. 24/3/16-299. Ibid. 
230 A. Matin, Majmoeh -y- Raviehhay -e- Qazaei (1380 A.H. 2002), 74. 
231 See Art.953 of the Civil Code. 
232 See Art.516 of the Civil Code states that the carrier’s obligation for keeping the goods vested in him is akin 
to the liability of an amin. 
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3.4.4.3 Vekalat (Agency) 
In relation to carriage, the Commercial Code deals with topics such as contract of carriage, 
the characteristics of a contract of carriage, and the duties, rights and exonerations of a 
carrier.233 It provides that provisions of vekalat in the Civil Code govern carriage.234 Article 
656 of the Civil Code provides that a vekalat is a contract whereby one of the parties appoints 
the other as his representative for the accomplishment of some matter.  As a result, if the 
principle of vekalat is applied to contract of carriage in a way, which is identical to ejāreh, it 
in fact means that the principles of liability for an amin are applied.235 
3.4.4.4 Contract of Carriage as an Independent Contract  
The author is of the opinion that the contract of carriage has provisions that distinguish it 
from amanat, ejāreh and vekalat. This is because: 
1. In the Civil Code, the carrier is considered as an amin, and the claimant should prove fault. 
However, the drafters of the Commercial Code accepted presumed fault liability.236 As a 
result, presumed fault liability is applied to liability for damaged goods and for death or 
bodily injury. 
It seems that the objective of the legislature in shifting the burden of proof to the carrier was 
to protect the claimant. It is also aimed at preventing probable abuses by the carrier through 
the attribution of fault and damage to his servants or agents. Therefore, the carrier is liable for 
any event that occurred during the period of carriage whether he directly performs the 
contract or delegates its performance to others.237  
                                                      
233 H. Samavati,  Hoqooq -e- Tejarat (1378 A.H. 2000), 89-104. 
234 See Art.378 of the Commercial Code. 
235 See Art.666 of the Civil Code. 
236 See Art.386 of the Commercial Code. 
237 See Erfani, supra note 197, at 135. 
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2. The author argues that if a contract of carriage is considered as a mere ejāreh, there will be 
problems in applying provisions of ejāreh to a contract of carriage. In ejāreh, a leased 
property is possessed. However, in the case of a person, he cannot be possessed and the 
carrier has complete freedom in performing its obligation.238 Therefore, a contract of carriage 
should be regarded as an independent contract rather than an ejāreh.    
3. The Commercial Code treats a contract of carriage as a vekalat.239 According to the 
provision of the vekalat; both parties to the contract have the right to cancel the contract. 
They have the right to cancel the contract after paying costs and compensating for related 
damages.240 However, the contract of carriage is not treated as a revocable contract and the 
carrier or consignor has no right to unilaterally cancel or nullify the contract, or avoid its 
obligations.241 
It is submitted that a vekalat is a contract where one party appoints the other as his 
representative for fulfilling an obligation. It is akin to a case where the representative has 
performed an act under his principal’s name. Whereas in a contract of carriage, the carrier 
does not perform the act of carriage on behalf of the other party, but performs it 
independently and under his own name.242   
4. The Commercial Code has not generally dealt with contracts of carriage according to the 
provisions of vekalat.243 The Commercial Code separates contract of carriage from vekalat in 
certain cases, and gives it a special status. For instance, it does not allow the consignor to 
retrieve goods from the carrier. The carrier should follow orders from the consignee.244 In 
                                                      
238 N. Katuzian, Uqood -e- Moayyaneh (1383 A.H. 2005), 351. 
239 For details about vekalat (agency), See 3.4.4.3, supra. 
240 See Art.382 of the Commercial Code. 
241 S. Maleki, Mahiyyat -e- Hoqooqi -y- Haml va Naghl dar Iran (1381 A.H. 2003), 75. 
242 See Erfani, supra note 197, at 107. 
243 See Art.378 of the Commercial Code. 
244 See Art.383 of the Commercial Code 
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addition, the carrier is permitted to sell the goods if they are not collected within a specific 
time.245  
As mentioned above, the author is of the opinion that a contract of carriage is an independent 
contract from amanat, ejāreh and vekalat. The contract of carriage follows the general 
conditions of contract mentioned in the Civil Code such as intention, capacity, specificity of 
transaction, and legitimacy, just like other contracts.246 It is an independent and irrevocable 
contract.  
According to Article 10 of the Civil Code, contracts shall be binding on those who have 
signed them if they do not violate the explicit provisions of the law. Since the contract of 
carriage is an independent contract, it is therefore binding unless it is contrary to the law.247 
Like other contracts, it has to observe the general conditions of contract mentioned in the 
Civil Code.248 The carrier is liable for damages resulting from delay, loss or destruction of 
goods; and for death or bodily injury to passengers within the limits of law and regulations. 
The liability principles of the Iranian contract of carriage can be listed below: 
(i) Carrier Liability  
The Commercial Code determines the rights, duties and obligations of the consignor, the 
consignee and the carrier.249 It does not consider the carrier as an amin and provides 
presumed fault liability hence the claimant does not need to prove the fault of the 
                                                      
245 See Art.384 of the Commercial Code. 
246 See Art.190 of the Civil Code. 
247 See Art.10 of the Civil Code. 
248 The general rules on contract (aqd) are provided in five chapters: the concept of contract; the validity of a 
transaction; the effect of contracts; the non-performance of contracts; and the termination of obligations. See 
Katuzian, supra note 126, at 10. 
249 The provisions of the Commercial Code generally apply to carriage of goods either by rail, sea or air 
provided that there is no specific law to that effect. Since the Iranian legislature has adopted the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention for international flights and the provisions of limited liability in the Warsaw-Hague Convention for 
domestic flights, so the related provisions have priority over the provisions of the Commercial Code. 
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defendant.250 However, the carrier can prove that the loss or destruction of goods has been 
caused by its inherent defects or it has occurred because of the fault of the consignor or the 
consignee.251 The Commercial Code states that a carrier is liable unless he proves that the 
loss, destruction or damage was due to the nature of the goods, or that it resulted from the 
fault of the consignor or the consignee, or that it was due to the instruction of one of them, or 
that it has been caused by events that no diligent carrier can avoid.252 Thus, the burden of 
proof has shifted from the claimant to the carrier.253  
The Commercial Code states that the carrier is obliged to deliver goods diligently to the 
consignee and he is liable in the case of breach.254 As soon as the goods are delivered to the 
carrier, he is responsible for taking care of them and delivering them intact and on time to the 
consignee.255  
The Commercial Code accepts presumed fault liability.256 The carrier is liable for events 
happening during carriage whether he performs the carriage himself or delegates it to his 
agent. The carrier, besides being liable for events during a carriage, is liable for the acts of his 
agent, whether they are intentional or unintentional.257 He is liable for his agent’s acts against 
the customer, but then he can refer this back to his agent.258 
                                                      
250 This is identical to the position under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929. 
251 This is similar to Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention 1929. M.S. Rad, ‘Manteq Garaei dar Hoqooq’, (1376 
A.H. 1997) 25 Majalle Hoqooqi Dadgostari, 105, at 108. 
252 See Art.386 of the Commercial Code. 
253 See Arts.386 and 387 of the Commercial Code. Since the Commercial Code and the Civil Code are in 
conflict with one another, different opinions were provided for what should be the principle of liability. It is 
submitted that where these two codes are in conflict on the liability of air carriers for baggage and cargo, the 
Commercial Code should be applied as it is regarded as specific law rather than the Civil Code, which is 
considered as general. B. Shahriar, ‘Mseoliat -e- Motesaddi -y-Haml -e- Khareji dar Iran’, (1378 A.H. 2000) 42 
Sanat -e- Haml -o- Naghl Journal 48, at 53. 
254 See Art.386 of the Commercial Code. 
255 See Art.388 of the Commercial Code. 
256 See Art.377 of the Commercial Code. 
257 See Art.388 (1) of the Commercial Code. 
258 See Art.388 (2) of the Commercial Code. 
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If the consignee does not accept the goods, or refuses to pay the carriage costs or other rights 
of the carrier, or if the carrier does not have access to the consignee, he must inform the 
consignor and keep the goods temporarily or ask a third party to keep them temporarily.259  
 (ii) Defenses  
The Iranian Commercial Code states that a carrier has to carry goods diligently, and he is 
liable for any defect, destruction or loss of goods or delay in delivery, unless he proves he has 
performed his obligation diligently and has taken all necessary measures to avoid the 
damage.260 Thus, the carrier is liable if he cannot prove that non-performance had an external 
cause, which cannot be attributed to him.261 If the carrier is prevented from performing his 
duty because of an event, which is out of his control, he is not liable.262  
Consequently, force majeure applies when any cause that is not related to the carrier leads to 
non-performance;263 and any event external to the carrier which cannot be attributed to him, 
brings exoneration.264 Force majeure is defined as unexpected and unavoidable events, which 
cannot be attributed to the carrier.265 Owing to such an event, the performance of obligations 
under the contract becomes completely impossible. Thus, externality, unavoidability and 
unpredictability are three necessary conditions for force majeure; and the existence of 
damage, the occurrence of an event, and the causal relationship between the damage and the 
event, are three elements of liability.266  
                                                      
259 See Art.384 of the Commercial Code. 
260 See Art.387 of the Commercial Code. 
261 See Art.277 of the Civil Code. 
262 See Art.229 of the Civil Code. 
263 For details about force majeure in Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian law, see 3.4.3 (Contractual liability), 
supra. 
264 S. Ghamami, Maseoliat Madani -e- Hokomat (1376 A.H. 1997), 107. 
265 See Katuzian, supra note 126, at 291-292. 
266 See Erfani, supra note 197, at 107. 
140 
  
(iii) Contractual Conditions 
A carrier should pay full compensation when he is liable. However, the carrier can limit or 
exclude his liability in a contract of carriage. There is a dispute over whether a carrier can 
insert conditions in the contract that would exonerate or limit his liability.267 Although there is 
no explicit reference to such conditions in Iranian law, their validity is justifiable since both 
the Commercial Code and the Civil Code accept contractual conditions.268 The Civil Code 
provides that if a contract determines the level of compensation for non-performance, the 
court cannot order the obligator to pay an amount, which is higher or lower than the agreed 
remedy. The Commercial Code also provides that parties to a contract can agree on an 
amount, which is higher or lower than the actual damage.269 Therefore, carriers can determine 
a cap for their liability. If the parties agree that the carrier just has to compensate based on 
limited liability in the event of non-performance, delay or damage, the claimant may receive 
compensation, which is higher or lower than the actual damages.270  
However, the limited liability should not be inappropriate and unjust.271 When parties 
conclude a contract, they display their intention. As long as it is not against public policy, 
they can insert any conditions in it. When liability is limited, the court cannot change that, 
even if actual compensation is more than that272 unless law and regulations prohibit that 
condition or the carrier commits gross negligence.273  
                                                      
267 H. Afshar, Hoqooq -e- Tatbiqi (1380 A.H. 2001), 113; Katuzian, supra note 126, at 670. 
268 R. Eskini, ‘Shart -e- Mojazat dar Qarardad -e- Beinolmelali’, ( 1377 A.H. 1988) 9 Majale Hoqooqi, 45, at 
68-69. 
269 See Art.230 of the Civil Code and Arts.386- 387 of the Commercial Code. 
270 Actual Damages are real damages to compensate for loss or injuries that have actually occurred. 
http://www.lectlaw.com. 
271 See Sotodeh Tehrani, supra note 3, at 77. 
272 R. Eskini, supra note 268, at 66-95. 




Liability and compensation for death or bodily injury is based on the Islamic concept of 
Diyah.275 Rules of the Diyah cover liability and compensation. In a restricted legal sense, the 
Diyah means remedy payable in the case of death or bodily injury.276 One definition says that 
the Diyah is a property (māl) which becomes obligatory (vājeb) due to homicide or bodily 
injury, no matter whether the Shariah has determined its amount or  not.277  
A new issue that can be discussed under the Diyah is death and bodily injuries that occur in 
air transport. At the international level, compensation for fatal accidents in air transport is 
moving towards unification.278 Consequently, clarification of Islam’s constant regulation such 
as the Diyah (and its flexibilities) is necessary.279  
Generally, the Shariah regulations on civil liability in the case of death and bodily injuries are 
codified in the Islamic Criminal Code.280 Therefore, the following subjects are identical in the 
Shariah and Iranian law. However, any deviation of Iranian law from the Shariah would be 
highlighted in the following discussion. 
                                                      
274 See Sarvestani, supra note 119, at 40. 
275 Ibid. 
276 The holy Quran says that, ‘should the relatives of the slain forgive the killer; they must be reasonably and 
gratefully compensated’ (Sureh 2:178-79).  Thus, the practical operation of the institution of the Diyah was 
confined to the field of homicide. However, it was also extended to a certain number of injuries to the body. 
Ibid., at 112. 
277 Diyah is the name of a property, which became obligatory because of a crime to life or part of the body. See 
Najafi, supra note 154, at 2; Art.294 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
278 International flights introduce political, social, economic and legal complications to countries since they face 
a large number of people and aircrafts from various nationalities within their territory. Due to the huge increase 
in international flights and the presence of foreign elements in the civil law of international air transport, a large 
number of cases related to foreign citizens come to courts. If there are not uniform international regulations, 
court awards for air carrier’s liability and damages for passengers differ from one country to another. They are 
severely under the impact of national legal systems. Thus a need for uniformity of regulations is felt. For details, 
see Chr. 4, infra. 
279 Ibid., at 9. 
280 Contrary to secular law, Iranian law following the Shariah discusses civil liability for death or bodily injury 
under Islamic criminal law. 
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3.4.5.1 Classification of Acts of Offender 
In the case of death or bodily injury, the act of the offender is classified as follows: 
1. Intentional offence or murder (qatl-e-amd) is an act in which the murderer has an intention 
of killing, or intends for an act that in itself is murderous, but does not have an intention to 
kill.281 The punishment for intentional offence is retaliation (qisas).282 
2. Quasi-intentional offences or homicide (qatl-e-shebh-e-amd) is an act in which the 
offender’s intention is not murderous. He has no intention to kill and the victim is killed 
accidentally, e.g. the liability of a carrier in air accidents. In such cases, as soon as the act of 
offending occurs; the Diyah is due to the victim and his inheritors.283 
3. Unintentional offence or homicide (qatl khataii) is an act in which the perpetrator has 
neither an intention to commit an offence against a victim nor an intention for the offending 
act itself.284 Although this kind of killing is discussed under Islamic criminal law, it also 
includes the civil liability of wrongdoers for compensation. 
The Diyah is sometimes optional and sometimes obligatory. It is obligatory in all cases 
except those of deliberate offences, which entail a right of vengeance or the Diyah.285 They 
are optional in the case of offences committed deliberately (intentional offences). The 
claimant is entitled to request qisas or exempt the offender and accept compensation 
according to the agreement between the claimant and the defendant.286 For quasi-intentional 
and unintentional offences, the claimant is only entitled to compensation.287 
                                                      
281 See Shahid Thani, supra note 208, at 418; Arts. 205 and 206 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
282 R. Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first 
Century (2005), at 44-48. 
283 See Art. 295 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
284 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 3-4 
285 Ibid., at 517. 
286 Ibid. 
287 K. Qeblei Khoei, Qavaed -e- Hoqooq -e- Mojazat -e- Islami (1385 A.H. 2006), 23. 
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Therefore in an intentional offence or murder (qatl-e-amd), the criminal liability of the 
wrongdoer is discussed and its punishment is qisas.288 However, if the claimant forgives the 
wrongdoer, qisas punishment will be changed to the Diyah.289 In the second type of quasi-
intentional offence or homicide (qatl-e-shebh-e-amd), there are punishment and the Diyah. 
However, the third type, i.e. unintentional offence or homicide (qatl khataii), only includes 
the Diyah.290 
3.4.5.2 The Nature of the Diyah 
The nature of the Diyah is not very clear in Iranian law. It contains diverse and contradictory 
characteristics, which resulted from its origin, and subsequent developments. The Islamic 
Criminal Code asserts that the Diyah is a limited liability paid to the claimant in the case of 
death or bodily injury. The Code is silent about whether it is applicable to civil liability or 
whether it has a civil aspect. This ambiguity has led to diverse views on the nature of the 
Diyah. Should it be considered as a criminal liability, or a civil one, or does it have a dual 
nature?  
If the Diyah is considered as a mere punishment and a criminal liability,291 civil liability 
should not be accepted. However, where the Diyah also applies to cases where no crime has 
happened, its civil aspect is undeniable. Yet, if it is considered solely as a civil liability, other 
compensations should be disregarded since the Shariah has only recognized the Diyah for 
compensation. Whilst the adoption of any of these opinions would cause rigidity to the 
liability principles in the Shariah and any further compensation would be rejected, a close 
                                                      
288 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 459; Art. 259 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
289 See Art. 298 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
290 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 500; Art 306 of Islamic Criminal Code.; Peters, supra note 282, at 48. 
291 The Diyah is of a punitive nature; refuting any idea that it is a compensation for the damages. It is submitted 
that ejtehād is forbidden where there is an explicit Sunnah, especially in criminal laws where their interpretation 
is limited. R. Norbaha, Hoqooq -e- Jazaie Omomi (1377 A.H. 1998), 316. 
144 
  
study of the Diyah regulations together with other principles in the Shariah seem to indicate 
that the Diyah has a dual nature.  
(i)  The Diyah as a Punitive Damage 
There is an opinion that the Diyah has a punitive nature. It is a kind of pecuniary punishment 
and paid as penalty for the offence. Its purpose is therefore to punish the offender and to 
serve as a lesson to others in the society.292 On the other hand, it can be seen as a form of 
compensation to the victim.293 In the Shariah, any action that harms the physical totality of a 
human being partially or totally, and causes an injury or death, is considered an offence or a 
crime.294 
The Diyah shares common characteristics with criminal punishment. It is fixed by the Islamic 
Criminal Code and the court cannot increase or decrease its amount.295  
It is claimed that the Diyah is an alternative for qisas and as the offender has to pay for it, it 
can be considered a punishment.296 Comparing the Quranic verses on qisas and the Diyah 
makes it clear that the Diyah is a kind of punishment; either it comes from an intentional or 
unintentional fault.297 
 From ancient times, the Diyah has been considered as a private punishment.298 When a 
murder occurs, public opinion considers the payment of the Diyah as a restraining force from 
                                                      
292 M.J. Husaini Amili, Miftah al-Kiramah Vol. I (1410 A.H. 1989), 2. 
293 It should be noted that whether we consider the Diyah as a punishment or compensation or a mixture of the 
two, we have to use this classification. F. Tarihi, Majma al-Bahrain Vol. I (1408 A.H. 1987), 416. 
294 F. Salehi, Diyah ya Mojazat -e- Mali (1376 A.H. 1997), 55. 
295 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 521. 
296 See Shahid Thani, supra note 208, at  419. 
297 See Salehi, supra note 294, at 56. 
298 The holy Quran, Sureh 2:179. 
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similar crimes. Foqahā have discussed the Diyah in the same chapter as other punishments in 
their jurisprudence books.299 
 (ii)  The Diyah as a Compensation 
There is another opinion that the Diyah has a civil liability nature. It is argued that there is no 
reference to the Diyah as a punishment in Islamic sources (the Quran and the Sunnah). On 
the contrary, there are traditions that can be counter-examples to this claim. Proponents claim 
that the Diyah was established to compensate for death or bodily injuries. It is distinguished 
from compensation in tort liability or other systems for damages to properties.300  
1. The Diyah is a compensation for death or bodily injury.301 Therefore, it is not a punishment 
since the purpose of its payment is for compensating the bodily injuries or losses.302 Court 
adjudicates it to cover the losses caused by offenders. If judge refuses such a judgment 
(hokm), losses to victim would be left uncompensated and this would be against the la zarar 
principle.303 Whatever is paid to the victim is for compensating the loss and injury he had 
faced.304 
2. Islamic punishments are always for sins and contain intention. However, in the majority of 
cases, in the Diyah there are fault-based acts or quasi-intentional acts, which lacked the factor 
of intention.305 
3. For unintentional offences, the āqele and not the offender, is liable for the Diyah.306 
However, according to Islamic criminal law, punishments are personalized. Āqele who is 
                                                      
299 See Salehi, supra note 294, at 58. 
300 M.H. Marashi, Didgah -e- Jdid dar Hoqooq -e- Jazai -e- Islami Vol. I (1376 A.H. 1997), 43. 
301 See Art. 295 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
302 A. Edris, Avaz, (1377 A.H. 1998), 178. 
303 Ibid., at 179. 
304 A. Mahmoudi, Hoqooq -e- Jazaie Islami (1359 A.H. 1980), 55. 
305 See Edris, supra note 302, at 180. 
306 See Art. 305 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
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liable for paying the Diyah is relatives of the offender.307 Thus, it is not meaningful to 
consider it as a punishment. Had it been stated that the Diyah is a punishment, it should be 
concluded that according to Islamic jurisprudence, innocent people have the capability to 
come under prosecution and punishment. As this offends against wisdom, the Diyah therefore 
has a civil nature. 
 (iii)  The Diyah as an Integrated Special Entity  
Regarding the conditions of the Diyah, considering it as an integrated special entity seems 
more realistic as compared with the previous idea which believed that all legal entities have 
to necessarily be put under one of the traditional dichotomies (i.e. civil or criminal liability). 
There is no sound reason to confine the Diyah to just one of them.308  
The following are the most important reasons that support the dual nature of the Diyah, and 
in the mean time, recognizing it as a unique entity: 
1. The Diyah is a pecuniary penalty. It is also compensation. It is a pecuniary penalty (fine) 
since there is a kind of hardship and grief for the offender and he will be deprived of some of 
his property. However, it is also like compensation, since the aim of the Diyah is to 
compensate the claimant.309 
However, in some cases, it is different from a pecuniary penalty and compensation. A 
pecuniary penalty is in law a kind of public punishment, which deprives the offender of some 
of his property and his liberty like when he is given a prison sentence. The aim of 
punishment, either to his property or to his liberty, is to remove crime for the benefit of the 
public. A pecuniary penalty is the right of society, and the victim or his relatives do not have 
                                                      
307 See Art. 307 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
308 M. Ashouri, Aein -e- Dadrasi-e- Jazaei Vol. I (1385 A.H. 2006), 265. 
309 N. Katuzian, ‘Mahiat va Qalamro -e- Diyah baray Khesarat’, (1372 A.H. 1993) Kanoon -e- Vokala Journal 
2, at 23. 
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a right to claim for it, but in the Diyah it is different. Firstly, the Diyah belongs to the victim 
and his heirs, and it is not transferred to the public treasury. Secondly, in most cases the 
Diyah payment is made not solely by the offender. His family or tribe contributes to this 
payment and the offender’s share is like that of other members of the tribe. Thirdly, the Diyah 
is only for the benefit of the victim or his heirs. Therefore, it is not possible to consider it 
merely as a criminal punishment.310 
2. The Diyah is not the only compensation, since there is a condition in consideration that 
states that the wrongdoer should cover the total compensation whether the damage or injury 
is material or immaterial, or is a combination of the two. However, the Diyah is a limited 
liability and it is not for all the damage caused by the offence.311  
(iv) The Diyah as a Hybrid Nature 
The author is of the opinion that the Diyah has a hybrid nature with specific characteristics. It 
has a dual face and an integrated nature that includes criminal and civil liabilities.312 Under 
Islamic criminal law, intentional offences are punished by retaliation (qisas), so civil and 
criminal liabilities have no clear-cut borders. Therefore, efforts to categorize the Diyah as a 
civil remedy or a punishment in criminal liability do not seem necessary in a system in which 
the boundaries between civil and criminal liabilities are blurred. The Diyah is an integration 
of criminal and civil liabilities, rejecting the concept of standalone criminal or compensatory 
liability.  
It can be argued that by conceiving the Diyah as an independent civil institution for 
compensating victims, this paves the way for legislators to set rules for liability in excess of 
                                                      
310 Ibid. 
311 M. Mirsaeidi, Mahiat -e- Hoqooqi -e- Diyah (1373 A.H. 1993), 54. 
312 See Ashouri, supra note 308, at 240. 
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the Diyah (unlimited liability). Hence legislators can codify laws and regulations that may 
contribute to the conditions and circumstances of national and international communities. 
Therefore, the author is of the opinion that the Diyah in Shariah law has two aspects. It is a 
punishment for crimes, and where there is no crime, it is compensation for the victim.313  
However, this compensation is the minimum remedy and if damage exceeds the Diyah, 
complete compensation should be made. 
A discussion of the nature of the Diyah is important for air carrier liability. This is because if 
the Diyah is considered to have either a punitive or a civil nature, there will be a conflict 
between the international regime and the Diyah.314 If it is assumed that it has either a punitive 
or a compensatory nature, it will not be possible to bring the Shariah and international 
conventions to a state of harmonious coexistence. This is owing to the fact that the foqahā do 
not accept principles other than what is explained by the Shariah. They would argue that such 
a principle is in explicit conflict with the Shariah. Those foqahā hold the Diyah as an 
unchangeable regulation so it is not possible to have liability in excess of the Diyah or 
unlimited liability. However, if a dual nature is conceived for the Diyah, there will be no 
obstacle in the effort to reconcile the Shariah and international regulations.  By accepting a 
dual nature, it can be concluded that the Shariah is flexible and can be implemented 
alongside international regimes. The author will investigate the different interpretations.315  
                                                      
313 In deliberate and quasi-deliberate homicide, the Diyah contains a criminal aspect since the offender is liable 
for paying it. However, in other purely unintentional offences such as manslaughter; since the tribe (āqele) is 
liable for the payment of the Diyah, it contains a civil liability aspect. 
314 Discussing the nature of Diyah is important because of the impact it has on the feasibility of accepting a 
limitation of liability in excess of the Diyah such as what is mentioned in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention 
1929, or the coordination between liability under the Diyah and the principles of liability in the Warsaw 
Convention 1929. For details see 4.3, infra. 
315 See Chr. 4.3, infra. 
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3.4.5.3 The Diyah and Liability 
 (i) The Diyah and Tort liability 
The Diyah is similar to compensation for civil liability, since in civil liability, the aim of 
payment is compensation. Malice has no place in it, especially in destruction cases. It is 
almost the same in the Diyah, since in quasi-intentional offences and unintentional offences, 
the payment of the Diyah is obligatory and malice is not a condition for its realization.  
Foqahā have divided the Diyah like in the case of destruction (etlāf). Liability for death or 
bodily injury can be by direct or indirect involvement, due to the harmful results attributed to 
it.  
1. For directly caused destructions, the general principle indicates that ‘passing the passage of 
man is permissible (mobāh), provided that the result is safe’.316 Passing included walking on 
foot, on animals, and nowadays in vehicles. The direct causation of death or bodily injury to 
persons can be directly attributed to the offender, i.e. he does an act with or without a tool in 
a way, that death is attributable to him.317 Therefore, in this case, strict liability has been 
accepted. 
2. For indirectly caused death or bodily injury (tasbib), the liability for death or bodily injury 
is based on fault. The wrongdoer has not been duly careful, and because of his carelessness, 
death or bodily injury was caused through acts like digging a well or putting stones in the 
passage of people. In these cases, the reason for injury is the person slipping and not acts like 
digging a well.318 That is, he has not paid due attention to the foreseeable outcome of his act, 
                                                      
316 Islamic jurists have discussed different kinds of indirectly caused negligence under the topic of what a man 
creates in the public passages. They have resorted to the la zarar principle and the Prophet’s tradition for 
substantiating liability in this case. See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 557. 
317 Ibid., at 560. 
318 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 95. 
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or acted in spite of knowing the outcome.319 In indirect causation, two conditions make the 
payment of the Diyah obligatory: a) a relation between cause and damage, and b) fault.320 The 
concept of fault is so broad that even if the act was taken for the public’s benefit but 
accompanied with negligence and results in damage or harm, the one who has caused death 
or bodily injury is liable.321  
However, there are some differences between destruction and the Diyah: 
1. In destruction (etlāf), the property is damaged, but in the Diyah, the damage has caused 
death or injury to a person.  
2. In etlāf, intention does not make a difference in the liability of the wrongdoer. However, if 
an offender has acted intentionally, the liability attributed to the act is not the Diyah but 
qisas.322 
3. In civil liability, there is an intention to compensate equally and fully the damage. This 
requires delicacy in delimiting the damage and in calculating the amount payable for the 
damage. However, in the Shariah there is a fixed amount for the Diyah. In etlāf, liability is 
unlimited, and if one causes a defect in the property, he will be liable for the price of the 
defect.323 
 (ii)  The Diyah and Contractual Liability 
If breaching the obligations of a contract causes death or bodily injury, there will be 
contractual liability and the liable party has to pay compensation. Generally, contracts made 
among parties are either for something to be done or for reaching a certain result.324 
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1. The Diyah and obligation de résultat 
When a contracting party accepts liability for achieving a certain result, if the aimed result is 
not achieved, and because of it the other party encounters damage, there is a breach of 
contract and the party is liable for compensation. The foqahā believe that breach of the 
contract contents is enough for imposing liability, even though the liable party has not 
committed any fault in carrying out his undertakings.325 
The author is of the opinion that if the carrier undertakes to carry safely passengers to their 
destination, but fails to do so successfully the mere existence of a causal relationship between 
the act of the carrier and the death or bodily injury of the passengers imposes an obligation on 
the Diyah on the carrier to pay.  
2. The Diyah and obligation de moyen(s) 
When a carrier obliges to merely provide his services to the best of his knowledge and belief, 
and it becomes clear that the carrier has not committed negligence or extravagancy, and has 
applied due diligence and caution, but in spite of his endeavors damage is suffered by the 
other party, he would not be considered liable.326 In this kind of obligation, according to the 
contract law, the obligor should do all possible and necessary acts and cautions to get the 
concerned result.327 
Therefore, according to the rules of breaching obligation de moyen(s), if a contracting party 
acts in accordance with his contractual obligation and is not negligent, yet somehow causes 
                                                      
325 See Edris, supra note 302, at 126. 
326 Ibid. 
327 See Amin, supra note 132, at 20. 
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bodily injury or death, since it is not due to his fault and / or breach of his obligations, 
naturally there will not be a contractual obligation on him to pay damages.328 
3.4.5.4 The Diyah and Limited and Unlimited Liability 
(i) The Diyah and Limited Liability 
There is a fixed tariff for the Diyah, unless another agreement is reached between the 
parties.329 In principle, it consists of camels of different ages and sex. The Diyah for homicide 
is one hundred camels, split into five categories and equal in number: twenty four-year-old, 
twenty three-year-old, twenty two-year-old and twenty one-year-old female camels and 
twenty one-year-old male camels. This division is subject to divergent foqahā options. If the 
homicide is intentional or quasi-intentional, the value of the Diyah increases (Diyah 
moghallezeh), comprising now, and only female camels of the first four categories described. 
If an offence occurs in one of the harām months,330 the offender, in addition to a full Diyah, 
has to pay another one third of the Diyah to the victim. There is a consensus over this rule.331  
Although according to the original principle the Diyah consists of camels, it was very soon 
recognized that it, equally well, could be paid in gold coinage (1000 gold Dinārs or 10,000 
Derhams according to different versions).332 As said, the Diyah may also consist of cattle 
(200), sheep (1000) or clothing (200 garments).333 
As discussed previously, there is a fixed tariff on the Diyah which is payable, unless another 
agreement is reached between the parties. In principle, the Diyah is one hundred camels. If 
                                                      
328 See Esmaili, supra note 196, at 67. 
329 See Art. 297 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
330 I.e. the four months of Rajab, Zelqade, Zelhaje and Moharam of the Islamic lunar calendar. Art. 299 of 
Islamic Criminal Code. 
331 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 27. 
332 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 504; Art. 297 of Islamic Criminal Code;Peters, supra note 282, at 51-53. 
333 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 28. 
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the homicide is intentional or quasi-intentional, the value of the Diyah increases.334 Each year, 
the Iranian Ministry of Justice announces the Diyah in the Iranian currency. Courts and 
insurance companies use it in their judgments and payments. In 2011, the Diyah was set at 
67,000,000 Tomans (appr. US $ 67,000).335 
There are disputes over whether the mode of payment depends upon the agreement between 
the parties, or whether it depends on the decision of either the offender or the court, or 
whether a mode is obligatory depending on different circumstances and localities. In addition, 
whether the payment of the Diyah with camels is a fundamental obligation, which is 
modifiable only in circumstances where payment in this form is impossible. However, it 
appears that an offender has the right to choose from six kinds of Diyah,336 and the victim’s 
heirs have no right to refuse the Diyah that the offender has chosen.337  
The amount of the Diyah is due in full only when the victim is a male Muslim.338 In a 
majority of opinion, the amount varies according to gender and religion.339 They believe that 
the Diyah of a woman is half that of a man.340 This reduction to half is only applicable where 
the Diyah exceeds one third of the full Diyah; otherwise, the Diyah for men and women are 
equal.341 The Diyah payable by a non-Muslim foreigner temporarily admitted to the Muslim 
territory is at the rate of one third or one-half in the opinion of the majority.342 
However, foqahā such as Ayatollah Sanei believe that according to the major Islamic 
sources, i.e. the Quran and the Sunnah, there is no difference among men and women, and 
                                                      
334 See Mirsaeidi, supra note 311, at 42 -112 
335 http://www.dadiran.ir/. 
336 See Husaini al-Amili, supra note 292, at 357. 
337 See Najafi, supra note 154, at 15. 
338 See Amin, supra note 132, at 55 
339 Ibid. 





Muslims and non-Muslims with regard to the Diyah. Likewise, according to the general rules 
of Islam, the Diyah is equal for women and men, or Muslims and non-Muslims.343 They argue 
that the basic reasoning for variations has been a few special traditions and ejmā among 
foqahā. However, both of them are authentically refutable.344  
Firstly, the traditions supporting variations are against the Quran and the Sunnah, and they 
are not authentic. Secondly, ejmā is not as authentic as a reason since some foqahā such as 
Ayatollah Sanei have expressed their doubt on it, and ejmā is not an independent reason. 
Ejmā is a proof where the Quran or the Sunnah has not provided a rule.345 It is affected by 
unauthentic traditions, and since those traditions had been in conflict with the Quran and the 
general rules of Islam, they are therefore not reliable. Consequently, any ejmā based on them 
is not reliable either.346 
As explained above, the Diyah regulations were directly adopted in Iranian law. However, 
their application in civil liability is still ambiguous. Among these cases, one can mention the 
nature of the Diyah, the unchangeable limited liability in the Diyah, and its application in tort 
and contractual liability. Since compensation based on the Diyah is the main conflict between 
Shariah regulations and the international system of air carrier liability, the author will analyze 
this issue below. Here the nature of the Diyah will be analyzed, and then studied in tort and 
contract. 
 (ii) The Diyah and Unlimited Liability 
The Diyah for death, both in civil or criminal liability, is predetermined. It should be paid to 
the inheritors of the victim according to the Shariah.  It means that neither the contracting 
                                                      
343 Y. Sanei, Nezarat  -e- Qzaei (1385 A.H. 2006), 5-22. 
344 Ibid. 




parties nor even the legislature can agree on less than that fixed amount predetermined by the 
Shariah. However, compensation in excess of the Diyah in favor of the victim is a matter of 
dispute among the foqahā, which will be discussed below. 
The dominant view is that the Diyah is a limited liability for the victim. Whilst a majority of 
foqahā is of the opinion that the Diyah was determined for death and bodily injury, an 
important question remains as to whether a claimant can claim unlimited liability in addition 
to the Diyah.347 Did ratification of the Diyah law abolish the Civil Liability Act 1960? 
Iran, according to the Civil Liability Act 1960, had accepted unlimited liability for death or 
bodily injury. However, the codification of the Islamic Criminal Code and its application by 
the courts has caused conflicts in the area of compensation for liability in excess of the 
Diyah. This issue surfaced in 1984 when the criminal courts posed the question to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court responded by clarifying that courts could not condemn 
defendants to shoulder liability in excess of the Diyah for the costs of medical treatment or 
for incapacity to work.348 Liability in excess of the Diyah is important in adjusting the Diyah 
to provisions of limited or unlimited liability in international air Conventions. Otherwise, it 
would lead to discrepancies in victims’ compensation, especially where the limited liability 
provisions in international air Conventions become applicable to domestic flights. If liability 
in excess of the Diyah is accepted, this will reconcile domestic law with the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention. After posing this question, the foqahā and the courts in Iran elaborated on their 
opinions.349 These opinions affected the judgments of courts and ended in non-uniformity.350 
                                                      
347 According to Art.1 of the Civil Liability Act of 1960, any damage whether physical or mental, imposes 
liability; and the offender is liable for compensation. 
348 Judgments of the Supreme Court, Civil Branches, No. 68.9.14. 
349 Ashouri, supra note 308, at 241. 
350 Judgments of the Supreme Court, Civil Branches, No. 75.4.5. 
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The author is of the opinion that the majority view, which is in favour of a limitation on the 
amount of compensation payable for death or bodily injury in the Diyah, is unacceptable in 
States like Iran. The following opinions support this claim, and indicate an inclination 
towards complete compensation. 
1. Opinions of Prominent Contemporary (foqahā) 
Since the Diyah is a legal entity of the Shariah, it is of great importance for both the 
legislators and the courts to refer to the opinions (fatvā) of prominent foqahā for its 
interpretation. Indeed, according to a prescription by the Constitutional Code,351 where there 
is no explicit text of law on an issue, courts should refer to well-known fatva of prominent 
contemporary foqahā. Up to the present time, no explicit text of law has discussed the issue 
of compensation exceeding the Diyah. Courts therefore resort to fatwa when investigating 
such claims. 
In the early stages of when the Diyah provisions were applied, religious scholars have 
investigated this issue and their responses indicated that it would be illegitimate for 
compensation to exceed the Diyah. Later on, however, liability in excess of the Diyah was 
limitedly accepted. 
a) Ayatollah Golpayegani, in response to the following case, declared that the offender is not 
liable for any other cost except the Diyah, and the offender and the victim should 
compromise on medical treatment costs. The case was about a car accident in which the 
driver hit a boy and broke his leg. The boy was an orphan and has a guardian. The driver 
undertook to compensate for the leg injury and to pay for the medical treatment.352 
                                                      
351 See Art.167 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
352 M.R Golpayegani, Majma al-Masa’il Vol. III ( 1386 A.H. 2007), 249. 
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b) Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, in response to another case, mentioned that the Diyah is 
imposed on a person who caused harm to another. If the victim needs medical treatment to 
recover, it is obligatory on the offender to pay the costs of medical treatment, in addition to 
the Diyah. If, because of the harm the victim suffers a pecuniary loss (e.g. if he cannot do his 
ordinary tasks or his job), this should also be compensated.353  
c) According to another contemporary Ayatollah, Hossain Nori, where the costs of medical 
treatment exceed the Diyah, the offender should pay this excess cost in accordance with the 
principle of la zarar. The loss should be compensated for by the offender since he is the 
causer of that offence.354  
2. Opinions of the Judiciary  
When the courts were investigating liability for death or bodily injury in 1985, they asked the 
Commission of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary if claimants could claim for 
compensation according to the Civil Procedure Act. The Commission responded by stating 
that even when the damage or loss is more than the Diyah, the claimant can only claim for the 
Diyah and has no right for the total remedy. It is clear that the Supreme Court rejected any 
possibility for the claimant to exceed the Diyah.355  
The Legal Office of the Judiciary, in response to a question about damages exceeding the 
Diyah, had initially stated that these are not compensable and that the defendant is only liable 
for the Diyah.356 However, a clear change of attitude took place in 1997, when in response to 
several inquiries from the Research Center of the Judiciary Power, it stated that damages 
                                                      
353 N. M. Shirazi, Rahnmon Vol. IV (1373 A.H. 1994), 191. 
354 H. Noori Hamedani, Tozihol Masael (1376 A.H.1997), 603. 
355 Opinion of the Commission of the Supreme Judiciary Council Vol. II (1987), 34. 
356 According to this opinion, where an offender is found liable under the General Criminal Act of 1973, the 
claimant can claim for compensation for any damages, and the court can issue compensation based on the 
medical treatment documents. However, in relation to an offender who is liable under the Diyah law, there is no 
reason to claim for loss or damage related to death or bodily injury. See S.S. Shahri Jahromi, Opinions of the 
Legal Office of the Judiciary in the Field of Criminal Cases Vol. I (1378 A.H. 1999), 73. 
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exceeding the Diyah are compensable. The Office noted that when resorting to the la zarar 
(no harm) principle, where it is clear that because of an offender’s act the victim has suffered 
an injury higher in value than the Diyah, a remedy in excess of the Diyah is acceptable.357 In 
subsequent consultative opinions, the Legal Office repeated this opinion.358 As a result, the 
Supreme Court in recent years has revised courts’ decisions in line with this new opinion.359 
In the early stage, different branches of the General Supreme Court had frequently rejected 
judgments awarded by lower courts in favor of compensation exceeding the Diyah. However, 
in 1995, the General Supreme Court (Civil Branch) confirmed that compensation could 
exceed the Diyah by referring to the la zarar principle. 
Therefore, although the courts and the foqahā did not initially accept liability exceeding the 
Diyah, they gradually inclined towards applying liability that exceeds the Diyah and 
unlimited liability for death or bodily injury. This liability exceeding the Diyah can be a basis 
for the final reform of the Diyah regulations in the future. 
The author is of the opinion that compensation in excess of the Diyah can be accepted since:  
1. The la zarar principle allows total compensation. 
2. Foqahā have recently accepted liability in excess of the Diyah.  
3. The Civil Liability Act 1960 is still in force, which provides unlimited liability for death or 
bodily injury.360  
                                                      
357 The Opinion of the Legal Office of the Judiciary, No. 1376.127.4125. 
358 The Opinion of the Legal Office of the Judiciary, No.s. 1376277.4135 and 137697.4128. 
359 Y. Barzigar, Hoqooq – Madani va Jazaei dar Ahkām -e- Dadgahha -e- Ali(1379 A.H. 2001), Criminal Cases 
(1388 A.H. 2009), 146. 
360 It is submitted that by accepting liability in excess of the Diyah, this helps pave the way for the Diyah 
provisions to be harmonized with the provisions of the Conventions. For a comparative study of the Diyah and 
limited liability in the conventions, see 4.3, infra. 
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3.4.5.5 Āqele (Defendant)  
There is a consensus (ejmā) among foqahā that in intentional and quasi-intentional murder, 
the offender should pay the Diyah from his property.361 However, in unintentional homicide 
(qatl khataii), his āqele should pay the Diyah instead of the offender.362 Āqele has no right to 
refer to the offender to ask what they have paid for the Diyah.363 The Diyah should be paid by 
āqele provided that the unintentional homicide is proved by a reason. Therefore, if the 
offender confesses to it, or if he comes to an amicable settlement with the heirs of the victim, 
he should pay the Diyah or the amount of money agreed through the amicable settlement.364 
In Islamic jurisprudence, the principle of collective liability was firmly maintained in theory. 
However, in practice it gradually weakened, and ultimately disappeared altogether.365 Āqele 
who has previously been the primary creditor became subordinate to the offender. 
Consequently, through the disappearance of the tribal organization of the developed Islamic 
society, the place of āqele was taken by the State or insurance.366 
In the Islamic Criminal Code, in unintentional homicide, āqele is still considered liable for 
the compensation.367 However, access to āqele for compensation is difficult, and even if āqele 
can be contacted, they may be financially unable to pay the Diyah. This can cause lengthy 
litigations. Therefore, the legislators have preferred to introduce a new term to cover 
                                                      
361 See Art. 304 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
362 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 502; Art. 305 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
363 There is a dispute among scholars with regard to āqele. Some are of the opinion that āqele are colleagues of 
the offender; others think that they are his family and tribe; whilst a number believe that they are the offender’s 
paternal relatives (osbe). According to Shia scholars, āqele are the offender’s paternal relatives be they children 
or adults. See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 499. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid., at 503. 
366 Ibid. 
367 There is a difference here between unintentional homicide (khataii) and quasi-intentional acts. In a quasi-
intentional offence or homicide, the offender himself should pay the Diyah while in an unintentional offence or 
manslaughter, it is the tribe (āqele) who should pay the Diyah. Ibid. at 505. 
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unintentional homicide together with negligent conduct.368 This new term includes most 
unintentional homicides especially those involving non-observance of governmental 
regulations. According to this new regulation, the defendant is liable for the Diyah.369 Its 
remit is expressed in Article 259 of the Islamic Criminal Code of 1996.  
3.4.5.6 Claimant 
The Diyah is a property, like other properties, which a man owns through a legal process. The 
first person who has a right to possess the Diyah is the victim. According to Shariah rules, if 
the victim dies, his Diyah, like other due property, should be given to his heir(s),370 i.e. they 
are the legal owners of the Diyah.371 Therefore, heir(s) can claim for compensation.372 There 
is a consensus among foqahā that the Diyah is like any other of the dead person’s property. It 
is divisible among his heirs according to Shariah rules.373 
3.5 Iranian law and International Liability 
Iran has ratified and given effect to the Warsaw Convention 1929, The Hague Protocol 1955, 
and the Guadalajara Protocol 1961 for international flights in 1975.374 According to the 
Specific Act of 1985 entitled ‘Determining the Scope of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on 
Domestic Flights’ in air transport accidents of domestic flights, Iran applies the provisions of  
limited liability in the Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Hague Protocol 1955.375 
 
                                                      
368 See Arts.305-307 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
369 See Art.259 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
370 See Art. 307 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
371 See Khomeini, supra note 156, at 504. 
372 The Shariah has identified the heirs of a victim in detail. See Arts. 861- 866 of the Civil Code. 
373 See Mirsaeidi, supra note 311, at 19. 
374 http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/StatusForms/iran_islamic_republic_of_en.pdf. 
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Although the Constitutional Code has not explicitly mentioned the Guardian Council as a 
body in the ratification process, according to Article 94 of the Constitutional Code all 
enactments of the Parliament must be sent to the Guardian Council to examine their 
conformity with the Shariah, and the Constitutional Code. The Guardian Council should 
affirm the treaty. Otherwise, it will not be treated as law. If the Council finds the treaty to be 
contrary to the Shariah, the enactment is returned to the Parliament for review. Otherwise, it 
is applicable law.379  
The contents of a treaty are applicable in courts insofar as they relate to the rights of persons 
and conflict of laws. According to the Constitutional system, private law conventions are 
incorporated into national law by an Act together with the translated treaty’s text. The Farsi 
version is the one applied by the local courts. Thus, in this law, no action will lie in tort in 
respect of liability in international carriage, but an action will lie under the applicable 
Conventions. 
3.5.2 Domestic Flights 
The Iranian legislators approved a specific statute entitled ‘Determining the Scope of 
Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights’. According to this statute, air carrier 
liability should comply with the limited liability provisions of the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention.380 Legislature also ratified the Islamic Criminal code. It contains regulations for 
limited liability against death that are in contradiction with the limited liability provisions for 
death under the Warsaw Hague convention.381  
                                                      
379 Ibid. 
380 Collection of Law and Regulations of Civil Aviation of Iran (1375 A.H. 1996), 125. 
381 See 4.3, infra. 
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3.5.2.1 Air Carrier Liability for Baggage, Goods and Delay 
As these principles are not in conflict with other laws in Iran, and they are not unchangeable 
principles of the Shariah, and, moreover, the legislators have clarified their application for 
the benefit of domestic customers and carriers, courts apply them without ambiguity to 
domestic flights.382 Therefore, courts exclusively apply the provisions of the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention as implemented for damage to goods or delay on domestic flights.383 In related 
cases they refer to Article 22 of the Warsaw-Hague Convention.384  
3.5.2.2 Air Carrier Liability for Passenger’s Death or Bodily Injury: Iran’s Dual System 
of Liability  
There are two types of regulations for Iranian air carrier’s liability for passenger death and 
bodily injury. One is the Diyah that comes from the Shariah and is generally applicable for 
all Iranians including air passengers in domestic flights,385 and the other one the Specific Act 
of 1985, which considers Warsaw-Hague regulations applicable in domestic flights.386 This is 
the main point of conflict that the author has examined in this study.387 
Iranian legislators approved in 1985 the aforementioned specific statute to determine the 
scope of liability of Iranian air carriers in domestic flights. According to this statute, air 
carrier liability should comply with the provisions of limited liability in the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention. However, this endorsement of the Warsaw-Hague Convention for domestic 
                                                      
382 See Case No. 1-74 -26.7.74 Trial Court, Case No. 31-5394-11 Supreme Court, Case No. 31-154- 6.3.75 
Appeal Court, Case No.192-4675-872- 25.2.76 Appeal Court, Case No. 245-31-26.3.1377 Appeal Court. Case 
No. 31-154- 6.3.75 Appeal Court, Case No. 192-4675-872- 25.2.76 Appeal Court. Case No. 245-31-26.3 Appeal 
Court. 
383 See Case No. 31-5394-11 Supreme Court, Case No. 31-154- 6.3.75 Appeal Court, Case No.192-4675-872- 
25.2.76 Appeal Court, Case No. 245-31-26.3.1377 Appeal Court. 
384 See 4.2.1.3 4, infra. 
385 See Art 306 of Islamic Criminal Code. 
386 Collection of Law and Regulations of Civil Aviation of Iran (1375 A.H. 1996), 125. 
387 See 4.3, infra. 
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flights has caused controversy in Iran. The principles of liability for death or bodily injury, 
which are based on the Diyah, operate differently from the limitation of liability in the 
Warsaw-Hague Convention.388 After comparing the international principles with the Shariah, 
section 3 of Chapter 4 deals with this conflict and the question of whether the limited liability 
provisions in the Warsaw-Hague Convention govern the Diyah law in domestic flights or 
vice versa. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Iranian law in general and carrier liability regulations in particular, have been under the 
influence of Islamic jurisprudence and the Shariah. The Shariah consists of principles and 
rules that foqahā provide according to Islamic jurisprudence from Islamic sources. There are 
diverse juristic opinions, and there may be different interpretations of the Shariah for an issue 
such as the Diyah which is limited or unlimited liability. However, in most cases there is a 
majority opinion that makes the dominant view. For example in the Diyah, the majority 
opinion is that it is a limited liability.389 
This does not mean that the Islamic legislature has to follow the majority opinion. It can 
develop another view by referring to the conditions of its pertinent society. However, these 
principles are in the abstract. As long as they are not implemented through codified laws and 
regulations in Iran, usually they are not obligatory. Therefore, there are two kinds of laws and 
regulations in the Shariah. 
                                                      
388 Case No. 245-31-26.3.1377 Appeal Court. 
389 In feqh, there is a technical term called in the Persian sources ‘qol -e- mashhoor’ that means a number of 
foqahā have the same opinion on a matter. Usually the books do not mention the name of those foqahā and only 
state ‘qol -e- mashhoor’. In this research, it is translated to ‘majority opinoion’. Its opposite is ‘qol -e- shaz’ that 
can be translated to ‘minority opinion’. 
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1. If there is an explicit text and there is no need for interpretation, the Shariah as a source of 
law is usually immutable and infallible. For instance, the Quran contains provisions on 
inheritance law and compensation for death or bodily injury. As these are rules in the 
Shariah, legislators in Islamic States cannot modify them.  
2. If there is no direct text on a particular matter, laws and regulations are usually flexible and 
changeable. The basic texts that inspire the foqahā are not followed universally and 
identically. From this, many schools of thought were born that understand the Shariah 
according to their ideas. For example, although the Quran generally explains liability for 
death or bodily injury, there is no explicit text that determines that limited liability is the only 
rule for compensation and that unlimited liability is unacceptable. As a result, there are 
different interpretations offered by the foqahā. 
The Shariah has its independent principles for liability that can be summarized as follows: 
1. In the Shariah, liability is based on compensation. It can be claimed that in tort, it is based 
on strict liability, i.e. as soon as a person harms another, he has to compensate even though he 
is not at fault. However, if the damage is indirect, the fault principle will apply.  
2. The Shariah prescribes amanat regulations for contract of carriage. The main principle in 
amanat is based on fault. It means that if the carrier has not committed fault, he would not be 
liable and the burden of proof would be on the claimant.  
3. The Shariah nevertheless has specific rules and regulations for death or bodily injury. 
Sometimes these principles are different from liability in tort and carrier liability. Liability 
principles in the Diyah are the same as talaf principles in tort. Consequently, liability is strict. 
That is, as soon as someone causes death or bodily injury to another person, he will be liable 
for compensation and if the cause is indirect, the fault principle will govern. Thus if the air 
carrier is considered as the direct cause of death or bodily injury to the passenger, it will be 
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subject to strict liability. It means that as soon as a relationship is established between the act 
of the carrier and the passenger’s death or bodily injury, the carrier will be liable for 
compensation. However, if the causation is indirect, his liability will be based on fault and the 
burden of proof will be on the claimant. 
According to the Constitutional Code of Iran, Shariah principles were codified by the Islamic 
legislature due to the demands of technological developments and the conditions of the 
Iranian society. 
The Parliament is not the only legislative body. Authorities such as the Leader and the 
Guardian Council play important roles in codifying laws and regulations and their conformity 
with the Shariah.  
The laws and regulations on air carrier liability in Iran are complex. When studying air carrier 
liability in Iran, attention should be paid to the principles of liability in the Civil Code, 
Commercial Code and Islamic Criminal Code, as well as applicable treaties as implemented 
in domestic law, and specific statutes. In addition to these, the opinions of foqahā and the 
Guardian Council should also be observed.390  
The Civil Code considers a contract of carriage as an ejāreh and recognizes rules of liability 
based on amanat. The general rules in the Civil Code govern both carriage of goods and 
passengers. However, there are other general and special laws and regulations for goods and 
passengers, which influence the carriage provisions in the Civil Code. 
The Commercial Code provides general principles of liability for goods.  The provisions of 
the Commercial Code for liability towards cargo and delay are similar to those of the civil 
law since the legislature had adopted them from civil law States. 
                                                      
390 In other words, the principles of the Shariah enjoy the same status as the text of law. Where there is no 
explicit law text on a particular matter, the Shariah is considered as a formal source of law in Iran. See Art.167 
of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
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The liability in the contract of carriage, according to the Commercial Code, is based on 
presumption of liability. Therefore, when the Specific Act of 1985 entitled ‘Determining the 
Scope of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights’ was ratified in 1985, the 
courts faced no difficulty applying the limited liability of the Warsaw Convention 1929, as 
amended by The Hague Protocol of 1955 to carriage of cargo and delay. In fact, the exact 
Warsaw-Hague Convention provisions were applied to domestic flights just as in the case of 
international flights.  
For passenger’s death or bodily injury, in addition to the general rules of the Civil Code and 
the Commercial Code, as well as the Specific Act of 1985 implementing the provisions of 
limited liability in the Warsaw-Hague Convention in Iranian law, one should refer to the 
Islamic Criminal Code. This Code, which follows the Shariah, provides special provisions 
for civil liability as well as criminal liability. This involves the inclusion of independent 
principles of liability for death and bodily injury (the Diyah) into the Islamic Criminal 
Code.391  
The most important issue in this Code is the determination of liability limits for death and 
bodily injury, which is in contradiction with the limited liability and unlimited liability for 
death and bodily injury in the Warsaw-Hague regime.392 Hence, the principles of liability for 
death or bodily injury in the Warsaw-Hague Convention and the Shariah collide in Iranian 
law. The next chapter discusses the liability principles of the Warsaw-Montreal regime. It 
will also include a comparison between the Shariah principles and the Warsaw-Montreal 
regime. Then the Shariah principles will be compared and contrasted with the international 
regime to reveal collision in practice in the investigation of an air accident in Iranian courts. 
                                                      
391 See Arts.294-297 of the Islamic Criminal Code. 
392 The Diyah is in contradiction with liability limits under article 20 of the Warsaw - Hague convention.  For 
detailed discussion see 4.3, infra. 
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CHAPTER 4   
 INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER’S LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
4.1    Introduction (From the Warsaw Convention to the Montreal Convention) 
In order to carry out a comparative study on international air carrier’s liability, this Chapter 
begins with a brief illustration of the historical background of private international air law. It 
then compares the principles of air carrier’s liability with the relevant terms from the Warsaw 
and Montreal Conventions in order to demonstrate how some principles of liability in the 
Shariah that seem to ostensibly diverge from the provisions of the Conventions, can indeed 
co-exist with the Conventions. 
4.1.1 The Warsaw Convention 19291  
The first International Conference on Air Law was held in 1925 in Paris.2 In the Conference, 
representatives of the prevailing legal systems of that time (for example, the United Kingdom 
for common law countries, and France and Germany for civil law countries) were present.3 
The European States in the first international conference established the Comité International 
Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens (CITEJA, a committee focused on technically 
tackling the different aspects of air carrier’s liability).4    
The committee worked for three successive years from 1926 to 1928.  The CITEJA submitted 
its report and final draft which had developed rules satisfying the legal systems that they 
represented, as well as precedents such as the 1924 Brussels Convention for the Unification 
                                                      
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed in Warsaw on 
12 October 1929. 
2The first international conference on private air law was finally held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 
from October 27 to November 6, 1925. The conference was composed of representatives from 44 states.  
3 In this conference, official delegates from 44 countries were present together with observers from the United 
States, Japan and Hungary. J. Ide, ‘The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee 
of Aerial Legal Experts’, (1932) Journal of Air Law 27, at 29. 
4 R. Horner and D. Legers, The Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law: Minutes Warsaw 
1929 (1975), 12 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Minutes Warsaw 1929’) at 15. 
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of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels,5 and 
the Convention on the Transport of Passengers and Luggage by Rail, concluded in Berne the 
same year as the Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, in 1929.6 
Participating States modified the draft and finally signed the Warsaw Convention 1929 (the 
WC29).7  
States in the Warsaw Conference recognized the economic, political and technical privileges 
of unifying some rules governing liability of air carriers at the international level in order to 
further develop the air transport industry.8 This Convention recognized the conditions of the 
early 20th century and the common economic interests of customers and operators, 
determined the limitation of liability9 on the one hand, and harmonized the civil law and 
common law rules on the other hand.10 As a result, it became a successful and durable 
international agreement which remained in place for over 70 years. 
4.1.2 Transitional Stages from the Warsaw Convention 1929 to the Montreal 
Convention 1999 
The WC29, along with its amendments and a series of intercarrier agreements that were 
adopted before the Montreal Convention, are collectively called the Warsaw System. They 
include: 1) The 1955 Hague Protocol; 2) The 1961 Guadalajara Convention; 3) The 1971 
Guatemala Protocol, 4) The 1975 Montreal Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4; 5) The 1966 
Montreal Intercarrier Agreement; 6) The 1995 IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger 
Liability (IIA); 7) The 1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Measures to Implement the IIA 
                                                      
5 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading.  
6 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 185. 
7The Convention entered into force after the deposit of the fifth ratification on February 1933. Up to 2011, 152 
states ratified it. http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/wc-hp.pdf. 
8 See Ide, supra note 3, at 31. 
9 H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Law (1954)  12 - 44.  
10 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 12. 
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(MIA); and 8) The 1996 ATA Intercarrier Agreement Provisions Implementing the 1995 and 
1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreement (IPA).11 
Changes in the economic and political conditions of countries after the Second World War 
required a more robust Convention. After the application of the WC29 by the different 
jurisdictions, certain shortages and inconsistencies came to light. Many countries, especially 
the United States, faced better economic conditions after the Second World War. 
Consequently, the level of welfare increased and people expected higher compensations and 
unlimited liability, just as domestic law.12  
The WC29 went far beyond a common point of principles in the legal systems of the common 
law and civil law since it imposed uniform limits of liability, breakable only in cases of faulty 
documentation or in cases of wilful misconduct of the carrier, in order to unify the cost of 
living in different countries.13 The claimants could achieve compensation in domestic law 
more than the limitation of liability in the WC29.14 Thus, they tended to sue based on a 
domestic cause of action or wilful misconduct to obtain remedy in excess of the applicable 
limitation of liability.15 Therefore, in order to increase the liability limits and to clarify terms 
such as wilful misconduct as well as to update the WC29 itself, States revised it in the Hague 
Conference 1955, i.e. after 26 years, and they continued revising it until 1999.  
                                                      
11 Chapter 4 reviews the evolution of the air carrier's liability in Conventions. It includes a brief discussion of the 
Warsaw system and the MC99. This Chapter deals with provisions of the WC29, the Hague Protocol, and the 
1975 Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 and ultimately MC99. In addition to the above instruments, the 1966 
Montreal Intercarrier Agreement, due to its important role in evolution of air carrier's liability, will also be 
discussed. This Chapter deals with the general principles of liability that govern air carrier’s liability in 
international instruments. First these principles are analyzed and then they arecompared them with the Shariah 
principles. Other conventions and protocols such as the Guadalajara Convention 1961 and the 1975 Montreal 
Additional Protocol No. 1, 2 and 3 and other international agreements such as the 1996 ATA Intercarrier 
Agreement Provisions Implementing the 1995 and 1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreement will not be investigated..  
12 K. Beaumont, ‘Proposed the Protocol to the Warsaw Convention of 1929’, (1953) Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 264, at 264-265.  
13 See Arts. 22 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention 1929. 
14 See Beaumont, supra note 12, at 264. 
15 Ibid.  
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1. The Hague Protocol16 modified principles of liability in order to regulate the interests of 
customer and air carrier. The important issues, amongst others, were an expansion of 
limitation and the simplification of transport documents.17 The provisions regarding air 
carrier’s liability and its limits needed strengthening. On the other hand, certain provisions 
concerning the formalities of transport documents needed to be clarified.18 
2. In the US, carriers were unlimitedly liable for compensation in domestic flights.19 There, it 
was believed that the limitation of liability in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol 
were far too low, so it refused to join the Protocol. According to the carrier’s agreement filed 
with the CAB,20 passengers on participating carriers going to, from, or with an agreed 
stopover in the United States, became subject to increased limitation of liability.21 
 In the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement provided strict liability22 instead of presumption 
of liability as basis of liability. 23     
3. The execution of the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement paved the way for a concerted 
effort to update the terms of the Convention to reflect a modern legal and technological 
                                                      
16 The Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
by Air approved in 1955. The Hague Protocol 1955 was presented to the Hague Conference, where i was signed 
in 1955 and entered into force on August 1st 1963. 
17 See Art. XI of The Hague Protocol 1955.  
18 See Arts. III, IV, and VI of The Hague Protocol 1955. 
19 See the ‘Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act (H.R.1000) for the 21st Century’. The 
common law of negligence governed the liability of air carriers in the United States for passenger death or 
bodily injury caused  by domestic flights. There were generally no fixed limitations on recoverable damages in 
any of the fifty States of the United States for death or bodily injury of persons caused by another’s negligence. 
G.N.Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as Developed by the Courts in the 
United States from Warsaw 1929 to Montreal 1999 (2010), 21. 
20 Agreement C.A.B. 18900, C.A.B. order E. 23680, Docket 17325, 44 C.A.B. 8 19, 31 FR 7302. It took effect 
on 16 May 1966. 
21 CAB Press Release 66-61, May 13, 1966. The formal CAB order appears in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) 
22 Bin Cheng calls this ‘absolute liability’. Bin Cheng, ‘A Reply to Charges of Having Inter Alia Misused the 
Term Absolute Liability in Relation to the 1966 Montreal Inter Carrier Agreement in my Plea for an Integrated 
System of Aviation Liability’, (1981) VI Annals of Air and Space Law 3, at 9.   
23 A.F. Lowenfeld and A.I. Mendelson, ‘The United States and the Warsaw Convention’, (1967) 80 Harvard 
Law Review520, at 547; David Cohen, ‘Happy Birthday: Agreement C.A.B. 18900, A Critical Review of the 




standards.24  In March 1971, the Guatemala City Protocol was signed by 21 States but did not 
enter into force. 25  
4. According to the international demand for revision of the air carrier’s liability towards 
cargo, States26 decided to revise air carrier’s liability through a new system.27 Additional 
Montreal Protocol No.4,28 in addition to new provisions on E-ticketing, changed the basis of 
liability.29  
5. The air transport industry in the 1990s achieved a strong global position.30  Therefore, it 
was difficult to find strong arguments for protecting airlines in international air transport. 31 
The international community including the United States, the European Union, IATA and 
even the airlines of individual countries such as Japanese airlines tried to improve the 
Warsaw system.32 International efforts to re-establish a uniform system of liability did not 
cease thereafter. Finally the ICAO, according to IATA33 and Regulations of the Council of 
                                                      
24Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport co., 351 F.Supp.702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 485 F .2d 1240 (2d Cir.1973) 
25 The Guatemala City Protocol did not enter into force  because, Article XX of the Guatemala City Protocol put 
a condition that was never met. It provides ‘This Protocol shall enter into force …, on the condition, however, 
that the total international scheduled air traffic, expressed in passenger kilometers, according to the statistics for 
the year 1970 published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, of the airlines of five States which 
have ratified this Protocol, represents at least 40 % of the total international scheduled air traffic of the airlines 
of the member States of the International Civil Aviation Organization in that year…’ But the United States, 
which its airlines has a large volume of traffic, did not ratify it. The United States never ratified the protocol due 
to its use of the volatile gold standard for determining liability limits, its unbreakable ceiling on liability, and its 
inability to adopt a supplemental compensation plan. E. Cotugno, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs 
From Either Courts or Legislature-Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in Committee, (1993) 58 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 745, at 756. 
26 ICAO Doc 9134-LC/173-2, at 1- 64. 
27 G.F. FitzGerald, ‘The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime Governing 
International Carriage by Air’, (1976) Journal of Air Law and Commerce 273, at 281. 
28 Doc ICAO 9145-9148, Additional Protocol No. 1,2,3 and 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929. 
29 See Art. IV of Additional Montreal Protocol No 4 of 1975. 
30 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 17. 
31 M. Milde, ‘The Warsaw System of Liability in International Carriage by Air: History, Merits and Flaws and 
the New Warsaw Convention of 28 May 1999’, (1999) XXIV Annals of Air and Space Law 155, at 163. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Essential Documents on International Air Carrier Liability (2nd Edition Issued by January 2004), IATA, 
Montreal –Geneva), at 68. 
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the European Union on air carrier’s liability,34 proposed a draft of the Montreal Convention 
1999.35 
4.1.3 The Montreal Convention 1999  
The drafters of the Montreal Convention 1999 (the MC99)36 intended it to be a 
‘compromising convention of the international air law and the unification of private air law.37  
They intended to update the Warsaw System since the WC29 was adopted at a time when the 
aviation industry was in its infancy.38 However, new phenomena such as developments in 
technological equipment, the globalization of air transport operations, and the shifting balance 
of interests with an inclination to protect the individual’s right to compensation, have made 
the drafters of the MC99 aware that the rules of law must evolve in accordance with 
technical, social and economic developments.39 
 In the light of technological developments and improved safety of air transportation, this 
reason for the limitation of liability carried less weight.40 As a result, the drafters of the MC99 
intended to establish fair and just compensation and unlimited liability for victims.41 They, 
insofar as possible, followed the Warsaw System agreements which were applied by different 
countries, jurisdictions, and statutes.42 They kept it intact except in cases in which the 
modifications helped uniformity and were in line with the international community’s 
demands.43  
                                                      
34 EC Council Regulation No. 2027/97. 
35 ICAO DCW Doc No. 10. 
36 The Convention entered into force on November 4, 2003. Up to 2011, 102 states ratified it. 
http://www.icao.int. 
37 See Milde, supra note 32, at 156-7. 
38 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2, Vol. I. 
39 See Tompkins, supra note 19, at 27. 
40 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2,vol I. 
41 ICAO DCW Doc. No.10. 
42 See Tompkins, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
43 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2.C-WP/1038 1, at 2. 
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Therefore, the ICAO decided to consider the issue and held the Conference.44  It proposed a 
new Convention that complied with the legal and economic conditions of States in 
international and domestic flights.45 The MC99 was approved because of the international 
community’s demand for protecting passengers and modernizing air travel treaties. Although 
the Convention paid particular attention to compensation for passenger’s death or bodily 
injury in an air accident, it tried to balance the interests of both air carriers and the 
customers.46  
Although the Montreal Convention replaced WC29 in 1999, the main principles of the WC29 
remained almost intact.47 Therefore, the Warsaw System and the MC99 in private 
international air law come under one regime commonly, called the Warsaw-Montreal 
Regime. 
4.2   A Comparative Analysis of the Warsaw-Montreal Regime with that of the 
‘Shariah’ 
4.2.1 Principles of Liability  
When referring to the principles of air carrier’s liability, the author has in mind the air 
carrier’s liability under the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention. These instruments 
address various aspects of the contract of carriage including documentation, limits of liability 
and jurisdiction.48 To elaborate further, and to address the matter of air carrier’s liability, the 
thesis will analyze the articles of the Warsaw Convention as well as the corresponding 
provisions of the Montreal Convention.  
                                                      
44 ICAO DCW Doc. No.10; ICAO DCW Doc. No. 42. 
45 ICAO DCW Doc. No.17. 
46 ICAO DCW Doc. No. 2. 
47 See Tompkins, supra note 19, at 42.  
48 Ibid., at 2. 
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The principles of air carrier’s liability could not be studied in isolation from other provisions 
in the applicable Conventions such as carriage instruments, jurisdictions, or contractual 
conditions. They had to be considered in the context of the Convention as a whole in order to 
achieve that delicate balance between the need to protect the interest of passengers with those 
of air carriers and the general public.49 However, the purpose of this section is not to 
exhaustively describe the contents of liability in the Warsaw System and the Montreal 
Convention. Only limited or unlimited liability, and the basis of liability (Articles 17, 20, 22, 
and 25) that have significantly changed in the Montreal Convention compared to the status 
quo under the Warsaw System will be discussed. This is because, the liability limits outlined 
in the Articles, especially Article 22, are in apparent conflict with liability under the Shariah. 
This will be elaborated below. 
4.2.1.1  The Basis of Liability (The Nuanced Approach in the Conventions)  
The Warsaw-Montreal regime has adopted various strategies as the bases of liability, and has 
used key names, terms and expression such as fault, negligence, the presumption of liability 
and strict liability. These are briefly outlined below.  
1. Various words have been employed to explain the liability regimes.50 Terms or expressions 
such as ‘fault’, ‘negligence’, ‘presumption of liability’, ‘res ipsa loquitur’, ‘strict liability’, 
and ‘absolute liability’ are used by different commentators to mean different things even 
within a single jurisdiction. Although these names, terms or expressions implicate common 
points, their coverage may be different.51 As noted by Haanappel: 
                                                      
49 Ibid. 
50 See M. Planiol and G. Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law (2005), 464. Basil S. Markesinis and H. Unberath, 
The German Law of Torts (2002), 82; A. Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States 
(1996), 122; and  http://www.legislation.gov.uk. 
51 See Chr. 2, supra. 
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'Common law is less “doctrinal” in nature than civil law. Judges and the laws they apply 
count more heavily than authors. In the literature, what is “fault”, or to use a better term, 
“negligence”, is fairly clear, whether it needs to be proven by the plaintiff or disproved by 
the defendant. In the latter case, one can speak of a presumption of liability or a 
presumption of fault. Common law gets more “fuzzy” when it comes to absolute or strict 
liability. For most, absolute liability is a form of liability (for instance, for nuclear 
damage) where, once there is damage and causation, the defendant has no defenses at all 
(the opinion, for instance, of Mircea Matte). Strict liability then is no-fault liability where, 
nevertheless, the defendant has defenses available such as Act of God / fortuitous event, 
and own fault of the victim. But, where the defense of Act of God / fortuitous event is not 
available but the defense of own fault of the victim is, French doctrine, as usual, is 
extremely elaborate. They speak of subjective / fault liability, with the possibility of 
presumptions, by law or by fact. They speak of objective / causal liability, with two 
forms, one based upon an obligation of result (with the defense of fortuitous event), one 
based upon an obligation of warranty (no such defense).German doctrine distinguishes 
between Schuldhaftung (based on fault) and Gefährdungshaftung (based on risk), more or 
less corresponding to the French subjective and objective liability.' 52 
 
2. The usage of a variety of names, terms or expressions for the liability regime in treaties 
may lead to confusion. For example, Milde and Dempsey introduce the liability regime in the 
WC29 as a fault-based regime with a revised burden of proof.53 However, Haanappel argues: 
'In the case of the Warsaw Convention, it is probably best, on the basis of the words of the treaty 
itself, to speak of a presumption of liability which can be rebutted by the defendant by proving the 
absence of negligence / fault'.54 
Another example is in relation to the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement. Milde and 
Dempsey express that the WC29 as applied in the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement was 
                                                      
52 See Unpublished Note from Haanappel, ‘What is in a Name’, Appendix 1. 
53 Miller says that ‘Articles 17, 18, and 19 create a presumption. Article 20(1) indicates that the presumption can 
be rebutted by proving the absence of fault. The logical conclusion is that the convention places a presumption 
of fault upon air carrier. Goedhuis observed ‘As regards the rules concerning the liability of the air carrier, the 
drafters of the Warsaw Convention were supporters of the theory of fault’ - ‘…general opinion considers that 
while the civil liability towards third parties should necessitate the application of the theory of risk, the theory of 
fault should be admitted with regard to liability towards passengers and goods’. See P Dempsey and M Milde, 
International Air Carrier Liability: The Montréal Convention of 1999 (2005), at 33; G Miller, Liability in 
International Air Transport -The Warsaw System in Municipal Courts (1977), 67; and D. Goedhuis, National 
Air Legislation and the Warsaw Convention (1937), 217. 
54 See footnote 52, supra. 
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still a fault system – there was not, therefore, an automatic application of liability.55 
Tompkins, however, mentions that the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement introduces strict 
liability,56 while Bin Cheng calls it absolute liability.57 These denominations may lead to 
confusion. It is thus appropriate to avoid uncertainty in the liability regime as laid down in a 
law or treaty, by looking at the text, i.e. the words of the Warsaw-Montreal regime, rather 
than putting a name on them. As Haanappel noted: 
‘…it is not the “name” that counts, but the liability regime as laid down in a law or treaty. 
This applies as well in general as in the case of the Warsaw 1929 / Montreal 1999 air 
carrier’s liability regime. In other words: look at the text, the words of the law / treaty 
rather than putting a “sticker”, a name on it. The latter approach may lead to confusion, as 
is perhaps best illustrated in air law in one of Bin Cheng’s articles, in (1981) VI Annals 
of Air and Space Law 3. In casu, what Bin Cheng (educated in the British legal system) 
calls absolute liability, Mircea Matte (educated in the Romanian and French legal 
systems, and not to be confused with his brother Nicolas) calls strict liability with respect 
to the Montreal Intercarrier Agreement 1966 (modifying the Warsaw Convention 1929 
for traffic to/from/via the USA).’58 
 
3.  This study had initially tried to avoid using vague terms such as absolute and strict 
liability. However, as it is inevitable that they would be mentioned in this study, this author 
provided the following definitions for each of them so as to avoid confusion:  
Fault usually means that the infringement in question was committed intentionally, recklessly, 
or negligently.59 Normally, a claimant has to prove each element of his case. Sometimes, 
however, the law assists him by allowing certain elements to be presumed. It is up to the 
defendant to disprove them, and if he fails to do so, the claimant wins the case.60 On the other 
hand, in the case of no-fault liability, the element of fault, i.e. blameworthiness on the part of 
                                                      
55 See Dempsey and Milde, supra note 53 at 215. 
56 Ibid., at 11. 
57 See Cheng, supra note 22, at 9.  
58 See footnote 52, supra. 
59 P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (1998), Chr. 2. 
60 V.E. Schwartz, K. Kelly and D.F. Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts: Cases And Materials (2005), 
131.   
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the defendant, does not need to be proved. This is not to say, however, that in these cases the 
defendant will inevitably be liable for the act or omission.61 The concept of strict liability 
assumes a causal relationship between the person held strictly liable and the damage.62. It is a 
liability independent of wrongful intent or negligence. Therefore, absolute liability is stricter 
than strict liability.63 
The author is of the opinion that the drafters of the Warsaw-Montreal regime did not intend to 
base air carrier’s liability on absolute liability, since under this regime, an air carrier is liable 
if there is a causal relation between the act of defendant and the damage suffered.  
(i)  Private International Air Law 
The principle of the liability system was provided in the First International Conference for 
Private Air Law. In its preliminary draft, liability was based on the fault theory proposed by 
Pittard, shifting the burden of proof onto the air carrier.64 
This principle was challenged during discussions in the third session of the CITEJA (Madrid 
1928) and also the Warsaw Conference.65 There was no consensus between the proponents of 
the theories of fault liability and strict liability as to the basis of liability for passengers and 
cargo in the Convention. 
Two theories were discussed at the CITEJA and the Warsaw conference. The first theory was 
based on the principle of liability based on fault, intended by the authors of the French Civil 
Code. Rippert (representative of France at CITEJA) argued that imposing absolute liability on 
air carriers was undesirable. If an air carrier has taken the usual reasonable measures to avoid 
                                                      
61See Planiol and Ripert, supra note 50, at 468. 
62 G. Viney, Tort Law, in G.A. Bermann and E. Picard, Introduction to French Law (2008), 249. 
63 M.A. Clarke, Contracts of carriage by air, (London, LLP, 2002), 136.  
64 See Viney supra note 62, at 250. 
65 Ibid., at 21.  
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damage, it should be exempt from liability.66 This theory is also supported by representative 
of Great Britain at CITEJA.67  
The second theory which was founded at the end of the 19th century68 was based on strict 
liability. This theory was subscribed to by Germany and put forward by Italy. It rejected the 
necessity of fault for the civil liability of the defendant.69 Richter from Germany in the third 
session of the CITEJA supported strict liability for passengers’ death and bodily injury. He 
believed that in practice, the original system merely presented a greatly reduced guarantee 
from the perspective of passengers if one excludes liability for errors of navigation and 
piloting. However, goods are different, because there can be a default in the handling of 
goods, i.e. commercial fault.70 
After discussions, The CITEJA drafted Articles 23 and 24.71 Article 23 was formulated to the 
following:  
(‘The carrier is not liable if he and his agents have taken reasonable measures to avoid the 
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures, unless the 
damage arises from a inherent defect in the aircraft.’72 Meanwhile, Article 24 was 
amended to the following: ‘In the carriage of goods and baggage, the carrier shall not be 
liable for errors of piloting, or flying of the aircraft, or of navigation, if he proves that he 
himself took reasonable measures to avoid the damage.’) 
In fact, the drafters modified the two Articles. Firstly, the second part of Article 23 
distinguishes inherent defect whereas the first part exempts the air carrier and its employees 
from liability regarding navigation errors, where necessary measures had been taken or where 
taking such measures was impossible. This provision has moved away from liability based on 
                                                      
66 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 252. 
67 Ibid., at 85. 
68 See Compte rendu de la 3’ session (Minutes of the 3d session of CITEJA Madrid) (1928), 41. 
69 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 86. 
70 Ibid., at 43. 
71 Report presented in the name of the international technical committee of aeronautical legal experts by Henri 
De Vos, reporter, on the preliminary draft of a Convention relating to documents of air carriage and the liability 
of the carrier in international carriage by aircraft. Ibid. 
72 See Minutes of the 3d session of CITEJA, supra note 68, at 47. 
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fault and is inclined towards strict liability.73 It mentions, in fact, one exception which is 
where the damage arises out of an inherent defect in the aircraft, this exception imposes strict 
liability on the carrier where the damage arises out of a inherent defect in the aircraft.74 
Secondly, the carrier is presumed to be liable for the actions of its employees or agents and it 
is just relieved from liability in cases of pilotage or aircraft handling or navigation errors in 
the carriage of goods and baggage. 
In the Second Conference on International Private Air Law, representatives of France and 
England once again challenged strict liability in Article 22 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CITEJA 
draft.75 The French and the UK delegations re-insisted on modifying Article 22.76 After 
lengthy discussions on the two proposals, the chairman presented a compromise. The 
delegations accepted the omission of the phrase ‘unless the damage arises out of an inherent 
defect in the aircraft’ from the first sub-paragraph, and the second sub-paragraph remained 
without modification.77 
Finally, Article 20 of the WC29 provides:78 
(‘1. The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such 
measures. 2. In the carriage of goods and luggage the carrier is not liable if he proves that 
the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling of the 
aircraft or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all 
necessary measures to avoid the damage.’)79 
                                                      
73 Ibid. 
74 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 40. 
75 Ibid. 
76 The delegations from France and Great Britain proposed to eliminate the last part of the first paragraph: 
‘unless the damage arises out of an inherent defect of the aircraft’ and the French delegation proposed to 
eliminate from the second paragraph: ‘in the carriage of goods and baggage.’ See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra 
note 4, at 252. 
77 Ibid. 
78 The translation of the French text of the Convention given here was taken from the British Carriage by Air 
Act of 1932.  
79 The interpretation of Article 20 about the necessary measures in different jurisprudences is discussed in the 
next sub section – See 4.2.1.2, infra. 
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The WC29 introduced a presumption of liability which can be rebutted by the defendant by 
proving the absence of negligence / fault. However, the amendments to this convention and 
the MC99 challenged it.  
1. The WC29 accepted the presumption of liability. Liability is presumed in the matter of 
carriage contract; the claimant has nothing to prove, except the contract from which his credit 
arose. Injury of a passenger because of an accident occurring during carriage must be 
considered as a fact constituting a presumption of breach of the carrier’s obligation. 
Therefore, the passenger does not need to prove that the carrier was negligent. He only has to 
prove the contract of carriage, the damage, and the causation between the damage and the 
carriage.80 
As a result, States with different legal systems accepted it. For example, although Germany 
applied risk-based liability (strict liability) to domestic flights,81 it should apply presumed 
liability on international flights.82 Likewise in the United Kingdom where the negligence 
principle is applied to domestic flights for passenger’s death or bodily injury, presumed 
liability is applied to both goods and passengers in international flights.83  
Under the common law, there is the rule which makes the common carrier an insurer of the 
safe carriage of goods.84 Liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury, on the other hand, 
depends on the legal concept of negligence.85 Normally in a negligence case, the burden of 
proving all elements of a tort is on the claimant. However, under a concept known as ‘res ipsa 
loquitur’, if the cause of harm was under the defendant’s control, and the harm would not 
                                                      
80 See footnote 52, supra. 
81 B.S. Markesinis, H. Unberath, and A. Johnston, The German Law of Contract (2006), 850. 
82 J. Zekoll and M. Reimann, Introduction to German Law (2005), 210-212. 
83 See Cane, supra note 59, at 2. 
84 O. Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage by Inland Transport (1965), 198-199. 
85 D. Owles and H. Cockerel, Liability for Defective Services (1985), 2. 
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have normally occurred without negligence or intention, the claimant does not have to prove 
negligence. In other words, the defendant has to disprove it.86  
The author is of the opinion that, in fact, the admitted approach in the WC29 regarding 
presumption of liability is a middle ground between strict liability and fault liability. The 
Convention accepts presumed fault liability to balance the interests of passengers and carriers. 
However, it refuses strict liability. Firstly, presumed fault liability is stricter than fault 
liability because the carrier should prove that it is not at fault. Secondly, it is weaker than 
strict liability, because the air carrier still has the right to resort to necessary measures. In 
strict liability, the defendant has no right to resort to the defence of necessary measures. Thus, 
the drafters of the WC29 preferred to formulate a middle way - on the one hand the air carrier 
is not absolutely liable, and on the other hand, it is not necessary for the claimant to prove 
that the air carrier is at fault.  
2. The Hague Protocol 1955 omitted Article 20 (2) and therefore terminated its vagueness.87 
Therefore, the liability of the carrier is based on a theory of presumed fault without exception. 
3. The basis of liability in international air carrier changed in 1966. As a relatively large 
amount of international passenger traffic, about 25 percent at that time, was carried to, from 
or via a point in the United States, the country enjoyed the necessary influence for changing 
the basis of liability.88 Consequently, strict liability and unbreakable liability were introduced 
in the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement.89  
                                                      
86 R. Youngs, English, French and German Comparative Law (1998), 243. 
87 See Art. X of the Hague Protocol 1955. 
88 SeeTompkins, supra note 19, at 5. 
89 Agreement C.A.B. 18900, C.A.B. order E. 23680, Docket 17325, 44 C.A.B. 8 19, 31 FR 7302. It took effect 
on 16 May 1966. 
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From the earliest postwar consideration of the Rome Convention 193390 to 1965, the United 
States opposed the principle of strict liability since it was their belief that the theory of strict 
liability was unjust to the aircraft operator in requiring it to respond to damage regardless of 
fault.91 This was despite the overwhelming support for strict liability among the other 
participating ICAO States.92 
Subsequently, a new basis for strict liability for aircraft operators was introduced: the concept 
of risk distribution between all the parties involved in the accident. It posed the question of 
‘who is in the best position to administer the risk, either by insurance or by loss distribution, 
so as to involve the least hardship’. For purposes of compensation, the question should not be 
one of ‘right or wrong’ but rather who could best bear or distribute the loss.93 Between the 
victim and the carrier, loss can be borne better by the carrier. It can distribute the loss or bear 
the insurance to cover it, as part of its cost of operation. Insurance by the victim is still a 
limited and uncertain protection.94  
The adoption of absolute liability for third parties did not mean that the thrust of the argument 
applied to passengers in private international air law. An argument about ‘assumption of risk’ 
was not persuasive for air travel in the 1960s. The significant issue, in both cases, was who 
could best bear and distribute the loss. Thus, when the issue came up again in the context of 
preparing for the Montreal agreement, the basic evidence had been laid for the acceptance of 
absolute liability. In 1966, the United States’ airlines opposed strict liability during the 
                                                      
90 Despite opposition from the United States, absolute liability was adopted in the Rome Convention (Article 1), 
‘Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation’, (1953) 20 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 89, at 
91. 
91Lowenfeld and Mendelson, supra note 23, at 558. 
92G. Rinck, ‘Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties’, (1962) 28 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 405, at 406. The appendix to the Article shows that out of 43 countries, only 7 (including the United 
States) based liability on either fault or presumed fault.  
93 Lowenfeld and Mendelson, supra note 23, at 559-560. 
94 Ibid., at 561. 
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sessions, at least in the absence of a corresponding amendment eliminating the wilful 
misconduct exception. The IATA also firmly opposed strict liability and cast doubt on its 
acceptability in the United States. Thus strict liability was eliminated in the draft and from 
further discussion in those meetings.95 However, the Agreement finally accepted strict 
liability96 in terms of the prospect of quicker and less expensive settlements, with less time 
and less money going for litigation than would have prevailed under the common law 
system.97 The prospect of accident investigation at remote locations and of complex conflicts 
of laws questions gave added emphasis to this problem in respect of international aviation 
accidents. The attraction of strict liability was that it would benefit most those who need the 
damage payments most urgently.98  
4. States in the Guatemala conference following the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement 
changed the basis of liability. The Guatemala City Protocol 197199 was provided in order to 
control amounts for the compensations and to increase the limitation of liability limits.100 It 
provided an unbreakable liability and a strict liability.101 However, air carrier could exonerate 
itself from liability if it could prove that102 a) the damage results solely from a cause which is 
related to the state of health of the passenger or an inherent defect of the baggage; and b) 
                                                      
95 ICAO, Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague 
Protocol (1966). 
96 Bin Cheng calls this ‘absolute liability’. See Cheng, supra note 22.  
97 Lowenfeld and Mendelson, supra note 23, at 601. 
98 Ibid. 
99 The Guatemala City Protocol 1971 is the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as amended by the 
Protocol issued in The Hague on 28 September 1955. 
100 Bin Cheng, ‘What is wrong with the 1975 Montreal Additional Protocol No.3’, (1989) XIV(6) Air and Space 
Law 230, at 233. 
101 See Chr. 2.2.1.2, infra.  
102 See Arts. IV and VII of the Guatemala City Protocol 1971. 
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contributory negligence, or wrongful act or omission on the part of the passenger, causing or 
at least partly causing the damage. 103 
5. States in the Montreal Conference 1975 after the failure of the Guatemala City Protocol 
1971, in their next step, focused on the principle of strict liability in the Additional Montreal 
Protocol No. 4 of 1975 for cargo damage, and distinguished between air carrier’s liability for 
passenger and cargo. The Protocol restricted the defences of carrier with regard to destruction 
of, loss of and damage to the cargo. Thus, liability of the carrier was based on strict 
liability.104  
Under Article 18 of the Additional Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975, the carrier could only 
exonerate itself from liability if it could prove that the damage had been caused solely by one 
of the four specific causes described in the Protocol. Any fault on the part of the carrier 
prevented it from being exonerated from liability. Likewise with unknown or unclear causes 
of damage which would be attributed to the carrier.105  
6. The MC99, as contrasted to the Warsaw-Hague Convention, distinguishes between the 
basis of liability for passenger death or bodily injury, from those for baggage, cargo and 
delay.  
6.1 The MC99 discussed the principles of liability in its chapter III. The provisions of liability 
were outlined to balance the interests of the users of international air transportation, the 
carriers, and the general public. It intended to ensure that a great equity would emerge, which 
would be widespread and gain substantial support, and which would bring more uniformity 
through the strict liability concepts for passengers’ death or bodily injury, as per the liability 
                                                      
103 See Art. XX of the Guatemala City Protocol 1971;and   ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-2 at 109-56 (1975). 
104 Ibid. 
105 I. Koning, ‘Liability in Air Carriage: Carriage of Cargo under the Warsaw and the Montreal Conventions’, 
(2008) 33 Air and Space Law 310,  at 321. 
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rules established by the Montreal Protocol No. 4 for carriage of cargo.106 As a result, the 
MC99 distinguished between the basis of liability for passenger, cargo, baggage, and delay. 
6.2. The MC99 provided a two tier liability regime for passengers’ death or bodily injury. In 
the first tier, it imposes strict liability for damages up to SDR 100,000 to alleviate the heavy 
burden of unlimited liability. The Convention provides the amount that covers a large number 
of claims. It removed any defence based on taking necessary measures to avoid the damage. It 
prescribed that the carrier is unable to exclude or limit its liability for the first 100,000 SDRs, 
except to the extent that the carrier proves that the damage was caused by, or contributed to, 
the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the passenger or the person claiming 
damages through the passenger.107  
Strict liability does not mean that any passenger could easily bring a claim for compensation 
for an air accident whether bodily or mentally injured. Firstly, the passenger must prove that 
an accident has occurred, that he has sustained damage in that accident, and that there had 
been a bodily injury which importantly affected his health. The liability of air carrier is 
recognized since the passenger proves causality and the cause and relationship between the 
accident and damage.108  
In the second tier, the MC99 introduced presumed fault and unlimited liability for damages 
more than 100,000 SDRs.109 The air carrier is liable for proven damages in excess of 100,000 
SDRs, if the carrier cannot prove that the damage was not caused by negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or that the damage was due solely to the negligence or 
other wrongful act or omission of a third party. 
                                                      
106 Ibid.  
107 See Arts. 20 and 21 of the Montreal Convention 1999. 
108 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2, at 116. 
109 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2. 
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Consequently, although the MC99 refers to a two tier system of liability for passengers’ death 
or bodily injury, in practice the MC99 provides  strictly liable unless the carrier elects to and 
in fact proves either or both of the defences of Article 21(2). While Article 21 has been 
loosely referred to as two-tire system of liability, the burden of proof falls on the carrier to 
decide whether to pay all of the proven damages, or to attempt to avoid liability for the 
proven damages in excess of 100,000 SDRs by proof of one or both of the Article 21 (2), as 
to which the carrier has the burden of proof. 110    
Despite the fact that carrier’s liability under the second tier of liability is unlimited, the 
quantum of damages has to be proved by the claimant. In addition, determining such proved 
damages should be subject to the lex fori principle.111 Therefore, as soon as an air accident 
occurs which causes damage, strict liability applies; and if the air carrier can prove 
contributory negligence (of the victim), he wholly or partly is exonerated from liability.112  
6.3. Regarding unchecked baggage, which includes passengers’ personal items, if the damage 
is caused due to the fault of the air carrier or its employees or agents, the air carrier is liable 
for damage. However, the MC99 provides strict liability for checked baggage. The carrier is 
not liable if and to the extent that the damage resulted from an inherent defect, quality or vice 
of the baggage.113  
Where the passenger himself is in charge of his related items, under the Convention the air 
carrier is considered liable only if the event which caused the destruction, loss or damage 
took place on board the aircraft or during any period within which the checked baggage was 
in the charge of the carrier. MC99 speaks of an‘event’. The requirement that the event 
                                                      
110 See Tompkins, supra note 19, at 35. 
111 See Dempsey and Milde, supra note 53, at183. 
112 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2. 
113 ICAO DCW Doc. No.17. 
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causing the destruction, loss or damage took place on board the aircraft or during a period 
whilst the checked baggage was in charge of the carrier is, by the way, also a requirement for 
unchecked baggage. However,in certain case laws, air carrier is considered liable only if the 
passenger is on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking. The fact is that the passenger needs to be on board the aircraft or if the damage 
needs to happen in the course of any  of those operation.114  
6.4. The MC99 provides unbreakable limit of liability for cargo damage.115 Air carrier’s 
liability for cargo damage is strict because the carrier is not liable if and to the extent it proves 
that the destruction, or loss of, or damage to the cargo resulted from one or more of the 
following: (a) inherent defect, quality or vice of that cargo; (b) defective packing of that cargo 
performed by a person other than the carrier or its servants or agents; (c) an act of war or an 
armed conflict; (d) an act of public authority carried out in connection with the entry, exit or 
transit of the cargo.116  
The MC99 adopts a liability for cargo which is identical to the Montreal Protocol No. 4.117 In 
fact, the Convention follows common law. In common law, the carrier is not exempt from 
liability by proving the four defences; 118 it should not be at fault as well. However, the MC99 
deviates from the Protocol and the common law on one important point. Article 18(2) of the 
Convention states that ‘the carrier would not be liable if and to the extent that the damage is 
                                                      
114 P. Martin et.al, Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law Vol. VII (4th Ed.), 797 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law’). 
115 See Art. 18 of the Montreal Convention 1999; S. Dempsey, ‘Carrier Liability for Loss and Damage of 
International Air Freight’, (2004) XXIX Annals of Air and Space Law 120, at 134; Koning, supra note 105, at 
315. 
116 See Art. 22 of the Montreal Convention 1999. 
117 See working paper C-WP/ 10420 14/6/96 for the 148
th
 session of the ICAO Council in 1996, in International 
Conference on Air Law (Doc. 9775-DC/2), Vol. III.  
118 These defences are the acts of God, the acts of the Queen’s or public enemies, inherent vices, and the 
consignor’s fault. For a detailed discussion, see Chr. 2, supra. 
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resulted from one of the four causes mentioned’.119 The additional wrongful act on the part of 
the carrier no longer leads automatically to air carrier’s liability, but it can be divided 
proportionally among the parties.120  
It is submitted that the position of the carrier has improved because it no longer has to prove 
the absence of all possible concurrent causes to be exonerated under Additional Montreal 
Protocol No.4 of 1975. Instead, the carrier has gone half way there, when it proves that one of 
the causes listed in Article 18(2) of the MC99 caused the damage.121 It becomes the 
responsibility of the claimant to prove that there is another concurrent cause for which the 
carrier is liable. Then courts can divide the liability evenly amongst the parties.122 
Due to improvements in economic and welfare conditions, developments in the air transport 
industry, and jurisdiction experiences that developed over time; States (such as the United 
States, the European Union member States and Japan), air carriers and organizations inclined 
to move from presumed fault liability to strict liability.123 Fast settlement of claims and the 
avoidance of lengthy and costly litigations were among the main factors and reasons for this 
new trend towards strict liability.124  
Over 70 years, case law in the United States for passengers’ death and bodily injury as well as 
for goods, progressively imposed more severe requirements on the air carrier to prove non 
fault.125 The presumption of liability under the WC29 was practically, and in courts, treated as 
                                                      
119 Emphasis added. 
120 See Koning, supra note 105, at 321. 
121 Ibid., at 322. 
122 Report of the meeting of the special group on the modernization and consolidation of the ‘Warsaw System’ 
(SGMW); See also ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, 10–28 May 1999 (Doc. 9775-DC/2), 
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strict liability.126 On the one hand, the air carrier was strictly liable for goods in the common 
law.127 On the other hand, it also had a duty to exercise the highest due care and diligence on 
passengers’ carriage.128 Thus, the air carrier was treated strictly liable in cases following an 
aviation-related accident. 
Consequently, liability in international regimes found a similar position as in the United 
States’ common law where air carriers are strictly liable for passenger’s death or bodily 
injury, and for goods sustaining damage.129 Therefore, international air carrier’s liability in 
case law practically found a similar position as in common law and the courts applied it to 
international flights as well as domestic flights.  
A comparative law survey shows that international air carrier’s liability systems do not opt 
exclusively for fault liability or strict liability, but recently adopt a more nuanced approach 
according to civil law and common law.130 Indeed, civil law and common law systems follow 
a nuanced approach with a mixture of strict liability and fault liability elements.131 The 
economic environment such as mankind enjoyed a relatively better welfare is a core criterion 
for combining strict and fault liability and that, therefore, legal regimes should take an 
economic approach. This approach is based on these systems to balance elements of strict 
liability and fault liability. This approach includes intermediate solutions such as reversing 
the burden of proof using an objective standard of care and distinguishing between goods and 
passenger.132  
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Traditionally, tort and contract are treated in nearly all civil law countries as aspects of the 
law of obligations.133 Civil law countries opted for fault liability in contract law and tort,134 
while common law countries opted for strict liability in contract and negligence in tort.135 Yet 
this impression is the result of too much abstraction on both sides.136 Upon closer inspection, 
the common denominator between civil and common law is that all systems opt for a nuanced 
combination of the two bases of liability.137  
The nuanced approach regarding the basis of liability, that is, (presumed fault liability and 
strict liability, in common law and civil law systems that ultimately displayed itself in the 
international regime of Warsaw-Montreal, can be seen in the Shariah principles and Iranian 
law. However, there are similarities and differences between them that will be discussed 
below. 
(ii)  The Shariah 
Comparing the basis of liability under the Shariah with the Warsaw-Montreal regime presents 
various points of similarities and differences, which are particularly important when studying 
air carrier’s liability in Iran.138  
The burden of proof is upon the claimant in the Shariah but this principle cannot be applied 
where proof and evidence require a professional’s intervention, to the extent that a layman 
cannot follow the evidence.139 According to the general rules, the individuals are bound to 
                                                      
133  B. Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2007), 5. 
134 See Planiol and Ripert, supra note 50, at 495and F.E. Werner, M.W. Finkin and A. Ebke, Introduction to 
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139 A. Kho’i, Mabāni Takmelat al Minhāj Vol. II (1363 A.H. 1984), 221.  
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compensate for the loss incurred to others when they commit a fault.140 But in exceptional 
cases, for example, when a contract exists between the parties, they can change the basis of 
liability to strict liability141 or the legislator can provide strict liability in a special statute. For 
instance, according to the Acts passed in 1968 and 2008 on the civil liability arising out of the 
ownership of motor vehicles, liability is strict, and the owner of the vehicle should in all 
circumstances compensate for the damages and cannot discharge himself from liabilities 
incurred as a result of his act by proving that he is not at fault.142  
1. In comparison with the WC29: 
The basis of liability in the WC29 is based on presumed fault for passengers as well as goods. 
However, the Shariah distinguishes between goods and people.  
a) In the Shariah, liability in contract of carriage is based on fault liability. The burden of 
proof is on the claimant in contrast with the Convention where the air carrier is liable for 
breach of contract, unless it can prove that the damage was caused by external causes outside 
its control.143 However, Iranian law accepts presumption of liability. The air carrier is 
supposed to be liable until it can prove it is not at fault. According to the Iranian Commercial 
Code the legislature presumes that the air carrier is liable unless proven otherwise.144 In 
conclusion, Islamic law in Iran modified the Shariah rules and accepted presumption of 
liability.145  
b) In the Shariah, liability for death or bodily injury is based on strict liability. Once a person 
directly causes death or bodily injury to another person unintentionally, the wrongdoer is 
                                                      
140 See Arts. 50, 493, 516, 556, 577, 584 and, 640 of the Iranian Civil Code.  
141 See Arts. 10 and 642 of the Iranian Civil Code.  
142 See Chr. 3, supra. 
143 S. Amin, Remedies for Breach of Contract in Islamic and Iranian Law (1984), 28. 
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liable for paying the Diyah that does not depend on his fault.146 However, Iranian law 
modified it with regard to accidents, and admitted presumption of liability. Although the 
Shariah differs from the WC29, Iranian law applies presumption of liability in air accidents. 
Since the air carrier is liable because of negligence, carelessness, or non-observance of related 
regulations in a way that if the regulations had been observed, no accident would have 
happened.147  
In Iran, liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury is discussed under a specific kind of 
homicide called quasi-intentional killing. The defendant is liable because of negligence, 
carelessness, or non-observance of related regulations, in a way that if the regulations had 
been observed, no accident would have happened.148 Therefore, although the Shariah 
establishes strict liability for death or bodily injury, Iranian law recognizes liability based on 
the presumption of fault and expands defence limits. It can be concluded that the Shariah is 
not against changing the basis of liability whenever situations in a society require it. 
2. In comparison with the MC99: 
a) The principle of liability in the MC99 is based on a two tier liability regime for passengers’ 
death or bodily injury. As mentioned above, the Shariah also provides strict liability for death 
or bodily injury.  
b) Liability in the Shariah with regard to damaged goods is based on fault unlike the MC99 
where there is strict liability. The claimant should firstly prove the fault of the wrongdoer. 
Secondly, the defendant cannot be relieved from liability except by showing that damage is 
caused through force majeure. Liability for damaged goods is broadly defined and not limited 
                                                      
146 In an unintentional offence or homicide (khataei), the perpetrator has neither an intention to commit an 
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to the four defences in the Convention. However, the Shariah accepts contractual conditions 
to restrict the defence according to contractual conditions or special statute. Therefore, there 
is no conflict between the Shariah and the MC99 because Iranian law accepts a presumption 
of liability in the carriage of contract and allows parties to restrict their defence.149 As 
mentioned above, the basis of liability (strict, fault or presumed fault) depends on the scope of 
the defendant’s defence, so in the next section, the defence of ‘all necessary measures’ will be 
discussed. 
4.2.1.2   The Defence of the Air Carrier  
One of the rules which attracted a lot of attention in the Warsaw-Montreal regime is the 
acceptable defence of the air carrier. The basis of liability directly correlates to the scope of 
defences. Except the ‘contributory negligence’ defence that is mentioned in all applicable 
Conventions, the most important defence was the ‘all necessary measures’ one. As any 
discussion of the basis of liability would not be complete without mentioning this defence, it 
will be discussed below.  
(i)  Private International Air Law 
Article 20 of the WC29 provides the defence for passenger, goods and delay equally. 150 It 
provides ‘The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such 
measures.’ The concept ‘all necessary measures’ is extracted from the diligence conception 
and has entered into air law from the maritime law Conventions.151 This wording determines 
                                                      
149 See Art. 374 of the Iranian Commercial Code. 
150 The previous subsection discussed the basis of liability in Article 20 of the WC29. There, the author 
introduced the different interpretations of this Article in various jurisprudences. 
151 The Hague Conference in 1955 again discussed various proposals to replace the expression ‘all necessary 
measures’ by, for example, ‘all possible and foreseeable measures’ or even to redraft Article 20(1) to read: ‘the 
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the basis of liability of the air carrier. It means ‘all reasonably necessary measures’, i.e. the air 
carrier should show and prove that it has taken ‘all reasonable measures’ and not just 
‘reasonable measures’.152  
However, the MC99 determines on the one hand, four restricted defences for cargo,153 whilst 
refusing, on the other hand, to mention the defence of ‘necessary measures’ for passengers’ 
death or bodily injury. The MC99 provides that the air carrier can be relieved from liability if 
it proves that such damage is not caused by fault or wrongdoing or omission by it or its 
employees or agents or such damages are exclusively caused by wrongdoing or omission of a 
third party. However, it does not reaffirm the defence of necessary measures.154  
The defence pertaining to ‘necessary measures’ may be interpreted broadly or narrowly, 
which extends or diminishes the air carrier’s liability. Considering the various interpretations, 
the scope of the defence is subject to the courts’ interpretation in different legal systems.  
1. Restricted Interpretation: 
According to the restricted interpretation155, the air carrier is not liable if it can prove that it 
has taken all measures as to direct and proximate connection with the cause of accident, and 
that these measures were adequate to the concrete cause which resulted in the damage.156  
If, however, the cause of the accident is not reliably determined, the carrier can never produce 
positive proof to show that it has taken all measures to avoid the concrete damage. Hence, it 
cannot be exonerated, because the cause of an air accident usually remains unknown and it is  
                                                                                                                                                                     
carrier is not liable if he proves that the damage was not caused by his negligence or of his servants and agents.’ 
These proposals were rejected by a majority of 28 votes to 8 because they would have unduly reduced the 
liability adopted in the Warsaw Convention; Minutes of the Hague Conference, ICAO Doc. 7686.  
152 Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 114, at 455. 
153 See Art. 18 of the Montreal Convention 1999.  
154 See Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, supra note 114, at 453. 
155 The restricted interpretation was accepted by the US courts prior to 1970’s. See Ritts, Ex' x v. American 
Overseas Airlins, (1949) U.S.Av.R.65 (S.D.N.Y.1949). 
156 See Dempsey and Milde, supra note 53, at 68. 
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obvious that it will be too challenging for the air carrier that has to prove the cause of the 
accident.157 
Not only does the air carrier need to prove that it has taken precautionary measures, it also 
has to prove that it has taken the reasonable care required for preventing the damage or 
loss.158 In other words, it must have taken ‘necessary measures’ to avoid the damage. It is not 
sufficient for the air carrier to show that it, or its employees or agents, have taken usual and 
normal care. They must have also taken additional ‘necessary measures’ in line with the air 
carriage industry’s requirements. As a result, if the air carrier fails to provide adequate 
explanation of the causes of the accident, it, in fact, would not be successful in its defenses.159  
2. Broad Interpretation:  
According to the broad interpretation, the air carrier is not liable if it can prove that it has 
carried out its duty with the utmost diligence, as duly expected from him, according to the 
terms of the carriage contract. When a court accepts the broad interpretation, the air carrier 
can be relieved from liability when it meets the general proof indicating that it has taken all 
necessary measures for implementing a safe flight.160 The broad interpretation corresponds to 
the common law and civil law systems. 
In common law, a common carrier can be exempted from liability for any loss or damage that 
occurs to goods. However, it must prove that that loss or damage has occurred because of an 
act of God, the act of the Queen’s enemies,(in the United States, the act of public enemies),161 
the inherent vice or defect of the goods, or the negligence of the owner of the goods. It is 
                                                      
157 G.R Sullivan, ‘Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention’, (1936) Journal of Air Law 
1, at 20. 
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obvious that it complies with the restricted interpretation of ‘all necessary measures’ defence 
which is a heavier duty compared with when a carrier exempts itself by proving that it has not 
been at fault.162  
With regard to passengers, the courts in the United States have expressed different opinions 
about whether a defendant may exempt himself. He either has to positively prove the cause of 
the accident, or it suffices to negatively prove that he has not been at fault.163In general, there 
is no absolute warranty of fitness of the transport vehicle for the carriage of passengers. 
However, although the carrier does not guarantee the absolute safety of the carriage vehicle, it 
is admitted that it warrants that the vehicle is as safe as care and skill on the part of anyone 
can make it to be.164  
In the United States, after the WC29 entered into force, the courts tended to apply the strictest 
responsibility of care, vigilance and skill on the part of the air carrier and all persons 
employed by it. As a result, the necessary measures defence is restrictedly interpreted.165 The 
rule is founded on the expediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best guard against 
it. Hence, the common carrier, is liable for the slightest negligence that caused injury to the 
passenger.166  
In civil law countries such as France, if a passenger sustains damage resulting from an 
accident which is related to carriage, the carrier should prove force majeure to be 
exempted.167 As the liability principle in civil law is based on the air carrier’s fault, if it could 
prove that it has not committed fault and had taken all reasonable measures, it is no longer 
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liable.168 The air carrier would not be liable for inherent defects if it operates an aircraft which 
is manufactured from good average equipment, and it applies its control through related 
equipment.169 When force majeure is not regarded to be equivalent to an absence of fault, the 
air carrier would be liable for inherent defects, even if it operates an aircraft which is 
manufactured from good average equipment, and it applies its control through related 
equipment.170 Therefore, the interpretations made by courts regarding Article 20 play an 
important role in establishing strict liability or presumed fault liability. 
The author is of the opinion that the defence of the adoption of necessary measures provides a 
possibility for courts to decide according to their pertinent legal system and economic 
environments. As we have seen above, the United States imposes the highest due care for 
passengers’ death or bodily injury, which in effect is an application of strict liability in such 
circumstances. As the rights of the consumers are gradually observed in domestic and 
international areas throughout the world, the restricted interpretation is more appropriate than 
the broad interpretation, especially when the applicable Conventions provide limitation of 
liability.  
(ii)  The Shariah  
The acceptable defences are not defined in a specific chapter in the Shariah. Although it does 
not pay due attention to defences in the same way as the WC29 does, it discusses the 
justifiable defences in specific contracts such as hire, bailment, sale contracts, or in tort such 
as the Diyah.171 In general, the Shariah recognizes the theory of changed circumstances and 
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171 See M.A. F. Hosseini Maraqi, al-Anāwin Vol. II  (1417 A.H. 1996), at, 446-449. 
199 
  
acts of God (afat samavi) for goods damaged in contracts.172 Therefore, force majeure and 
changed circumstances are deemed as valid reasons to be relieved from liability. The juridical 
basis for this legal resolution by Islamic jurists is the required balance between rights and the 
undertakings of parties, and the prohibition of unfair loss.173 
In Iranian law, breach of contract always imposes liability unless it is caused by force 
majeure in which case the wrongdoer is exonerated from liability.174 In order for a carrier to 
be exempted from liability, the event should be unpredictable and unpreventable.175 This term 
includes all causes, which are external or internal to the wrongdoer. If the carrier proves that 
loss, destruction, or delay in carriage is caused by events that are not related to its diligence, it 
is discharged from liability.176 It includes any cause that is unrelated to the carrier that causes 
non-performance of obligation.177  
However, the carrier is strictly liable for death or bodily injury. It is only exonerated when 
death or bodily injury occurs by an external cause. Once death or bodily injury occurs, 
compensation should be made whether the accident occurs through direct or indirect causes, 
or a combination of the two. Therefore, the Shariah interprets force majeure broadly for 
damaged good, allowing the carrier to be exonerated easier. However, it interprets force 
majeure restrictively for passengers’ death or bodily injury, and so, it becomes more difficult 
for the air carrier to escape liability. 
The author is of the opinion that the Shariah determines strict liability for death or bodily 
injury, but Iranian law recognizes liability based on the presumption of fault and expands 
defence limits. It can be concluded that the Shariah is not against changing the basis of 
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liability whenever situations in a society require it. Regulations relating to force majeure are 
not public policy nor obligatory in the Shariah. As a result, parties can agree upon the 
contrary, i.e. they can agree to restrict or broaden the scope of force majeure.178  
The author is of the opinion that the scope of defence has a direct relation with limited or 
unlimited liability. If limitation of liability is applied, the acceptable defence may be 
restrictively interpreted because injured parties can obtain compensation. If unlimited liability 
is applied, it is better to interpret the defence broadly because liability limits are not 
determined and heavy liability is imposed on the defendant.  
4.2.1.3   Liability Limits  
(i)   Private International Air Law 
The drafters of WC29, aiming to balance the interests of the consumers with those of the 
airlines, inserted limitation of liability under the impact of maritime law in the WC29.179 
Therefore, the institution of ship-owners’ liability limit, with its long history, became a source 
of inspiration, when the possibility of a global limitation of liability in air law was being 
considered by the CITEJA.180 Owners of ships were pecuniarily liable to total loss involving 
large values and extensive life claims under circumstances over which the owner had only 
remote control. The tenable argument for the limitation of ship owners’ liability is to offer to 
national ship-owners the same protection which foreign ship-owners enjoy under their own 
law.181  
Air law commentators such as Drion did not accept this argument as appropriate for 
establishing equal and fair opportunities in international accident remedy, nor for legal 
                                                      
178 See Art. 230 of the Iranian Civil Code. 
179 See Drion, supra note 9, at 40. 
180 See Minutes Warsaw 1929, supra note 4, at 86. 
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uniformity of liability limits.182 The argument was never recognized as an admissible theory 
for justifying limited liability in air law.183 He believed more pivotal evidences go back to 
protection of a financially weak industry, the air carriers, and uniformity of the law with 
respect to the compensations sums to be paid .184 The air carrier’s liability, as far as it is in the 
interest of aviation, should be limited. The liability limit was deemed as an encouragement 
for the aviation industry to protect itself from risks that would discourage people from 
investing in this industry which had social benefits.185 Liability limits were considered as a 
counterpart of an aggravated liability system imposed on air carriers at that time.186  
The WC29 limited internationally the liability for death or bodily injury to 125,000 Poincaré 
francs;187 approximately USD 8,300.188 In the carriage of registered luggage and of goods, the 
liability of the carrier was limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram. Regarding the objects 
which the passenger carries with him or her, the liability of the carrier was limited to 5,000 
francs per passenger. 
When the WC29 came into force in 1933, the liability limits of the WC29 were not low in 
those early days. Rather, it was the government that diminished it through their 
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interpretations.189 Customers’ dissatisfaction with the limitation of liability in applicable 
Conventions prompted their abolition by international movements. The international 
community witnessed the dissatisfaction of several countries in respect to a low limitation of 
liability.190 This fact, together with improvements in economic circumstances, encouraged 
States, international organizations and air carriers to lift the limits after 26 years of approving 
the WC29. Subsequently other international treaties gradually increased the sum of limited 
liability. The air carrier’s liability limits for death or bodily injury were doubled and became 
250,000 French francs, approximately USD 16,600 in the Hague Protocol 1955. However, the 
liability limits of the air carrier for cargo remained unchanged.191  
Then the Guatemala Protocol 1971, although it never entered into force, increased the 
unbreakable liability limits to 1,500,000 francs for passengers’ death or bodily injury.192 
Finally,193 in the first tier, the MC99 imposed strict liability for damages up to SDR 
100,000194 and in the second tier introduced presumed fault and unlimited liability for 
remedies more than 100,000 SDRs.195 
(ii)  The Shariah 
The Shariah distinguishes liability for property from liability for death or bodily injury. It 
introduces unlimited liability for damaged goods196 and the Diyah as a limited liability for 
death or bodily injury. In a restricted legal sense, the Diyah is a specified amount of money or 
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goods for compensation in death of bodily injury.197 In fact, the main principle for death and 
bodily injury in the Shariah, unlike the common law and civil law systems, is limited 
liability. As discussed in the previous Chapter, in its original form, the Diyah consisted of 
camels. Very soon after the Prophet Mohammad, Imam Ali ebn-e-Abi Taleb198 ruled that it 
could, equally well, be paid in gold coinage.199  
There is an important question as to whether a claimant can claim, in addition to the Diyah, 
for other losses and damages resulting from death or bodily injury.200 This issue is important 
in adjusting the Diyah to limited or unlimited liability in the applicable Conventions. It would 
lead to a discrepancy when compensating victims, especially where the limited liability in 
international air Conventions becomes applicable on domestic flights. If liability in excess of 
the Diyah is accepted, it can reconcile domestic law with the WC29; otherwise there would 
be an obstacle in this regard.201 
Islamic jurists express different opinions about compensation in excess of the Diyah. In the 
past, they believed that the Diyah was constant and unchangeable. However, after the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, they accepted unlimited liability. This issue surfaced in 1984 when trial 
courts posed the question concerning it to the Supreme Court. The relevant commission in the 
Supreme Court responded by saying that courts could not condemn defendants to liability in 
excess of the Diyah by covering medical treatment costs or for incapacity to work. After 
posing this question, experts in the Islamic law and experts in the Iranian law elaborated on 
their opinions.202 These opinions affected different court judgments.203  
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1. Comparing the principles and methodologies of the Shariah with the WC29 presents 
various points of convergence and divergence.  
1.1 Liability for goods damaged has been unlimited in the Shariah and defendant should pay 
the total compensation. However, the WC29 provides limitation of liability for goods that 
sustained damage.204  
1.2. The WC29 and the Shariah both accept limited liability for death or bodily injury.205 
Whilst the Shariah provides limited liability under the Diyah, the WC29 provides limited 
liability under Article 22. The basis of limits or extent of liability as enumerated in the WC29 
is a point of divergence from the Diyah system. 
In the Shariah, liability is fundamentally based on the Diyah. The main assumption is that 
liability is limited for death or bodily injury. It would concentrate on compensating the 
victims within unified limits.206 All suffering persons should be similarly compensated. An 
action for the Diyah should not exceed the limits enumerated for each person. In fact, it fixes 
the amount of compensation to be paid to the victim.207 However, the WC29’s approach 
accepts both unlimited (Article 25) and limited liability (Article 22). The WC29 accepts a 
uniform ceiling of liability that may not apply in the case of a failure to conform to certain 
formalities208 and in the case of wilful misconduct.209  
The method of calculation in the Diyah is different from that of the Convention. The Diyah 
system provides the way of calculating the sum that suffering persons should receive. The 
main issue is to convert the value of the Diyah as enumerated by the Prophet into 
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contemporary values. However, the Convention uses another method for calculation. In the 
carriage of passengers, the liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to the sum of 
125,000 francs.210  
2. The above analysis is applicable when comparing the Shariah with liability limits for death 
or bodily injury under the MC99. 
2.1. In relation to cargo, the Shariah, in contrast with the MC99, introduces unlimited 
liability.  
2.2. As previously mentioned, the Shariah introduces the Diyah which limits liability for 
death or bodily injury. However the MC99 provides unlimited liability.211 Any action under 
the Diyah should not exceed the limits enumerated for a person. In fact, it fixes the amount of 
compensation to be paid to the victim.212 However, the MC99 accepts a two tier liability 
regime (unlimited liability). Principally, the liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury is 
unlimited.213  
3. As mentioned above, the method of calculation in the context of the Diyah is different. The 
Diyah for unintentional acts is based on limited liability and there is a fixed tariff for it. The 
Convention, on other hand, has introduced 100,000 SDR for death or bodily injury.214 
Limited liability in the WC29 and unlimited liability in the MC99 for death or bodily injury 
are the main points of conflict between the Shariah principles and those of the international 
regime. In section 3, the author analyzes this conflict and brings proposal for resolving it. 
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4.2.1.4    Breaking the Liability Limits   
(i)  Private International Air Law 
Wilful misconduct was a tool to break limited liability in the WC29. As limitation of liability 
in the WC29 might be an advantage for the air carrier, the drafters excluded the intentional 
acts of the air carrier and its employees in order to balance the interests of both air carriers 
and customers.215 As compensation in common law and civil law was based on fault and 
unlimited liability, the drafters intended to accept the limitation of liability just for fault 
liability; not to add other actions of air carrier including its intentional act. As a result, they 
excluded the intentional action of the air carrier.216  
This concept was challenged in the Warsaw System several times.  
1. 'Wilful misconduct' was considered as a vague equivalent of 'faute lourde' and 'dol'. 
Therefore, Article 25 of the WC29 was revised accordingly.217 The vagueness of the concept 
of wilful misconduct in this Article caused a lack of uniformity in its interpretation.218 Wilful 
misconduct connotes different things in French and English. In French, it contains an element 
of intention or will for making harm, while translating this concept into English is difficult.219 
The concepts of dol and wilful misconduct both include intentional acts, an intent of 
committing the act and knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act. But these two concepts 
differ. In wilful misconduct, the committed act only requires that a risk of probable damage is 
caused to others, whereas in dol the committed act is designed to harm others.220 Further, 
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while in wilful misconduct, the one who commits the act probably does not have an intention 
to cause damage, in dol he must have an intention to harm.221 So during the discussion of the 
Hague Protocol, the drafters paid special attention to the concept of wilful misconduct and 
replaced it with a new phrase that clearly explained the intention of the drafters of the 
Warsaw Convention. 
The courts faced challenges on clarifying the concept of wilful misconduct in the Hague 
Protocol 1955 because it opened a way for the customer to achieve total remedy as it was 
available for them in their legal systems.222 Since wilful misconduct could be intentional acts 
or reckless acts, the delegates discussed it seriously and the Hague Protocol finally provided a 
more precise definition.223 In this Protocol ‘wilful misconduct’ was replaced by phrases 
‘intent to cause damage or recklessly’ and ‘with knowledge that the damage would probably 
result’. This language explicitly asserts the intention and recklessness of the act. 
2. The international instruments after the Warsaw-Hague Convention gradually inclined to 
reduce the impact of wilful misconduct in establishing unlimited liability.224 The Guatemala 
City Protocol 1971 and the Additional Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975 provided unbreakable 
liability.225 The main idea was that breaking the limitation of liability caused lengthy, costly 
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and very inefficient litigations.226 As a result, the claim of wilful misconduct was an 
advantage neither for air carriers nor customers.227 Thus, unbreakable liability was accepted. 
3. The drafters of the MC99 reconsidered wilful misconduct. Since the MC99 makes 
provision for a strict liability system, unlimited potential damage recovery for passenger 
death or bodily injury and unbreakable limit of liability for cargo damage claims, ‘the 
likelihood of wilful misconduct claims and litigation is very remote at best’. 228  
The drafters argued that it was not necessary to have the concept of wilful misconduct or 
phrases like ‘intent to cause damage or recklessly’ and ‘with knowledge that the damage 
would probably result’ to help break the limitation of liability for passenger death or bodily 
injury. This is because, the MC99 recognizes that a carrier would be unlimitedly liable ‘if he 
cannot prove that the damage was not caused by negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission…’.229 
In relation to cargo, the drafters of the MC99 had initially reintroduced the provision for 
breaking the limitation of liability. In all the preliminary drafts and preparatory works, the 
provision was maintained. Even the final text of the MC99, the 30
th
session of ICAO’s Legal 
Committee in Montreal in 1997, approved the possibility of breaking the limitation of liability 
for the carriage of goods. It appeared in Article 21 A(5). However, the drafters removed it 
from the MC99 without substantial discussion.230 
Consequently, the MC99 admitted wilful misconduct just for removing and excluding 
limitation of liability for damaged baggage and delay.231 The MC99 provides that the 
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limitation of liability should not be applied if it is proved that the damage resulted from an 
action or omission by the air carrier or its employees or agents with an intention to cause 
damage or with recklessness, with knowledge that that would probably cause damage. 
Regarding the action or omission of its employee or agent, it must be proved that the 
employee or agent had taken the measures within its employment remit.232 Therefore, 
intentional conduct or recklessness only applies to the delay in the carriage of passengers and 
baggage.233  
Therefore, the author is of the opinion that the MC99 concentrates on the legal systems of the 
common law and civil law countries for liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury, and 
the protection of passengers, more than the WC29 did as the latter focused on protecting the 
air carriers. When the MC99 based carrier’s liability on fault and accepted unlimited liability, 
it includes wilful misconduct as well. 
(ii)  The Shariah  
The Shariah provides different rules for death or bodily injury and goods in civil liability. 234 
1. Regarding liability for damaged baggage and goods in the Shariah, firstly liability is based 
on fault.235 Secondly, damage should be compensated totally.236 Consequently, while the 
Shariah accepts unlimited liability for damaged goods based on fault, naturally unlimited 
liability is applied for the wilful misconduct of the carrier.  
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2. Regarding liability for death or bodily injury, there should be a distinction between 
intentional acts and reckless acts, and with knowledge that that act could probably cause 
damage.  
2.1. If it is proved that the wrongdoer has inflicted death or bodily injury intentionally, he is 
punished according to Islamic criminal law. Liability for an intentional offence is retribution 
(qisas).237 However, the claimant is entitled to request compensation (the Diyah) instead of 
qisas. Consequently, the claimant can exempt the defendant, and receive the Diyah (limited 
liability) or total remedy (unlimited liability) according to an agreement between the claimant 
and the wrongdoer.238  
2.2. If it is proved that death or bodily injury has occurred recklessly and with knowledge that 
damage would probably result, the claimant is entitled to claim just for limited liability (the 
Diyah).239 Therefore, one can say that the Shariah distinguishes between a reckless act with 
knowledge that damage would probably result, and an intentional act for death or bodily 
injury.  
The Shariah, when juxtaposed against the Warsaw-Montreal regime, presents various points 
of convergence and divergence:  
1. In comparison with the WC29: 
a) The Shariah accepts unlimited liability for goods sustaining damage whether it results from 
fault or intentional act.240 However, the WC29 only accepts unlimited liability for wilful 
misconduct.241 As a result, wilful misconduct triggers unlimited liability in both.  
b) The Shariah accepts unlimited liability for death or bodily injury where firstly an 
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intentional act occurs, and secondly it is agreed upon between the claimant and the 
defendant.242 Thus, both the Shariah and the WC29 apply unlimited liability for intentional 
acts. In relation to reckless acts with knowledge that damage would probably result, the 
WC29 applies unlimited liability. However, the Shariah applies limited liability.243 
2. In comparison with the MC99: 
a) The Shariah applies unlimited liability for cargo sustaining damaged whether fault or 
intentional act occurs. However, the MC99 applies unbreakable liability.244 
b) The Shariah applies only limited liability for death or bodily injury resulting from an act or 
omission of the carrier, done recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result. However, the MC99 applies unlimited liability.245  
4.1.2.5   Contractual Conditions  
(i)   Private International Air Law 
Article 23 of the WC29 provides that: ‘Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability 
or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this Convention shall be null and void, 
but the nullity of any such provision does not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which 
shall remain subject to the provisions of this Convention.’ This Article was later reaffirmed in 
Article 26 of the MC99. 
Article 22(1) of the WC29 expressly gives the right to agree on higher limits of liability. 
Nevertheless, Article 23 of the Convention considers null and void any agreement between 
the parties that tended to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which 
is laid down in this Convention.  
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This Convention created an exceptional system against air carriers, because in the civil law 
and common law systems, the carrier is traditionally free to insert clauses in the carriage 
contract which exclude or reduce his liability.246 The WC29 imposes upon them a compulsory 
system of liability and declared void all clauses which contradict the provisions of the 
Convention unless these are better for passengers.247 
In the 1920s, although carriers in common law countries such as England and civil law 
countries such as France might impose any contractual conditions for exempting or delimiting 
liability in domestic carriages,248 the Convention restricted those conditions. The drafters 
believed that contractual conditions would diminish customer rights since it is the air carriers 
that usually impose the carriage contractual conditions. Thus the WC29 declares such 
contractual conditions null and void in order to unify regulation and protect the passengers.249 
In conclusion, the drafters did not accept contractual conditions that relieve the carrier of 
liability or let them fix a lower limit.250 
Of course, common law and civil law countries gradually moved to restrict contractual 
conditions exempting, delimiting, or designed to reduce the liability of the provider of 
services. For example, the courts in the United States refused to accept such conditions 
because they believed that these were against public policy.251 In the United Kingdom, these 
conditions were also restricted by specific statutes.252 A similar situation can also be observed 
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in civil law countries.253 Therefore, the courts have, in recent years, tended to reject these 
conditions for the benefit of passengers.254  
(ii)   The Shariah  
In the Shariah, exemptions from liability are recognized as valid.255 However, according to 
Islamic jurisprudence, the validity of a non-liability condition in contractual liability is 
considered as a well-established principle; except in two cases: 1) when causing intentional 
damage and heavy fault; and 2) when the conditions contradict public order. However, in all 
other cases, such conditions are valid because non-liability is not contradicting any mandatory 
principles or public order.256 
There is no explicit reference to such conditions in Iranian law. Therefore, there is a dispute 
as to whether carriers can insert conditions in a contract that restrict their liability or exempt 
them from liability.257 In general, both the Iranian Commercial Code and the Iranian Civil 
Code accept contractual conditions.258 The Civil Code provides that if a sum of compensation 
is determined in a contract for non-performance, the court cannot hold the obligor to pay 
more or less than that fixed amount.259 The Commercial Code also provides that parties of a 
contract can agree upon a sum less or more than the total value of goods.260  
However, the Supreme Court in its judgment261 did not accept compensation up to a limited 
liability mentioned in the carriage contract which was less than the price of goods. It held that 
                                                      
253 See Chr. 2, supra. 
254 K. Freund and L. Rudden, A Source-book on French Law (1991), 298-299. 
255 M. Gharavi Ashtiani, Ejareh  dar Sharh al- Lum‘ih  Vol. I (1309 A.H. 1930), 34. 
256 S.M.K. Yazdi Tabatabaei, al- Urwat al- Wusqā (1404 A.H. 1983),  332. 
257 N. Katuzian, Zeman Qahri (Masoliyat -e-Madani ) (1369), 670. 
258 R. Eskini, ‘Shart -e- Mojazat dar Qarardad -e- Beinolmelali’, ( 1377 A.H. 1988) 9 Majale Hoqooqi, 45, at 68-
69. 
259 See Art. 230 of the Civil Code. 
260 See Arts. 386 and 387 of the Iranian Commercial Code. 
261 Case No. 29/4/25- 805 Supreme Court. 
214 
  
the carrier has to compensate for all damages sustained and he cannot resort to the agreement 
for compensating less than the price of goods.262 The Supreme Court held that except in cases 
mentioned explicitly in law, the carrier is liable in full for events and faults that happen.263  
The author is of the opinion that contractual conditions in general are valid unless they are 
contrary to public policy. Firstly, the Warsaw-Montreal regime provides that exemption 
conditions are void and invalid.264 Secondly, different common law countries such as the 
United States and England, or civil law countries such as France and Germany, contrary to 
their legal systems, tend to render void these conditions in their modern domestic law. In fact, 
States now pay more attention to the rights of customers because of the improvements in the 
economic circumstances, thus they refuse to accept these conditions. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that currently, contractual conditions for exemption or limiting liability for death or 
bodily injury are not consistent with public policy. 
The above clarification indicates that the basis of liability in the Warsaw-Montreal regime 
was based on the common law and the civil law, whilst taking into account the conditions of 
the transport industry at that time as well as the economic status of air carriers and the general 
welfare of States. For so many years, it has undergone changes to survive in line with 
international circumstances, which was an indication of its dynamism that paved the way for 
States with different legal systems such as Islamic countries like Iran, to access the 
international system.  
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4.2.2   Terms   
Although a majority of the liability principles in the international system was written in a way 
which was acceptable to the two legal systems, the drafters did not reach a consensus on the 
definition of key terms so as to be acceptable by all legal systems. Consequently, they left the 
interpretation of those terms such as ‘accident’ to courts in WC29. Hence in this section the 
author will elaborate on this flexibility as a main feature that attract States such as Iran to 
these Conventions. 
The key terms in applicable agreements can be interpreted in accordance with the different 
countries’ legal systems and circumstances.265 In spite of several modifications in the Warsaw 
System and over 70 years case law in the United States, the MC99 does not determine general 
and key terms. The drafters of the MC99 preferred to leave the interpretation of these 
concepts to the legal systems. It is believed that the danger of defining these terms precisely is 
that the adopted definition will not be all-inclusive of the intent of the drafters.266 The 
uncertainties of events can dictate the outcomes of important legal developments.267 These 
terms were therefore left to court decisions.268  
4.2.2.1   Claimants in Liability for Death or Bodily Injury  
(i)  Private International Air Law 
Article of 17 of the Warsaw-Montreal regime does not expressly determine who a ‘claimant’ 
is. Although Article 24(1) of the WC29 and Article 29 of the MC99 ensure that the 
Convention preempts over national laws, it does not determine who is entitled to be a 
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claimant in relation to harm to passenger and cargo.  The determination of who is entitled to 
be a claimant is a substantial legal issue for States when applying their pertinent provisions. 
The group of entitled claimants is not uniformly and equally defined in different legal 
systems.269 As a result, the drafters of the WC29 and MC99 could not provide a provision that 
harmonizes different legal systems. Where there were principles that legal systems insist to 
apply when determining who can be a claimant, the applicable Conventions left it to the laws 
and regulations of contracting States. 270 Therefore, they provide that the claimant for death of 
passengers should be determined under national law.271  
Claims based on Article 17 should be brought to the courts that have jurisdiction under 
Article 28 of the WC29, regardless of whether they are filed by the passenger himself, or, by 
a person entitled to sue in the event of death, because inheritance is more a social entity than a 
legal one.272  
It is submitted that the right of persons other than the passenger or his personal representative 
to claim should firstly be in accordance with the substantive rule of the lex fori, or it can be 
designated by the choice of law. Countries such as Australia and Canada which have enacted 
the WC29 by special legislation usually have substantive rules specific to Warsaw cases, or 
the choice of law as in the United States.273 Secondly, exempting, delimiting, or designed to 
reduce the liability of the provider of services should be within the liability limits of the 
WC29. This is in accordance with the US Supreme court’s decision in the case of Zicherman 
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v. Korean Airlines Ltd.274 The court held that persons who bring suit and may be 
compensated, are to be settled by the domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting 
parties. This opinion has been supported by the drafting history of Article 24 as well as the 
post-ratification understanding of the contracting parties.275  
The common law confers the right of a deceased to his personal representative. The personal 
representative has the right to sue on behalf of his principal for compensation following death 
or other damages, i.e. the heirs need to be appointed by a qualified court as personal 
representatives, otherwise they cannot bring the action in their own names.276  In civil law, 
the deceased person’s rights automatically transfer to his beneficiaries. Therefore in such 
countries, the beneficiaries do not need to be appointed as the personal representatives by a 
court and they have the right to sue in their own name.277 
(ii)   The Shariah  
The Shariah has prescribed all rules and regulations of inheritance, and its rules are stable and 
unbreakable. Claimants eligible for claiming compensation in the event of death were 
specifically determined in the Shariah. No court can investigate a claim unless an interested 
person(s) or his representative claims for an action.278  
In the Shariah, claimants for the death of a person are defined by the inheritance law. 
Provisions of inheritance do not depend on the will of the legislature or the courts, and no one 
can change them through legislation. The legislature or courts could not modify the Shariah. 
Therefore, courts should determine claimant(s) in accordance with inheritance law. Thus, if 
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the national and international treaties are approved to be contrary to the Shariah, the 
legislature would abolish them. 
Whereas the claimants in an inheritance case are determined by the primary source in Islamic 
law that is the Quran, there is no room for jurists’ interpretation. They cannot provide an 
opinion contrary to the explicit text of this book. Therefore, the Iranian legislature would not 
accede to a treaty that accepts inheritance claimants as other than what is mentioned in the 
Quran. Or, if it had ratified such a treaty, it would withdraw it. In the Shariah, claimants in a 
death case are beneficiaries who have the right to claim on behalf of the deceased for 
compensation.279 The belongings of the deceased automatically and obligatorily transfer to 
his beneficiaries. This is so, irrespective of whether the deceased or his beneficiaries want 
that transfer or not, or even if they have requested for a non-transfer, or were silent about it. 
This is owing to the fact that inheritance is a property that the beneficiary cannot entirely 
estrange from himself.280 Also, it is not possible for the deceased (passenger) to change his 
beneficiaries or their respective shares.281  
In fact, inheritance is a relation between two persons where on the death of one, the other 
inherits from him.282 Inheritance is based on various degrees of kinship. Heirs of the lower 
categories take an inheritance when no person of a higher category exists.283 While in each 
class, there is also a hierarchy and the closer ones have priority in receiving inheritance, and 
they prevent others from having a share.284 The determining factor in total exclusion from 
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inheritance is the nearness of the relationship to the deceased. Hence each class of heirs 
deprives the next class from taking any inheritance.285  
Inheritance law applies to all Iranian citizens regardless of their place of domicile.286 If an 
Iranian passenger dies in air accident, the courts can identify his eligible beneficiaries in the 
claim for compensation. Therefore if an Iranian passenger dies in an international flight, and 
subsequently a claim for remedy arises according to Article 28 of the WC29 in Iran, the 
inheritance regulations of the Iranian Civil Code should be observed for identifying eligible 
claimants.  
Principally, all residents, whether they are of Iranian or foreign nationalities, shall be subject 
to the laws and regulations of Iran. However, the Iranian Civil Code has made an exception 
regarding personal status.287 Foreign nationals in Iran are bound by the substantive laws and 
decrees of that national's own State, including the rights of inheritance.288  
In conclusion, if the victim of an air accident is an Iranian, Iranian law would apply even 
though the victim had been a resident of another country. However, if the passenger is not 
Iranian, his beneficiaries may claim according to the inheritance law of the passenger’s 
country.  
According to the Iranian conflicts of law, two conditions should be meeting if a foreign law is 
to be applied. Firstly, a foreign law may apply if it is not contrary to public order, otherwise it 
is not applicable.289 For instance, if a foreign law accepts unmarried partners as eligible 
beneficiaries, the Iranian courts could not accept it because the court treats it as contrary to 
public order. Secondly, the application of a foreign law is confined to the mutual treaties 
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between Iran and the concerned foreign State.290 As a result, foreign law is applied in Iran 
provided that it is not contrary to public order and there is a bilateral agreement for that 
purpose. 
The author is of the opinion that since the Shariah, like the civil law and common law 
systems,291 has its own special principles on the rights of claimants in death claims, and as 
they are stable and unchangeable, if the Warsaw-Montreal regime had determined claimants 
in death cases, it would have placed an important preventive element for Iran to adhere to the 
relevant Convention. In conclusion, the flexibility of the WC29 and the MC99 in delegating 
the determination of claimants in the case of death to national laws, paved the way for Islamic 
States such as Iran to smoothly adhere to these applicable Conventions without much 
difficulties for those questions. 
4.2.2.2.   The Definition of ‘Accident’ 
(i)  Private International Air Law  
Although Article 17 of the WC29 indicates that the air carrier’s liability is established when 
an accident occurs, it does not provide a definition for it. The term ‘accident’ changes in the 
Guatemala City Protocol 1971 that follows the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement, where 
it is replaced with the term ‘event’.292 However, the term ‘accident’ was preserved in the 
MC99. As a result, the drafters never defined in a way that would clarify its limits and 
scope.293 The definition and interpretation of the term is left to the courts.  
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The definition of ‘accident’ was a controversial issue that received different interpretations, 
especially in the United States.294 According to Article 17 of the WC29, the air carrier is 
liable only for accidents, not events, that cause damage. If an event takes place in an 
international air carriage, that event is not compensable unless that event occurs as an 
accident.295 In cases involving passengers, the first thing a court must do is to find out if an 
accident occurred, as that is the first requirement for carrier liability under the Convention. 
The courts had struggled to define the term ‘accident’ in Article 17, before the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue.296 The courts needed to know what an accident is and 
what its delimitation is.  After searching for evidence of negligence in events that were 
related to the technological capabilities of aircraft and found none, they dismissed the 
claim.297 However, the changing times effectively pressured the courts in the United States to 
expand air carrier’s liability.298 They must know firstly if an accident has taken place 
according to the Convention, and secondly, what is the exact definition of the accident.299  
In attempts to define accident, we face two approaches of narrow and broad definitions. If the 
accident is defined narrowly, the area of air carrier’s liability would be restricted. If the 
accident is interpreted broadly, the liability of the air carrier will increase.  
1. Narrow definition:  
Regarding the objectives of the WC29, the drafters in the 1920s supported the development of 
the air transport industry while protecting air carriers. Subsequently, courts in the early days 
                                                      
294 See Tompkins, supra note 19, at 154-157. 
295MacDonald v. Air Canada439 F. 2d. 1402 (1st Cir. 1971) and see: Air France v. Saks 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 
1984), rev'd 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 
296 See Goldhirish, supra note 276,  at 215. 
297 DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3rd Cir. 1978). See Dempsey and Milde, supra 
note 53, at 68. 
298 A. Ciobanu, ‘Saving the Airlines: A Narrower Interpretation of the Term “Accident” In Article 17 of the 




of the WC29 inclined more towards defining the accident narrowly. The drafters of the WC29 
sought to limit carrier liability for air accidents rather than to confer uniformity on liability 
questions in the case of any type of passenger injury.300 They restricted its domain to aviation 
risks and the control exercised by the air carrier over the accident.301 Thus, the accident was 
related to a characteristic risk of air travel to be legally defined as an accident.  
Consequently, the term ‘accident’ as used in Article 17 of the WC29 was intended only to 
cover events that were related to the technological capabilities of aircraft.302 As a result, air 
carriers are exempted from liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury that arises from 
events which are not caused by aviation risks. The WC29 did not intend to expand the 
coverage of accidents to incorporate failures of security screening devices, and other modern 
security measures or omission of air carriers, and the attitude or behavior of passengers 
toward each other, or the impact on health of a passenger on accident occurrence.303  
By adopting the narrow definition, the WC29 distinguishes between liability in air accidents 
with the traditional tort liability in the concerned countries.304 For instance, if an air hostess 
pours coffee on a passenger, according to tort in domestic law, the air carrier will be liable for 
the injury. However, under the WC29, no air accident has happened there.305 Thus, if injury 
or loss results from the reaction of a passenger to the normal operation of an aircraft, the 
event is not regarded as an air accident. According to this interpretation, the expression 
‘normal operation of the plane’ shows that the negligence must be related to the aircraft and 
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its equipment.306 Therefore, the purview of Article 17 of the WC29 limited air carrier’s 
liability. However, subsequent judicial procedures of the courts in the United States gradually 
expanded liability through a broad interpretation of the accident.307 
2. Broad definition:  
If the courts defined the accident broadly, it goes beyond the aviation risks and includes 
incidents that are not fully related to aviation.308 The legal system of the pertinent courts plays 
an important role in such circumstances. The US Supreme Court, in the case of Air France v 
Saks, defined an accident as “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to 
the passenger”.309 This definition explains the cause of the accident.310 Using this definition, 
the injured party in the Saks case only needed to prove that some unexpected, unusual or 
external event to the travel had resulted in damage.311 The court recognizes the air carrier 
liable where there is a chain of caused links among the acts or omissions of the air carrier or 
his employees. This definition is in fact an attempt to expand the definition of accident from 
air carriage characteristics or aircraft operation to cases beyond them. The US Supreme Court 
in the Saks case does not require that the accident to have necessarily resulted from an air 
carriage risk or be related to aircraft operation.312  
The definition given by the French legal system for accident was principally identical with 
the definition in England,313 and was similar to the Saks case.314 For instance, the French 
Supreme Court in the Haddad case did not limit the accident to mechanical accidents 
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affecting the aircraft.315 By extending the interpretation of accident to include ‘fortuitous or 
unexpected’ events, this therefore makes the French approach compatible with the Saks  case. 
However, they do differ in one important regard in that the French Supreme Court applied the 
definition of ‘accident’ as used in Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention in the context of 
accident investigation.316  
Under the Saks case, there was no need for the occurrence to be fortuitous, unexpected or in 
any way abnormal.317 The court held that mistakes taking place during a normal and usual 
flight such as hijacking which are the consequences of unforeseeable and unpredictable 
interference by unruly passengers and malevolent (third parties) was presumed as an accident. 
However, the air carrier can avoid liability under the due care defence provided in Article 20 
of the WC29. An accident should even be extended to unexpected acts of a third party during 
a flight and the claimant should enjoy the right to sue against the air carrier for damages 
sustained during the terrorist attack.318  
Despite the fact that the Saks decision answers the question of what an accident is, in 
principle, there is not a specific methodology to be followed to decide whether an incident is 
an unexpected or unusual event or a happening that is external to the passenger. It is for this 
reason that there exist such variations amongst court decisions. Consequently, courts consider 
events like the following as accidents even if they do not arise from normal aviation risks: 
events caused by unruly (fellow) passengers,319 inaction of the air carrier,320 turbulence, some 
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of the events that happen to passengers in the cabin321 such as supply of infected food which 
causes food poisoning, or food contaminated in other ways,322 and hijacking and terrorist 
acts.323 These were examples from court decisions where a broad interpretation of accidents 
was applied. 
The author is of the opinion that the above mentioned judicial procedures indicate that the 
definition of accident has to be made by courts. Courts seek to observe justice and fairness in 
either broad or narrow interpretations. If a legal system expects higher due care of passengers 
from the air carrier, some events may be considered accident, even though they are not 
qualified under the limited sense of accident. Also, if necessary due care or reasonable 
measures became obligatory for the operator per the contract, if it happens, they are 
considered accident even if they are not absolutely set up within the scope of accident.324  
 (ii)   The Shariah  
When damage is caused by an event and there is a casual link between the event and the 
damage, the wrongdoer is liable such as the tort liability in the two legal systems. As a result, 
the carrier is liable for the result of his acts, rather than for his efforts.  
The carrier’s obligation in this context is to exert the highest due diligence to carry the 
passenger safely.325 Accordingly, carriers are requested to exert their best efforts to transport 
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the passenger. Upon its failure to accord with these measures, an air carrier is considered to 
be performing negligently and will therefore be considered an aggressor.326  
Where there is a relation between the causer and the damage, the wrongdoer becomes liable 
for compensation, whether the damage occurred because of an accident related to the 
operation of the aircraft,327 or if it arises from a risk inherent in air travel,328 or if the injury is 
caused by the unusual, unexpected and abnormal operation of the aircraft.329 In fact, the 
accident is not based on any notion of negligence or fault. It requires a relation to the 
inappropriate event(s) in the operation of the aircraft or by employees of the carrier.330  
The author is of the opinion that the Shariah would nevertheless apply a slightly different 
approach than the common law and civil law. An Islamic court would not require that the 
event or happening be unexpected or unusual. It would rather concentrate on the casual link 
between the event and the damage. This link is presumed, so long as the passenger or goods 
are under the care or custody of the carrier.331 Nonetheless, such liability is not strict for 
goods and the carrier still has ways to avoid liability by proving non-fault. In practice, 
however, liability is strict for passengers’ death or bodily injury, if the carrier directly causes 
damage.332 Therefore, the Shariah always demands a causal link between the action of the 
carrier and the death or bodily injury. 
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4.2.2.3    Operation of ‘Embarking’ and ‘Disembarking’ 
(i)   Private International Air Law 
The period and place of the accident are also not defined. According to the Warsaw-Montreal 
regime, the accident which has caused damage must occur on board an aircraft,333 or in the 
course of any of the operations of embarking and disembarking of passenger. The Warsaw-
Montreal regime refers to the course of any of the operations of embarking and disembarking, 
but in practice the domain of embarking and disembarking are not determined. Do the airport 
or airline instructions indicate precisely when a passenger’s movement is classed as 
embarking and disembarking for a specific flight? The domain of embarking and 
disembarking is vague in the Conventions and its interpretation has been left to the courts.  
States from both the civil law and common law systems in the WC29 concluded that the 
implementation of the Convention is not limited to the flight time.334 Consequently, to cover 
most situations, the courts should have considered several tests. In spite of all common points 
among courts of the two legal systems, it seems that the scope of liability coverage in the 
common law, and especially in the United Stated, is broader than the civil law which pays 
attention to the carriage contract when passengers are in the zone of transport risks.335  
Civil law countries such as France, determine the scope of the time and place of an accident 
in accordance with their domestic law. Courts examine whether the passenger is within the 
exclusive zone of the air carrier. Therefore, the carrier is responsible for the safe carriage under 
the terms of the contract of carriage. According to this approach, as soon as the accident falls 
within the contractual limits and obligations, the passenger does not have to prove that the 
carrier was at fault. When a carrier is in charge of the passengers, as determined by the 
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contract of carriage, the carrier is liable for compensation.336 The French court in Mache c. 
Air France337 held that in order for the air carrier to be liable under the Convention, the place 
where the damage occurred should be exposed to the inherent risks of air navigation and 
operation. However, other French courts have qualified accidents that had not happened in 
such areas.338 As a result, it seems that the approach of determining the place of accident is an 
important element in French jurisprudence. 
In England, while investigating accidents to verify if a passenger is under the control of the 
air carrier, the courts pay more attention to the movement of the passenger according to the 
procedure. The Court of Appeal in Adatia v. Air Canada (1992)339 stated that English courts 
should be cautioned and should pay precise attention to the issue of passenger movement 
through airport procedure in a certain flight during embarking and disembarking operations. 
There are general procedures for passengers at the airport terminal such as check-in and 
security screening between the operations of embarking on or disembarking from a certain 
flight.340 Therefore, the courts should pay precise attention to the place where the passenger 
was, in the airport procedure.   
In United States domestic law, the approach is slightly different. Firstly, the negligence of the 
air carrier at the time of the accident should be proved and the rule is that the air carrier in the 
carriage of passengers is liable only if it was negligent.341 Secondly, the carrier is expected to 
provide a highest due care to passengers.342 Where this care is not extended, the carrier is 
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liable. This intense care which is expected from the carrier leaves its impact on the period it is 
liable.343  
The courts applied factors for specific conditions like the procedures that a passenger takes to 
enter the aircraft or a certain place in the concerned airport, especially when dealing with 
passengers who have sustained damage.344 The court in the Price v. British Airways case paid 
attention to the operation of the aircraft345 and the court in Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd paid 
attention to the risks inherent in air travel.346 However, the court in Husain v Olympic 
Airways interpreted the scope of liability and set additional requirements to be met by the 
claimant’s claims.347  
As the one test is not sufficient for determining liability, as a result, courts resort to a 
combination of approaches which seem closer to justice and the objectives of the drafters of 
the WC29. The courts in the United States have applied a triple test in the 1970s.348 If 
conditions are met, the air carrier is liable. The tripartite test was recognized as being more 
useful, but the primary emphasis was on the place where the passenger was located, and in all 
claims there must be a reasonable link between the stages of air travel and the accident.349  
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Three factors that designate the location of the air carrier’s liability under Article 17 of the 
WC29 are: 1) The location of the accident, 2) The activity of the injured party at the time of 
the accident, the duration of the activity that the injured party was involved with during the 
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking, and 3) control.350  
In special circumstances, the courts of the United States defined the operations of embarking 
and disembarking broadly.351 Special circumstances have also influenced the tripartite. They 
imposed liability on the air carrier for any accident from the beginning of the process of 
embarking in the departure airport to safe disembarking at the destination with regard to the 
Warsaw negotiations.352  
In Air France v. Gilberto,353 where passengers were forced by hijackers to stay in an empty 
building at the Entebbe airport, the Illinois Supreme Court applied Article 17 of the WC29, 
arguing that the taking of the claimants to a point that was neither their intended destination 
nor an intended intermediate stop, cannot realistically be looked upon as a disembarking.354  
As far as disembarking is concerned, an accident takes place, according to Article 17, if the 
accident occurs in the apron, or when the passenger is on the bus which takes him to the 
aircraft on apron, especially when these buses operate under the control of the air carrier.355 
The Court of Appeal in the McDonald v. Air Canada case in the first circuit held that the 
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operation of disembarking terminated by the time the passenger had descended from the plane 
by the use of whatever mechanical means which had been supplied, and he had reached a safe 
point inside the terminal.356 Therefore, the air carrier is not liable if the passenger sustains 
damage in the baggage reclaim area. The operation of disembarking terminates when the 
passenger reaches a safe place within the terminal, even though he remains a passenger of the 
air carrier while inside the building.357  
However, it is accepted that according to the carriage contract, the air carrier has a duty to 
deliver checked baggage to the passenger in the baggage claim area, and as long as 
passengers do not receive their baggage(s), they are under its control, even though none of the 
air carrier employees are present in that area.358  
When a passenger, who has passed the check-in counter, the security procedures, and has 
received the boarding card enters the area designated as that to be under the control of his 
chosen airline, from this moment his freedom of movement will be restricted. The passenger 
can only use one specific route to the aircraft, and the passenger cannot enter or exit other 
common areas in the airport. In fact, only the air carrier now has the necessary facilities for 
protecting the passengers against harm.359 Therefore, the duty of the air carrier to care for the 
passenger and his properties starts from the time of check-in and only ends when the 
passenger reaches or must reach a place designed for receiving his checked baggage.360 In 
conclusion, the scope of the course of any of the operations of ‘embarking’ or ‘disembarking’ 
is flexible, and the courts are able to interpret it broadly or narrowly.  
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The author agrees with the view that the carriage of passengers should start from the time that 
the passenger puts himself under the control of the employees of the air carrier.361 When the 
passenger enters the terminal, the mere entering into the terminal does not indicate that he is 
under the control of the air carrier, since usually the air carrier is not aware of that 
passenger’s presence in the terminal, and the control of the air carrier only starts when the 
passenger gives his ticket at the counter for checking-in his baggage. At this moment, the 
passenger comes under the control of the air carrier.362 Of course, after the baggage check-in, 
the air carrier is not in charge of the passenger since the passenger can roam around the 
terminal without the control of his contracting air carrier.363 Therefore, the period that the 
passenger is under the control of the air carrier can be determined by examining the actual 
circumstances in each certain case. The due care can include the cases where the air carrier or 
its dependent bodies have an impact on the carriage operation in the airport with technical 
equipment.364 
(ii)   The Shariah  
The Shariah concentrates on the undertakings of the air carrier and the responsibility of the 
passengers. The Shariah questions in whose custody the passenger is.365 It then considers the 
matter objectively to determine whether the one in charge took the necessary precautions to 
protect the passenger from suffering harm regardless of whether the injury took place on the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.366 As a result, 
as soon as the air carrier causes the death or bodily injury of passengers, it becomes liable.  
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Therefore, according to the Shariah, the carrier is liable if it causes death or bodily injury 
when they control passengers. Conversely, it is not liable when it is not in charge of 
passengers even if they are in the course of embarking and disembarking.367  
There is no case law in Iran to show when the air carrier becomes responsible for the 
passengers. However, when airdromes, airports and terminals are under the control of general 
official authorities (an Iranian airport company or air securities),368 it is predictable that courts 
would interpret the phrase narrowly unless there is agreement between the parties.369 
4.2.2.4    ‘Bodily Injury’ and ‘Mental Injury’ 
(i)   Private International Air Law  
Mental injury is a controversial issue in the Warsaw-Montreal regime. Damages that could be 
compensated under Article 17 of the WC29 covers: ‘Damages sustained in the event of the 
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger.’ The 
phrase did not help to recognize mental injury in the Convention. Article 17(1) of the MC99 
subsequently uses the shorter form ‘death or bodily injury’.  
Prior to the economic and social developments, courts usually paid less attention to 
compensation for mental injury in international flights.370 Several factors account for this 
state of affairs: 
 1. The minutes of the WC29 negotiations do not indicate that mental injury which is not 
connected to bodily injury could be compensated.  
2. The aim of the Convention was to protect air carriers against extending liabilities.371  
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368 S.M. Hashemi, Hoqooq - e-Asasi Jomhouri Islami Iran Vol. II (1371 A.H. 1993), 642. 
369 Upton v. Iran Air, 15 Avi17, 101and 1979 AL 171, US District Court. 
370 This is contrary to the strict and literal interpretation of Article 18 as seen in Victoria Sales v. Emery Air 
Freight, US Court of Appeals (2nd Circ.), 22 October 1990; 22 Avi. 18,502; (1991) XVI Air and Space Law 
202), at 202. 
234 
  
However, after the Second World War, the international community experienced economic 
and political stability. Due to the economic prosperity, especially in developed countries, 
mankind enjoyed a relatively better welfare.372 Thus human dignity, and the preservation of 
individual rights by States, public and private institutions and other people, gained ever 
increasing importance. In the light of these developments which inevitably draw attention to 
passengers’ rights, claimants started to claim for mental injuries. In response, legislators were 
inclined to codify regulations for mental injury.373 As a result, this tendency transmits from 
civil liability in domestic law to international air carrier’s liability Conventions.374  
Drafters of the MC99 and many States in the Montreal Conference 1999 tried to insert mental 
injury in addition to bodily injury in Article 17. Indeed, it was a major topic of discussion at 
the Conference.375 The phrase ‘mental injury’ was finally rejected and as a result, the 
Convention does not resolve the issue of whether mental injury in the absence of any bodily 
injury would be recoverable.376 Therefore, the drafters again left it to courts to decide whether 
Article 17(1) covers mental injury.377 
Although the explicit wording of Article 17 of the WC29 only refers to physical injury and 
nothing else, it can be reasoned that compensation for mental injury can be deduced from the 
WC29. The meaning of ‘lésion corporelle’ (translated into English as ‘bodily injury’), which 
appeared in the authentic version of the WC29, was vague and played an important role in 
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mental injury cases.378 The ambiguity is caused by different interpretations regarding mental 
injury and there is no uniform approach among contracting States.379 
No reason could be found in the preliminary discussions of the Convention indicating that the 
drafters or the contracting parties had paid special attention to psychiatric injury within the 
meaning of ‘lésion corporelle’. The English equivalent of ‘lésion corporelle’ (which means 
the ‘wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury’) only covers physical injury. In fact, 
there is no counterpart in French law for the common law doctrine which distinguishes 
between physical injury (compensable), and purely mental or emotional injury 
unaccompanied by physical injury (not compensable).380 Common law jurisdictions exclude 
recovery for mental distress and make a distinction between mental and physical injuries.  381  
1. Mental Injury Accompanied by Bodily Injury 
In common law, pure mental injury is not compensable.382 In the United States, court 
decisions that preceded the Supreme Court decision in Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd,  383  
accepted that damages were recoverable under Article 17 for mental injury caused by an 
accident.384 The court stated that bodily and ‘corporelle’ are in fact logical compromises in 
order to implement strict liability for physical injuries which were obvious. However, this 
phrase does not include emotional reactions or any other mental injuries.385 Therefore, 
although French law permits recovery for any damage, whether material or moral, and the 
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phrase ‘dommage corporelle’ covers both physical and mental injuries, the phrase ‘lésion 
corporelle’ in the Convention does not include mental distress. 386 
Although pure mental distress has not been accepted in the United States, mental injuries 
have recently been compensated by the courts.387 The ruling in the Australian case388 differed 
from the accepted standards in the Floyd case by explicitly stating that damages for mental 
trauma alone could be compensated.389 Also in the Zicherman case,390 the court determined 
that the French word ‘dommage’ could be interpreted broadly and that it was used by the 
drafters of the WC29 in the sense of a legally recognizable harm. This decision indisputably 
indicated the significance of legally recognizable harm as a compensable element. It therefore 
admits mental injury as damage under Article 17 providing compensation for emotional 
injuries based on bodily injury, where there is no causal link between them. It thus reverses 
the principles referred to in the Floyd case.391 
2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as Bodily Injury  
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One group of damages claimed by passengers refers to a mental injury called Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). 392 These claims are based on symptoms like headaches, nausea, 
panic attacks. Using developments in medical science, if the claimant can prove that some 
parts of the brain are damaged, these injuries would be compensable under Article 17 of the 
WC29.393 Thus, courts do not have a right to refuse compensation under such 
circumstances.394 However, it would be accurate to say that evidence always need to be 
produced, and that physical injury is conceptually distinguishable from any damage 
impacting on the mind. Hence in order to receive compensation, claimants have brought their 
claims in a different way.395 They claim that this disease itself is a compensable physical 
damage. Thus, lawyers and courts face the issue of whether PTSD could be considered a 
compensable physical damage.396  
In conclusion, the provisions in air carrier’s liability conventions have not determined 
whether mental injury accompanied by bodily injury, pure mental trauma, or just bodily 
injury, are compensable. There is no clear answer for the question and it depends on the 
interpretation of the courts and their jurisdiction on the term ‘bodily injury’. There is no 
uniform international procedure in this regard. Thus, courts make different interpretations 
from Article 17 of the WC29. Usually, in most cases, judges avoid favoring claims for pure 
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mental trauma and psychological injuries.397 As a result, it depends on various court 
interpretations which are based on their legal systems.  
The author is of the opinion that pure mental trauma and fear are not compensable. This is 
firstly since the nature of aircraft operation involves mental and psychological pressures and 
stresses for all passengers with varying degrees. Secondly, States have adopted different 
measures for tackling mental injuries. Thirdly, accepting compensation for these injuries 
would invite many cases to be litigated. However, the author believes that only mental 
injuries accompanied by bodily injuries, or severe mental injuries that cause bodily injuries, 
are compensable because these kinds of mental injuries can be treated as bodily injuries as 
mentioned in the international regime. 
 (ii)   The Shariah  
The Shariah does not expressly mention mental injury as a compensable damage. As 
discussed in Chapter 3,398 according to the Shariah rules, an offender causing wrongful death 
or bodily injury must pay the Diyah to the heirs of the victim. It has determined a limitation 
of liability for death or bodily injury. Its provisions have also explained compensation 
recovery for some immaterial damage such as loss of beauty. Pure mental injury is not 
mentioned there. However, it is generally submitted that pure mental trauma should be 
compensated. Mental injury as a compensable damage could be justified by two reasons: 
1. The Shariah recognizes mental injury implicitly because the la zarar principle emphasizes 
mental injury. The principle is based on compensable recovery for bodily injury, mental 
injury and emotional distress.399 Since mental injury is considered as a form of loss, there is 
                                                      
397 See Lachance, supra note 378, at 144-5. 
398 See Chr. 3.4.5.4, supra. 
399 M. Esmaili, Teori -e- Jobran -e- Khesarat (1384 A.H. 2005), 61-65. 
239 
  
no reason for limiting this principle to physical injury. As mentioned before, the Prophet had 
used two words for explaining this principle (zarar and zerar). The former refers to material 
damages and injuries to persons; and the latter refers to mental injury.400  
2. For bodily injury which cannot be calculated through the Diyah, the court can apply its 
discretion to justly evaluate the damage and decide on the deserved compensation through 
arsh. Arsh includes the loss on damaged organs where the Shariah has not determined 
them.401 Therefore, although the Shariah has not determined mental injury in the Diyah, 
according to the la zarar principle and as a rule of wisdom that no damage should be left 
uncompensated, the courts can also award mental injury through arsh.  
In Iranian law, there is likewise no regulation for authorizing pure mental injury. However, 
the ex-Criminal Procedure Act recognized mental injury as compensable. Article 9 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1957 states that if a victim sustains pure mental injury, he can 
claim for compensation. Consequently, courts accepted claims for mental injury on the basis 
of this provision. After the Islamic Revolution, the provision was abolished by the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1999 which omitted the phrase regarding mental injury. Since then, the 
Guardian Council402 had declared compensation for mental injury to be contrary to the 
Shariah. Courts referring to this opinion are reluctant to award compensation for mental 
injuries.403  
It is nevertheless submitted that there is evidence other than the la zarar principle that 
recognizes mental injury in Iran.404 Although there is no explicit reference to mental injury in 
Iranian law, there are provisions in the Civil Law Act 1960 that are related to mental 
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injury.405 The Civil Liability Act 1960 implicitly refers to mental injuries when it mentions 
that immaterial damages including mental injury are compensable.406 Thus, mental injury can 
be investigated where it is accompanied by bodily injury, or where it is claimed 
independently. According to this Act, if bodily injury causes mental injury, the defendant is 
liable. Thus the courts can accept mental injury, regardless of the Guardian Council’s 
opinion, on the basis of this Act. 
According to the above analysis, as the provisions of the Warsaw-Montreal Convention’s 
regime do not explicitly refer to mental injury, it may be seen as an indication that Islamic 
States can refer to their legal systems on this issue. The Shariah is flexible and it can accept 
mental injury so there is no obstacle for courts when investigating and ruling on mental injury 
cases. Although the courts in Iran, following the Guardian Council’s opinion, currently refuse 
to award compensation for mental injury, they can give recognition to mental injury on the 
basis of the la zarar principle and the Iranian Civil Liability Act 1960. 
So far the principles of liability under the international regime were compared with those of 
the Shariah in Iranian law. It became clear that the main point of conflict is limited and 
unlimited liability under the international regime and the Shariah. The author will analyze 
this conflict in the Iranian law.407 
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4.2.2.5   Exclusivity of Remedy 
(i)   Private International Air Law  
The WC29 states that any actions for damage can only be brought subject to the conditions 
and limits that are explained in the Convention.408 But the wording of Article 24 explicitly 
made no mention of any exclusivity of remedy.409 Preparatory works in the CITEJA and 
Warsaw Conference 1929 are not helpful in determining the exclusivity of remedy in the 
WC29.  
Most air carrier’s and passenger’s hesitations are about whether different jurisprudences 
intend to affirm only one regime for liability in international air carriers, where no liability 
has been established under the Convention and the event that has happened is not qualified 
under the definition of accident in the Convention; or if they are looking for a remedy in any 
other way that is not mentioned in this Convention by admitting that the Convention is not an 
exclusivity of the WC29.410  
Ambiguity of the exclusivity of the WC29 may arise where a claim is brought on the limits of 
Articles 17 and 24 of the WC29.  One of the ambiguities is on whether the Warsaw 
Convention exclusively covers all aspects of air carrier liability in international air carriage. 
This issue can be questionable where, under the WC29, no liability had been considered for 
damage that occurred without any accident in international air carriage.411 
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The ambiguity was an issue that had been interpreted differently in the United States 
jurisprudence.412 Two different interpretations have been provided.413 Until 1999, the courts 
in the United States did not follow just one approach. One approach did not accept cause of 
action and the exclusivity of the WC29.414 They permitted remedies that were not mentioned 
in the Convention. However, another approach accepted cause of action and the exclusivity of 
the WC29.415 These approaches are crucial where in the absence of liability under Article 17 
of the WC29, a claim arises out of international carriage by air.  
After years of uncertainty, two important decisions, one in the Sidhu case416 in the United 
Kingdom and another in the Tseng case417 in the United States, affirmed the WC29’s 
exclusivity of remedy, and put an end to disputes and contradictions among US courts on this 
matter.418 
According to the court decision in Tseng, if the Convention was the only basis on which a 
passenger could claim for compensation in international flights, exclusivity of remedy under 
the Convention was provided. The court stated that if a claimed damage was not qualified 
under the limits of Article 17, remedy was not allowed under the Convention and its 
amending protocols.419 
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After the court decision in Tseng,420 courts in the United States accept that the Convention 
provides the exclusive basis for a death or bodily injury claim arising during the course of 
international air transportation to which the Convention applies.  
The court in Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lineas Areas de Espafia held that WC29, as 
amended, pre-empts claims based on tort or illicit act.421 The court held that remedy should be 
exclusively within the framework of the Convention, although it could be provided under tort 
or contract, it should be exclusively within the conventions’ limits and conditions. A claimant 
can bring the action under tort. However, to prove the liability of an air carrier, only the 
provisions of WC29 should apply.422 
The author believes that the exclusivity of remedy under the WC29 and the MC99 can play 
an important role in the broad definition of an accident, the mental injury and the scope of the 
operation of embarking and disembarking. Since remedy should be made exclusively within 
the framework of the applicable conventions or there would otherwise be no compensation 
from the air carrier envisaged, courts should try to prevent an injured party from being 
uncompensated as far as possible by expanding the definition of accident, bodily injury and 
the scope of the operation of embarking and disembarking.423 
For example, prior to the Tseng case, the courts in the United States held that an air carrier’s 
conduct in responding to a medical emergency did not qualify as an accident under the 
Convention.424 The claimant could avoid the WC29, and he could probably use state law tort 
remedies. However, the Tseng case changed the situation. Because of the exclusivity of 
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remedy, if the claimant is unable to identify the accident, he will probably lose the remedy. 
Therefore, courts should be more flexible when observing justice and fairness in defining 
accident to compensate losses.425   
Claimants would wish the phrase to be interpreted broadly to recover damages. By contrast, 
air carriers are reluctant for the phrase to be interpreted broadly and they would wish that an 
accident falls out of the scope of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking, in order 
to waive liability. Thus the courts, taking into account justice and the interests of both the air 
carriers and the passengers, tend to interpret the phrase broadly or narrowly.  
(ii)   The Shariah 
The issue about the exclusivity of remedy in the WC29 and the Shariah arises when an 
accident causing the death or bodily injury of Iranian passengers takes place on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. Can claimants 
claim the Diyah in addition to limited liability in the WC29? 
If a treaty explicitly provides for exclusivity, the Iranian jurisprudence cannot hold, according 
to domestic law. As mentioned in Chapter 3,426 treaties that are concluded between Iran and 
other States in accordance with the Constitutional Code427 enjoy the status of domestic law 
and they have priority over other domestic law,428 unless Iran legally withdraws from the 
treaty. For example, if Iran accesses to the MC99, the courts can only accept remedy in the 
MC99 because of the wording of Article 29 which explicitly provides for the exclusivity of 
remedy.  
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However, Iran only applies the Warsaw-Hague Convention. As the wording of Article 24 of 
the WC29 does not explicitly state an exclusivity of remedy and Iranian courts do not 
consider other jurisprudences such as the Sidhu case429 in the United Kingdom or the Tseng 
case430 in the United State.There is no case law and interpretation in Iran which determines 
and admits the exclusivity of the cause of action and remedy in the WC29. However, the 
author argues that when the appeal court in the Aseman Airline case431 only referred to the 
limited liability provisions in the Warsaw-Hague Convention and has not admitted the Diyah 
in domestic air carriage,432 it indicates that Iranian jurisprudence has implicitly admitted the 
exclusivity of the WC29. However, one should wait to see how the courts in Iran will make 
decisions in the future.  
4.3   The Warsaw Convention and the Shariah: On a Collision Course?  
Air carrier’s liability in domestic accidents has attracted the special attention of the legislature 
of Iran since 1984. In 1985, the Parliament approved a specific statute to determine the limits 
of Iranian air carrier’s liability in domestic flights, which was based on the limits approved 
for international flights by the Warsaw-Hague Convention (the Act of 1985).433  
The explicit language of the Act in determining liability for domestic flights according to the 
Warsaw-Hague Convention on the one hand, and the insufficiency of compensation 
according to the Diyah regulation on the other hand, caused controversies from legal and 
executive points of view. In practise, it has caused problems for the courts when determining 
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liability in air accidents. An example of this would be the Aseman Airline accident in which 
the Airline asked the Guardian Council for its interpretation of related laws.  
4.3.1 The Aseman Airline Case  
The Aseman Airline accident is an important case that challenged the liability for passengers’ 
death or bodily injury in Iran.434 In 1994, an Aseman Airline Fokker F-28 crashed during a 
domestic flight from Isfahan to Tehran, killing all 66 people aboard. It crashed near Natanz, 
150 miles south of Tehran. Courts, when adjudicating this case, came to different 
judgments.435 The first court ruled that the air carrier should pay the Diyah to the victims’ 
beneficiaries.436 Nevertheless, when the claimants appealed and asked for the 1985 Act to be 
applied, the Appeal Court issued a different judgment.437 Basing their claim on the 1985 Act 
and Article 22 of the Warsaw-Hague Convention, the claimants asked for 250,000 francs per 
passenger and 5,000 francs for luggage, which were more than the Diyah.438 The Appeal 
Court investigated the case and ruled in favour of the claimants. The court rejected the 
judgment of the trial court and declared that the liability could not be based on the Diyah, and 
it had specific conditions of a civil liability. The court applied the official price of gold and 
awarded damages equal to 300,000,000 tomans (US dollars 300,000) per passenger.  
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The Appeal Court investigated the case and ruled in favour of plaintiffs. The court rejected 
judgment of the trial court for payment of Diyah as remedy to the inheritors and declared that 
the liability could not be based on Diyah and it had specific conditions of a civil liability. 
The Appeal Court therefore approved liability in excess of the Diyah.439 After examining 
Islamic jurisprudence and the legal foundations related to liability in excess of the Diyah for 
death or bodily injury in air accidents, it stated that contemporary Islamic jurists approve 
liability in excess of the Diyah. Hence, by referring to liability based on the Act of 1985, 
which is a specific law, the court ruled in favour of the beneficiaries and based air carrier 
liability on the Warsaw-Hague Convention. 
Then, the defendant claimed that the legislature, by ratifying the Islamic Criminal Code 1991 
and Article 714 of the law of Criminal Code 1996, had abolished the Act of 1985. Therefore, 
the new law should be applied in the case of death or bodily injury in air accidents. The 
Appeal Court responded by stating firstly that the referred provisions in the Islamic Criminal 
Code only include pilots where they have a direct role in causing the accident, whereas the 
subject of the Act of 1985 has been remedies which have a civil liability aspect and refers to 
air carrier’s liability. Since that Act also includes baggage and cargo, it cannot be abolished 
by the Diyah regulations. Secondly, that the Act of 1985 is specific and Article 714 is general, 
and a succeeding general Article cannot abolish a preceding specific one.  
The air carrier also claimed that there was a condition in the carriage contract that exempted 
domestic flights from the purview of the Warsaw-Hague Convention. However, the Appeal 
Court held that according to Article 10 of the Civil Code, private contracts are binding on 
parties if they are not contrary to the explicit text of the law; while the said condition which 
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was approved and implemented by the Ministry of Road and Transport, is explicitly contrary 
to the text of the 1985 Act. It further stated that since the Warsaw Convention 1929 and the 
Hague Protocol 1955 are binding on domestic flights according to the 1985 Act, all of their 
provisions are binding and the air carrier cannot relieve itself by contractual conditions. 
In 1995, when the Appeal Court refused to apply the Islamic Criminal Code on the Diyah 
provisions and issued its judgment according to air carrier liability in the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention, the Ministry of Road and Transport intervened. The Minister of Road and 
Transport, using the procedure provided for in the law,440 requested that the Guardian Council 
(GC) verify whether compensation under the Warsaw-Hague Convention is in conformity 
with the Shariah. He also requested the Council’s interpretation of the 1985 Act.  
4.3.2  The Guardian Council of the Constitution’s Interpretation of the Law related to 
Air Accidents  
The Act of 1985 explicitly refers to the provisions of the Warsaw-Hague Convention that 
allow payments in excess of the Diyah for death or bodily injury in domestic flights. 
However, the Ministry of Road and Transport had sought the GC’s official opinion about 
their conformity with the Shariah.441 In fact, the Ministry believed that the Diyah is an 
unchangeable regulation in the Shariah and that domestic flights should be governed by its 
regulations. The Ministry is therefore of the view that the remedy for Iranian passengers in 
domestic flights should be decided accordingly, since the regulations are in force for all 
Iranians. 
The GC declared that the Warsaw-Hague Convention is relevant to international air carriage 
and the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards its signatories. But, it is not 
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relevant to domestic flights.442 However, since the Act explicitly indicated that Iranian air 
carriers should be governed by the limited liability provisions in the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention for domestic flights whether the passengers are Iranians or not, the GC thereby 
disregarded the Act of 1985, providing no sound reason for their decision. Later on, the 
Minister of Road and Transport once again questioned the GC about that opinion.443 He asked 
the Council to clarify whether a new judgment according to the Warsaw Convention in 
addition to Diyah is contrary to the Shariah or not. The Council responded by opining that 
since there is an insurance contract between the air carrier and the insurance company, the 
beneficiaries are entitled only to the Diyah and they have no right to any other sum. 
This opinion also indicates that it is not possible for the court to find for unlimited liability. 
Regarding the segregation of regulations between Iranian passengers in domestic flights from 
foreign passengers, the legal system governing damages resulting from the death or bodily 
injury of the former is based on the Diyah provisions and is not covered by the Warsaw-
Hague Convention. 
4.3.3   A Critique of the Guardian Council’s Interpretation 
These two interpretations by the Guardian Council are refutable: 
1. The GC was supposed to explain its opinion about the conformity of the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention with the Shariah. Instead, it provides an opinion about the conformity of the 1985 
Act with the Shariah. In so doing, it went beyond its jurisdiction and interpreted an ordinary 
law (i.e. the Act of 1985), while according to the Constitutional Code, the Council should 
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only interpret Constitutional Articles.444 It is not clear why the GC disregarded its jurisdiction 
by interpreting an ordinary law and provided such an unexpected interpretation.445 
2. Regardless of the formal critique on the interpretation of the GC, even if it is accepted that 
the Council has a right to interpret an ordinary law, the opinion expressed suffers from 
internal inconsistencies. It does not seem logical to reserve the Warsaw Convention 1929 for 
international air carriage, and for non-Iranian passengers. If the Convention is applicable 
exclusively to international flights, all domestic flight passengers would be beyond its 
purview, not solely Iranian passengers on such flights.  
3. The GC has not paid attention to the fact that the Act of 1985 has been ratified by the 
Parliament and affirmed by the GC itself. The Warsaw-Hague Convention is enforced in Iran, 
and according to the Act of 1985, air carrier’s liability in domestic flights should be governed 
by the provisions of the Convention. Therefore, it is not possible to exclude Iranian 
passengers from this Act, since these treaties are considered as ordinary laws once they have 
been ratified by the Assembly and enjoy the same status as the Criminal or Civil Codes. 
4.3.4   Reconciling the Shariah and the Warsaw-Hague Convention  
The author is of the opinion that although there are discrepancies between the Convention and 
the Shariah, the latter has the capability to adopt the Warsaw-Hague Convention’s limitation 
of liability and unlimited liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury in domestic flights as 
well as international flights. Solutions for unlimited liability could be negotiated through the 
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application of the la zarar principle,446 the insertion of contractual conditions and the use of 
special statutes.   
1. The Islamic legislature leaves no loss without compensation, even if the wrongdoer is not 
at fault.447 The principle of la zarar, which encompasses all in a society, prohibits causing 
any loss to others and the misusing of one’s rights.448 Wherever judgments result in an 
illegitimate or disproportionate loss, this principle moderates those judgments and provides a 
right for the injured party to break the contract and ask for total remedy.449 By referring to the 
la zarar principle, unlimited liability is therefore justifiable. Under this approach, the sums 
awarded for the Diyah are taken to be the baseline. To calculate the value of total remedy or 
unlimited liability, courts are thereby authorized to reach sums which are in excess of the 
Diyah (unlimited liability).  
2. The Shariah authorizes parties to insert a term for liability in excess of the Diyah in the 
contract. If the parties agree to this arrangement, the courts cannot refuse to uphold it.450 
Therefore, if the limitation of liability provision from the Warsaw-Hague Convention is 
inserted into domestic contracts, this would not be against public order or the Shariah even if 
the final amount may be higher than the Diyah.451 
3. The Islamic legislature approved two specific statutes that authorize unlimited liability: the 
Civil Liability Act 1960 authorizes total compensation, and the Warsaw-Hague Convention is 
applied to domestic flights in Iran. According to Article 1 of the Iranian Civil Liability Act 
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and Article 25 (wilful misconduct) of the Warsaw-Hague Convention, unlimited liability is 
allowed. After being approved by the Parliament and the Guardian Council, the Warsaw-
Hague Convention is treated as a specific statute for domestic flights.452 Iran can therefore 
apply the Diyah regulations simultaneously with unlimited liability.453 
4.4   Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter elaborated the evolution of the air carrier’s liability regime since its inception to 
the present. It discussed the Warsaw-Montreal regime which evolved within a purely 
common law and civil law framework that did not take into consideration the principle of the 
Diyah as espoused by the Shariah. However, the flexibility and dynamism of the international 
system enabled countries with other legal systems, such as Islamic countries, to adopt it.  
The Chapter compared the principles of liability such as the basis of liability, and limited or 
unlimited liability, to prove that the international system is dynamic. Certain aspects of air 
carrier’s liability such as ‘claimant’, ‘bodily injury’, ‘mental injury’ and ‘exclusivity of 
remedy’ were discussed in order to prove that the international system is flexible.  
1. International air carrier’s liability principles are dynamic. At the beginning, the founders of 
the Warsaw Convention wished to unify regulations.454 Limited liability and presumed fault 
liability, instead of strict liability and unlimited liability, were provided to protect air carriers 
against death and bodily injury.455 However, after the Second World War, the Warsaw 
Convention became contestable, because air transportation and public welfare improved. The 
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drafters modified them frequently to balance the interests of both customers and airlines. 
Although they intended to maintain this balance, in practice it turned out to be in favour of 
carriers since the limitation of liability in the System were far too low. Gradually, in 
subsequent instruments of the Warsaw System and in the Montreal Convention 1999, they 
inclined towards the interests of passengers.456 Through the amendments of the WC29, the 
principles of liability such as the basis of liability and liability limits (unlimited or limited 
liability) were modified. These modifications played an important role in its survival for over 
eight decades.  
At the same time, the author also showed that the claim by Zweigert & Kotz that the Shariah 
is rigid and inflexible is not valid.457 Regarding the Diyah, although there are specific 
regulations to that effect in the Shariah, Islamic countries may, by applying a broad 
interpretation, adopt the liability principles of other systems which are appropriate for air 
carriage in their domestic and international flights, and reconcile between the Shariah and the 
international system of air carrier’s liability.  
From the discussions above, it can therefore be concluded that there are two main issues that 
cause a conflict between the Shariah and the Warsaw-Montreal regime. Firstly, the Shariah 
accepts unlimited liability for any damage to property,458 but according to Article 22(2) and 
22(3) of the WC29 approves limited liability in this regard. Secondly, in relation to 
passengers’ death or bodily injury, the former recognizes limited liability for death or bodily 
injury, while Article 22(1) of the WC29 firstly accept limited liability which is different from 
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458 See Chr. 3, supra. 
254 
  
the Shariah and secondly, the WC99 (Article 25) and the MC99 ( 22) adopt unlimited 
liability.459 
2. International air carrier’s liability principles are flexible. In spite of several modifications, 
the Montreal Convention 1999 does not determine general and vague key terms such as the 
definition of ‘accident’, ‘operations of embarking’, ‘operations disembarking’, and ‘bodily 
injury’ since, in an 80-year process, these terms had been defined and interpreted by courts 
and have became clearer for air carriers and customers. This is also aimed at preserving the 
validity of the vast body of existing legal precedents and their interpretations. The key terms 
were left for the courts to interpret, i.e. they can interpret applicable agreements in accordance 
with their legal systems and circumstances.460 If these concepts had been defined in the 
MC99, the definitions might have differed from the ones made by courts. This issue would 
compromise the outcomes gained by case law and would harm the flexibility of the 
international regime of air carrier’s liability.461 Not only can common law and civil law 
countries apply these principles, other legal regimes such as Iran can do so too.462  
The Shariah has defined claimants and their rights in death claims. As they are stable, if the 
Warsaw-Montreal regime had determined claimants in death cases, it would have placed an 
important preventive element for Iran to adhere to the relevant Convention. 
The Shariah does not define the accident nor requires that the event or happening be 
unexpected or unusual. It rather concentrates on the causal link between the event and the 
damage. This link is presumed, so long as the passenger or goods are under the care or 
custody of the carrier. The Shariah then considers the matter objectively to determine 
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whether the one in charge took the necessary precautions to protect the passenger from 
suffering harm regardless of whether the injury took place on the aircraft or in the course of 
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.  
The Shari ah does not expressly mention mental injury as a compensable damage. However, 
the Guardian Council declared compensation of mental injury to be contrary to the Shariah. 
Courts referring to this opinion are reluctant to award compensation for mental injuries.  The 
author is of the opinion that the Shariah recognizes mental injury implicitly because the la 
zarar principle emphasizes on mental injury. The principle is based on compensable recovery 
for bodily injury and mental injury. 
3. Iranian legislators have approved a specific statute entitled ‘Determining the Scope of 
Liability of Iranian Air Carriers in Domestic Flights’ (the Act of 1985). According to this 
statute, air carrier’s liability should be in compliance with the provisions of the Warsaw-
Hague Convention for baggage, cargo, delay and passengers’ death or bodily injury.463 
3.1. Since there are no significant conflicts between domestic regulations and regulations of 
the Warsaw-Hague Convention regarding air carrier’s liability for cargo and delay, the latter 
regulations are applied to domestic flights without exception.  
3.2. In addition to the 1985 Act, the liability of air carriers for passengers’ death or bodily 
injury is determined by the Diyah in the Islamic Criminal Code which places a special 
limitation on liability. As a result, there is a conflict between the Diyah and the compensation 
scheme under the Warsaw-Hague Convention for passengers’ death or bodily injury (whereby 
limitation of liability was prescribed in Article 22 and unlimited liability in Article 25). 
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3.3. The Guardian Council in its interpretive opinion declared that the Diyah regulations 
should be applied to all Iranian citizens.464 Thus compensation should be meted out according 
to the Diyah regulations for Iranian air passengers’ death or bodily injury in domestic flights. 
There is no judicial consensus with regard to liability for death or bodily injury in domestic 
flights. Courts have made different decisions based on this interpretive opinion. Some have 
accepted it and awarded compensation according to the Diyah, while others have focused 
their judgments on the Act 1985 which considers the Warsaw-Hague Convention enforced 
and ruled according to its Article 22.465 As a result, there is no unified judicial precedent in 
this regard. 
The author claims that regulations of the Warsaw-Hague Convention and the Diyah can be 
simultaneously applied to domestic flights. Conflicting cases can be resolved through the 
application of contractual conditions, the la zarar principle, or the ratification of a specific 
statute.  
It can be concluded that: 
1. Iranian law, which is adopted from the Shariah, faces no obstacle in accepting limited or 
unlimited liability. The Islamic jurists and the courts have paid attention to damage exceeding 
the Diyah. It is submitted that the Diyah as a limited liability is not in favour of the injured 
party. It is therefore against Islamic principles such as the la zarar principle.   
2. The limitation of liability and unlimited liability provisions of the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention allow higher levels of compensation than the limits set by the Diyah. If parties 
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have agreed to incorporate these in the carriage contract, they would be applicable since the 
conditions are not against public order and the Shariah.466  
3. Since the legislators have approved the Warsaw-Hague Convention for domestic flights in 
a specific statute,467 and the Guardian Council as a supervisory authority has affirmed the 
statute and subsequently has not explicitly declared the provisions of the Convention to be 
contrary to the Shariah, it can be inferred that it is possible to determine liability limits other 
than the Diyah. Hence on domestic flights, liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury is 
as prescribed by Article 22 for limitation of liability and Article 25 for unlimited liability. 
Therefore, in Iran and under the Shariah, not only is there no obstacle for applying this 
Convention to international flights, it is also applicable to domestic flights. This can be a step 
towards uniformity. 
 It has been shown above fistly because of the dynamism and flexibility of the Warsaw-
Montreal regime, countries with different legal systems are usually interested in accessing the 
international Conventions for air carrier’s liability even if their legal systems may differ from 
the applicable Conventions. Secondly, the basic concepts of the Warsaw-Montreal regime can 
also be made compatible in the liability principles of Iranian law as laid down in the Shariah 
and the Diyah. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5. 1 Reconciling Principles from Various Jurisdictions  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has yet been carried out on air carrier’s 
liability comparing the international liability system with Islamic law with a special focus on 
Iran. A study of the air carrier’s liability in an Islamic State like Iran, and comparing it with 
other liability regimes, offer the drafters of international conventions new insights that could 
help them to appreciate the similarities and differences among the various foundations of 
liability. This innovative contribution to the knowledge in the field of air carrier’s liability 
analyzes the compensation for death or bodily injury in air accidents from the perspective of 
Islamic law. In this thesis, old concepts of the Shariah have been explored and new avenues 
have been proposed for them.  
The findings from this study are important for the drafters of international conventions, States 
that follow the Shariah like Iran, practitioners and air law researchers. The first group may 
use these findings in future amendments of the international regime of air carrier’s liability to 
achieve more uniformity across different legal systems. This study helps the second and third 
group by showing them how an Islamic State has dealt with the air carrier liability regime and 
which solutions can harmonize domestic laws applying the Shariah with international 
regulations of air carrier’s liability.  
Air carrier’s liabilities as regulated in the above legal regimes are based on various 
foundations, since the issue of liability towards others is a kind of social behavior. However, 
through compromises, many commonalities can be found. Since the 1920s, European States 
have provided regulations for air carrier’s liability in private international air law. Such 
initiatives were based on the common grounds of liability rules in the two major legal systems 
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that is, the common law and civil law systems of those States. They have attempted to 
minimize legal conflicts relating to liability for the compensation of damages caused by 
accidents for air carriers, passengers, consignors and consignees by providing uniform 
regulations of certain aspects of air carrier’s liability.  
In addition to the principles of liability laid down in those two legal systems, the drafters of 
private international air law treaties implemented principles adopted from other conventions 
including but not limited to the international maritime and rail conventions. For instance, they 
adopted the idea of limited liability that was deemed appropriate for air carrier’s liability. 
European States thereby recognized the economic, political and technical privileges of the 
unification of certain rules governing the liability of air carriers at the international level for 
the development of the air transport industry. 
Yet, unlike the 1920s and the following decades, uniformity of international air carrier’s 
liability is not solely a demand from European States. After the Second World War, new 
States emerged employing legal systems which differ from the two prevailing systems. For 
instance, although Islamic States in Asia and Africa engage in international air transport, they 
follow different legal, social and political principles. Disregarding the legal system of the 
Islam may in the long term harm the uniformity of international air carrier’s liability. Islamic 
States may, for example, prefer to apply only their domestic laws and regulations whilst 
ignoring internationally agreed principles.  Hence, one of the challenges confronting 
international private air law is the legal structure and legislation of Islamic States.  
An important question that needs to be asked is: could Islamic States that have not been 
actively participating in the drafting of the Warsaw Convention 1929 as variously amended 
and the Montreal Convention 1999, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Warsaw-Montreal regime’, 
and whose legal system differs from the common law or civil law, accept the current 
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international regime of air carrier’s liability? And do principles of the Shariah as codified in 
the legal system of such States, allow them to access the international principles?  
To answer these questions, in addition to the two legal systems of common law and civil law 
and the Warsaw-Montreal regime, the author investigated the legal system of Iran, which 
follows the Shariah. After the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian Legislature, implemented both the 
Shariah and the Warsaw-Hague regulations for the regulation of international and domestic 
flights. However, there is a conflict between the liability principles under the Shariah and the 
Warsaw-Montreal regime on the limited liability for death or bodily injury to passengers.  
The author’s principal conclusion is based on the assumption that Iran, as an Islamic state, 
can adopt the Warsaw-Montreal regime on liability that occurs during its international flights 
and domestic flights and could also overlook the Diyah provisions for air passenger's death or 
bodily injury, which are in conflict with the Warsaw-Montreal regime even if the Guardian 
Council, as the official body that determines the conformity of regulations with the Shariah, 
provides a different opinion.  
5.2 Common and Civil Law Principles of the International Regime Governing Air 
Carrier’s Liability  
As said the Warsaw-Montreal regime is a compromise of features of the civil law and the 
common law systems. These two systems have similarities and differences. States following 
the Warsaw-Montreal regime have disregarded the common law rule on the insertion of 
exemption conditions by carriers or unlimited liability for death or bodily injury to establish 
and successfully implement the international system. To verify this finding, Chapter 2 of the 
thesis investigated the principles of liability under civil law and common law. This 
investigation revealed a number of important points.  
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1. As the systems distanced themselves from common principles of liability which are based 
on fault and proceed towards liability based on the presumption of liability,1 and in some 
cases such as hazardous activities accepted strict liability through specific statutes,2 this trend 
had an impact on air carrier’s liability in international instruments like the Warsaw 
Convention 19293 and the Montreal Convention 1999.4Air carrier’s liability in the Warsaw 
Convention 1929 and the Montreal Convention 1999 is based on presumption of liability, 
which can be rebutted by the defendant by proving absence of negligence or fault.5 The 
presumption of liability under the Warsaw Convention 1929 was practically treated as strict 
liability in different jurisprudences such as United States jurisprudence.6 Hence, the Montreal 
Convention 1999 provides a strict liability regime.7 Fast settlement of claims and avoidance 
of lengthy and costly litigation were among the main reasons for adopting this new trend.8  
The comparative law survey showed that international air carrier’s liability systems do not opt 
exclusively for fault liability or strict liability, but adopt a more nuanced approach according 
to civil law and common law. This approach includes intermediate solutions such as shifting 
the burden of proof, using an objective standard of care, and distinguishing between carriage 
of goods and passengers.   
                                                      
1 S. Grundmann, ‘The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach’, (2009) 
107 Michigan Law Review 1583, at 1584. 
2 M. Planiol and G. Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law (2005), 468; and M. Arnheim, Principles of the Common 
Law (2004), 251. 
3 R. Horner and D. Legers, The Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law: Minutes Warsaw 
1929 (1975), 12 (hereinafter referred to as “Minutes Warsaw 1929”) at 15. 
4 G.N.Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as Developed by the Courts in 
the United States from Warsaw 1929 to Montreal 1999 (2010), 5. 
5 See Unpublished Note from Prof. Dr. P.C.C. Haanappel, ‘What is in a Name’, Appendix 1. 
6 A.F. Lowenfeld and A.I. Mendelson, ‘The United States and the Warsaw Convention’, (1967) 80 Harvard Law 
Review520, at 547; David Cohen, ‘Happy Birthday: Agreement C.A.B. 18900, A Critical Review of the 
Montreal Interim Agreement and the Authority for its Implementation’, (1982) VII Air and Space Law 70, at 
558. 
7 See Tompkins, supra note 4, at 27. 
8 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2, at 116. 
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2. Differences in liability principles also confirm the conclusion that States like France and 
Germany, which have a civil law system and the United Kingdom and the United States, 
which use common law sometimes neglected their own specific principles for the sake of 
uniformity of international regulations.  Not all of the international principles are identical 
with those from a national legal system. However, in the international arena, States should 
neglect their domestic specific principles, if they are constitutionally allowed to do so. For 
example when no contractual provisions regarding liability are expressly made, carrier’s 
liability may, in common law, be established according to the rules of bailment.9 However, 
since the concept of bailment does not exist in civil law10 as well as Warsaw-Montreal 
regime, this must be established according to the rules of the general law of contract, 
provided that a contract can be implied.  
5.3 Flexibility and Dynamism of the International Air Carrier Liability System 
The international air carrier liability regime laid down in the Warsaw-Montreal regime, in 
addition to the common principles drawn up in the legal systems of common law and civil 
law, contains principles that have no precedence in either system, such as delimitation of 
liability and nullification of conditions limiting liability. However, these were adopted since 
they were in the interest of parties to a carriage contract, and uniformity in the international 
regulations of air carrier’s liability. I conclude that the process of adopting principles has 
bestowed the international regime with dynamism and flexibility.  
Flexibility and dynamism of the international air carrier liability regime can be noticed in the 
following issues: 
                                                      
9 N.E. Palmer, Bailment (1991), 3. 
10 K. Freund and L. Rudden, A Source-Book on French Law (1991), 298-9. 
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1. The international air carrier liability system laid down in the Warsaw-Montreal regime is 
aimed at balancing the interests of carriers and customers in the following fashion.  
In the 1920s, the trend was to support the nascent aviation industry by accepting limited 
liability.11 Air carrier’s liability established by the Warsaw Convention 1929 was limited to a 
fixed maximum for death or bodily injury of a passenger or his delay; or for damage, losses 
or delays of baggage and cargo.12 This regime was aimed at maintaining a balance between 
the interests of air carriers and passengers. The unification of international air carrier’s 
liability rules in relation to limitation of liability also helped air carriers to insure their 
liabilities. The introduction of the limitation of liability was an essential departure from total 
compensation. It was a common point among States whose airlines engaged in international 
air transportation, whether or not their legal system accepted unlimited liability.13 
 In the course of the 20th century States tried to increase the amount of limited liability to 
respond to economic and social conditions worldwide through various amendments of the 
Warsaw Convention 1929.14 Finally, whereas limitation of liability was contrary to the legal 
systems of the common law and civil law, and to economic conditions, the Montreal 
Convention 1999 provided unlimited liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury. 
However, it maintained limitation of liability for cargo, baggage, delayed baggage, and delay 
sustaining damage.15 This is because limitation of liability on international carriage by air was 
useful for insurance purposes and could deliver fast and low cost litigation.16 
                                                      
11 J. Ide, ‘The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts’, 
(1932) Journal of Air Law 27, at 29. 
12 See Art. 22 of the Warsaw Convention 1929. 
13 W. Guldimann, Air Transport in International Law –Possibilities and Limits in International Unification 
(1982), 164. Lowenfeld and Mendelson, supra note 6, at 559-560. 
14 K. Beaumont, ‘Proposed the Protocol to the Warsaw Convention of 1929’, (1953) Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 264, at 264-265. 
15 See Tompkins, supra note 4, at 209. 
16 ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2, at 21. 
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2. The Warsaw-Montreal regime does not expressly determine who is entitled to be a 
‘claimant’. Although Article 24(1) and Article 29 of the Montreal Convention 1999 ensure 
that they preempt over national laws, the group of entitled claimants is not uniformly and 
equally defined in the different legal systems. The right of persons other than the passenger or 
his or her personal representative to claim, should firstly be decided according to the 
substantive law of the forum, which includes relevant rules of conflict of laws. Secondly, 
those rights should accord with the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention 1929.17  
3. The Warsaw-Montreal regime does not provide a definition of key terms such as the 
definition of ‘accident’, ‘embarking’, ‘disembarking’, and ‘bodily injury’. These terms have 
been defined and interpreted by courts and have become clear for air carriers and passengers. 
The key terms were left for the courts to interpret, i.e. they can interpret applicable 
agreements in accordance with their legal systems and circumstances.18  
The exclusivity of remedy under the Warsaw-Montreal regime can play an important role in 
the broad definition of the key terms. Since compensation should be made exclusively within 
the framework of the applicable conventions, courts should try to prevent an injured party 
from staying uncompensated as much as possible by giving broad definitions, interpretations 
of terms.19 
5.4 Impacts of the Shariah on Air Carrier’s Liability in Iran 
Next to the civil and common law systems, the Shariah too has its specific principles. 
However, it has equally been flexible and can modify itself to meet the requirements of the 
                                                      
17 P.P.C. Haanappel, ‘The Right to Sue in Death Cases under the Warsaw Convention’, (1981) Air and Space 
Law 66, at 69-75. 
18 P. Martin et.al, Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law Vol. VII (4th Ed.), 705 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law’); MacDonald v. Air Canada 439 F. 2d. 1402 (1st Cir. 1971) and see: Air 
France v. Saks 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 
19 See 4.2.2.5, supra. 
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current era and international law. The author concludes that Islamic jurists can resort to 
Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic sources, which provide flexible rules for contemporary 
situations in their society. For instance, liability limits for death or bodily injury in the Diyah 
regulations were set by the Prophet of Islam in accordance with the social conditions of his 
era. However, they underwent changes after his passing away.  
The principles of liability in the Shariah that impact on air carrier's liability in Iran are the 
following:  
1. There is a general principle called la zarar that can be used for regulating liabilities for 
death, bodily injury and damage to property. This principle is extracted from the Prophetic 
saying ‘la zarara va la zerara fil Islam’, which means that there is not any harm in Islam.20 
Where the Shariah does not provide a direct reference to the liability of air carriers, this rule 
can be used for claiming compensation for passengers’ death or bodily injury.21 
2. The principle of destruction (etlāf) mentioned in most Islamic jurisprudence discussions, is 
applied by jurists when a destruction or loss occurs to baggage or cargo in transportation. If a 
person directly destroys the property of another person or the interests pertaining to it either 
intentionally or ignorantly, he is liable for compensation. According to this principle, the 
destructor is strictly liable.22  
3. Islamic jurists study the contract of carriage in the framework of amanat and impose the 
principles of liability from it on the contract of carriage.23  An amin24 should do his best to 
maintain the property as if it belongs to him. If the property is damaged or lost, provided that 
                                                      
20S.J. Zehni Tehrani, Tashrih al-Matalib, (1371 A.H.1992), 421.  
21 See 3.4.1, supra 
22 R. Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasilah Vol. II (1384 A.H. 2005), 189. 
23 Shahid Thani (Al Amili), al-Rozat al-Bahiyya’ (Sharh al-Lum‘ah) (1365 A.h. 1986), 385. 
24Amanat in the Shariah is a specific contract whereby one person entrusts a thing belonging to him to another in 
order that the latter should retain it for him free of charge. The person entrusted with the thing is called an amin. 
See 3.4.4.1, supra. 
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he accomplished his duty well, the amin (holder)  is not liable  and he is protected by law.25 
However, according to the Commercial Code, the contract of carriage is an independent 
contract of amanat. It accepts a presumption of liability. The Commercial Code has also 
adopted defences such as force majeure.26 
4. Liability for death and bodily injury in the Shariah is based on the Diyah.27 The Diyah 
prescribes limited liability for death or bodily injury even where the wrongdoer is not at fault. 
Therefore, the Diyah imposes strict and limited liability.  
5.5 Reconciling Conflicts between the Shariah and International principles 
Liability for death or bodily injury is the point of conflict between the Shariah and 
international principles. Limited liability under the Diyah stands in contrast to the liability 
outlined in Articles 20, 22 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and in Article of 21 of the 
Montreal Convention 1999. This study therefore investigated whether this conflict is solvable, 
or if the Shariah is impeding the attainment of uniform international regulations. 
In order to illustrate the points of collision between the Shariah and the international regime 
of air carrier’s liability, the author investigated the laws relating to air carrier’s liability in 
Iran. Iran, as an Islamic  State, has concurrently implemented liability under the Shariah and 
the international regime. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, domestic air accidents were 
investigated under the Islamic Criminal Code (Diyah) and the Specific Act of 1985 entitled 
“Determining the Scope of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights”. According 
to this Specific Act, limited liability of air carrier for baggage, cargo, delay and passengers’ 
                                                      
25 See Art. 4 of the Civil Code. 
26 See Art.377 of the Commercial Code.  
27 E. Shafei Sarvestani, ‘Diyah Va Khesarathay -e- Nashi as Sadamat -e- Badani’, (1379 A.H. 2001) VII 




death or bodily injury should be in compliance with the provisions of the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention.28 
Later on, the Guardian Council as a body responsible for supervising the laws’ compliance 
with the Shariah in its interpretive opinion of the Specific Act of 1985, declared that the 
Diyah regulations should be applied to all Iranian citizens including death or bodily injury in 
domestic flights and the Warsaw-Hague Convention to be in force just in international 
flights.29 However, courts have made different decisions based on this interpretive opinion. 
Some courts have accepted it and awarded compensation according to the Diyah,30 while 
others have focused on the Specific Act of 1985, which considers the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention to be in force and applied Article 22 of the Warsaw-Hague Convention to 
domestic flights and international flights.31 The latter courts argue that the Guardian Council 
did not provide an opinion about the conformity of the the Specific Act of 1985 with the 
Shariah. In so doing, it went beyond its jurisdiction and interpreted an ordinary law (i.e. the 
Specific Act of 1985) as according to the Constitutional Code, the Council should only 
interpret Constitutional Articles.32 It is not clear why the Guardian Council disregarded its 
jurisdiction by interpreting an ordinary law and provided such an unexpected interpretation.33 
Meanwhile, the author concludes that conflicting cases can be resolved through the 
application of a specific statute such as the Specific Act of 1985 and the la zarar principle, 
pursuant to the following approaches:   
                                                      
28 See 4.3, supra. 
29 Opinion of the Guardian Council, No. 1191 (1995). 
30 See Case No. 1-74 -26.7.74 the Trial Court. 
31 Case No. 245-31-26.3.1377 Appeal Court. 
32 Art. 73 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran. 
33 Art. 73 of the Constitutional Code of the I.R. Iran indicates that it is the duty of the Islamic Assembly to 
interpret ordinary laws. In fact, the legislature, more than any other authority, is aware of the objective of any 
particular law and it is they who could provide its correct meaning. See N. Katuzian, Introduction of Legal 
Science and Iranian Legal System (1382 A.H. 2003), 45. 
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1. The law of Iran, which is adopted from the Shariah, faces no obstacle in accepting limited 
liability of the Warsaw-Hague Convention or unlimited liability of the Montreal Convention 
1999. Islamic jurists and courts are today paying attention to damages exceeding the Diyah. It 
is submitted that restricting compensation merely to the Diyah principles is not in favour of 
the injured party. Hence, it is against Islamic principles such as la zarar.  
2. Since the legislators have approved the Warsaw-Hague Convention for domestic flights in 
the Specific Act of 1985, and the Guardian Council as a supervisory authority has affirmed 
the statute and subsequently has not explicitly declared provisions of the Convention to be 
contrary to the Shariah, it can be inferred that it is possible to determine liability limits other 
than the Diyah. Thus liability for passengers’ death or bodily injury sustained on domestic 
flights is also subject to the Convention’s Article 22 on limitation of liability. 
It can therefore be concluded that in Iran as an Islamic State, not only is there no obstacle to 
applying the Warsaw-Montreal regime to international flights, but the regime can also be 
made applicable to domestic flights. The Iranian legislature may interpret the regulation in a 
manner that would help pave the way for a uniform application of international regulations 
that balances the interests of the contracting parties. This can be a step towards uniformity of 
carrier’s liability in international carriage by air. 
5.6 Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions explained above, the author puts forward the following proposals: 
1. The drafters of private international air treaties should research different jurisdictions 
before submitting their reports and final drafts. The uniformity of treaties would be enhanced 
if they provide provisions and principles that include the common points of different 
jurisdictions and jurisprudences in order to achieve coherence of liability principles. In the 
past, the drafters of the international air carrier's liability regime such as the CITEJA on the 
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Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Secretariat Study Group of ICAO on the Montreal 
Convention 1999 proceeded from legal principles of civil and common law States. They 
disregarded other legal systems such as those of Islamic States, which also have special 
principles. One of the factors impeding the global uniformity of international rules governing 
air carrier’s liability was the tendency to overlook the principles of liability in Islamic States 
that follow the Shariah. This could lead to inconsistency in air carrier’s liability at the 
international level.  It is therefore appropriate and important for the drafters to consider other 
jurisprudences, such as Islamic Law, in the future.   
2. This study analyzed the Warsaw 1929-Montreal 1999 air carrier’s liability regime and the 
Shariah in Iranian law. The Shariah is applied by different Islamic States, each of which has 
developed its owns case law. It is therefore recommended that academic researchers study the 
principles of liability in other Islamic states in order to clarify their similarities and 
differences with the international system and to standardize international rules in the future 
pursuant to this approach. 
3. The treaties had initially balanced the interests of carriers with those of passengers while 
bringing together the legal principles of States and overlooking differences between the 
various jurisdictions in order to achieve uniformity. They also attempted to develop 
international agreements to unify their conflict of laws in the interest of developing the air 
transport industry, which is beneficial for the same States. This makes it appropriate for the 
Islamic legislators to give priority to international provisions when there is a conflict between 
local law and international law depending on constitutional provisions regarding the 
implementation of international agreements, whether based on monism or dualism.34 It is 
                                                      
34 The terms monism and dualism are used to describe two different theories of the relationship between 
international law and national law. Monists accept that the internal and international legal systems form a unity. 
270 
  
therefore recommended that legislators of Islamic States such as the Parliament and the 
Guardian Council in Iran be more flexible when they approve and interpret private 
international air agreements. 
4. Since the Specific Act of 1985 explicitly determines the limits of Iranian air carrier’s 
liability for the operation of domestic flights which was based on the limits approved for 
international flights by the Warsaw-Hague Convention on the one hand, and compensation 
according to the Diyah provisions for all Iranian people on the other hand, there are 
contradicting points of view in Iranian jurisprudence. In practice, such conflicts have caused 
problems for the courts, claimants and airlines when determining liability for domestic air 
accidents. They were in doubt as to exclusivity of the Specific Act of 1985 for death or bodily 
injury. It seems to me that it is appropriate for the Iranian Parliament to amend the Specific 
Act of 1985. It is therefore recommended that the amended Act clearly states that it 
exclusively adopts the limited liability provisions stipulated in the Warsaw-Hague Convention 
and that this prevails over the Diyah regulation. Alternatively, the Parliament is 
recommended to abolish the Specific Act of 1985 and only apply the Diyah regulations to 
domestic flights.  
The Parliament can remove the present ambiguity of the Act through either of the above- 
mentioned proposals. However, the author would give priority to the first proposal since the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In a pure monist State, international law does not need to be translated into national law. The act of ratifying an 
international treaty immediately incorporates the law into national law; and customary international law is 
treated as part of national law as well. International law can be directly applied by a national judge, and can be 
directly invoked by citizens, just as if it were national law. However, Dualists emphasize the difference between 
national and international law, and require the translation of the latter into the former. Without this translation, 
international law does not exist as law. International law has to be national law as well, or it is no law at all. A. 
Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (1992), 27; M. Akehurst, A Modern Interdiction to International 




application of international regulations to domestic flights is a step towards uniformity of 
regulations throughout the world.  
5. With reference to Chapter 4 where the author analyzed the Montreal Convention 1999 and 
the application of the Shariah in Iranian air carrier’s liability, it is proposed that Iran adopts 
this Convention. This is for four reasons. Firstly, the development of air transport in the 
international arena is achieved by observing uniform international regulations. Secondly, it 
updates the Warsaw System and develops private international air law for air carrier's liability 
in accordance with technical, social and economic developments. Thirdly, up to 2011, 103 
States have ratified it. Fourthly, the study confirmed that conflict between the provisions of 
the Montreal Convention 1999 and the Shariah can be resolved through the application of a 
specific statute by the Parliament such as the Specific Act of 1985. As a result, if Iran wishes 
to develop its air transport, it is advisable that the international Conventions, especially the 





          Summary 
 
The Warsaw Convention was primarily written with the two main legal systems that is 
common law and civil law in mind. Since the transport industry was then operating and 
growing mostly in European States, it was justifiable to tackle the issue of liability according 
to their legal systems. However, the period after the Second World War witnessed the 
emergence of new States, some of whose legal systems differ from the two prevailing 
systems. A large part of these new States had been Islamic States, mostly situated in the 
Middle East and North Africa and some in South East Asia. On the one hand, there is an 
increasing trend in Islamic States to apply Islamic law. On the other hand international air 
transport operations are fast growing in these States. Based on these two facts, if the Islamic 
states insist on implementing certain principles such as principles of compensation for death 
or bodily injury according to the Shaiah, there would be a conflict between these principles 
and those of the international system of air carrier’s liability. Consequently this conflict 
weakens the uniformity of the international regulation. Therefore, it is necessary to study the 
principles of liability in Islamic law and Islamic States in order to clarify their similarities and 
differences with the international system to help achieve the uniformity of international rules 
in the future.  
The majority of Islamic States had been under the influence of civil law or common law and 
Islamic law. The legal system of Iran, for example, has been influenced by civil law and 
Islamic law.  
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The Iranian legal system is therefore a mixture of the two and their respective degrees of 
influence differ from one area of law to another. For instance, whilst liability for death or 
bodily injury follows the Shariah; obligation and trade law are under the influence of civil 
law. The basis of legal liability and compensation in Islamic law are partly different from the 
principles of civil law and common law. So, Islamic law differs from international 
instruments of air carrier’s liability.  
Iran ratified and gave effect to the Warsaw Convention 1929, The Hague Protocol 1955, and 
the Guadalajara Protocol 1961 for international flights in 1975. According to the Act 1985 
entitled ‘Determining the Scope of Liability of Iranian Air Carriers on Domestic Flights’ in 
air transport accidents of domestic flights, Iran applies the provisions of limited liability in the 
Warsaw Convention as amended at the Hague in 1955. 
This difference between the Shariah and the international system is crystallized when the 
provisions of the Warsaw, and later Montreal Conventions and those of Islamic law were 
simultaneously applied to domestic flights in Iran. This would be particularly relevant where 
there is a gap between the Diyah in the Shariah regulations and liability limits under the 
international system, thus causing a huge difference in the compensation levels. Therefore in 
order to unify liability rules at the international level, it is necessary to pay due attention to 
the Islamic legal system for which the most important concept is the Diyah.  
Can the Shariah, like common law and civil law systems, compromise some of its regulations 
so as to enable a harmonious and fruitful coexistence with the international system? The main 
purpose of the current study is to explore the hypothesis that although Islamic law has its 
independent principles of liability, Islamic States can adopt international air carrier’s liability 
in international flights and allow the two systems to coexist in domestic flights, irrespective 
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of the fact that such States have not been active in the drafting of most of these regulations. In 
so doing, the work focuses mainly on the legal system of Iran. 
To answer this question and verify the hypothesis, the author provides five chapters. This 
thesis consists of five chapters. After presenting a general introduction to possibilities and 
challenges of uniformity of international regulations on air carrier’s liability, in addition 
to the aim of study and methodology in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 discusses the prevailing legal 
systems that are the common law and civil law that have affected the Warsaw system. A close 
study of the principles underlying legal liability in these two systems would lead to an 
appreciation of their similarities and differences. This would in turn be very useful in gaining 
a better understanding of air carrier’s liability in private international law especially since 
international commentators desired to use the rules of liability of the two systems in the new 
Convention to make it more comprehensive so as to achieve more uniformity. Further, an 
analysis of these two systems provides an important insight into the reasons for the collapse 
of the Warsaw System. It also helps make clear that in order to achieve uniformity within the 
framework of the Warsaw Convention, States adopted principles such as liability limitation, 
invalid contractual conditions, or the presumption of fault for death or bodily injuries which 
had no precedence in either of their pertinent legal systems.  
Chapter 3 investigates the legal liability under the Shariah and Iranian law. The Shariah 
provides sufficient principles that make it a self-contained and independent system. The most 
important subject related to this study will be the Diyah as a legal principle and compensation 
for death or bodily injury. Chapter 3 also deals with air transport regulations in Iran. To 
comprehend the air carrier’s liability system in Iran, one should understand the State’s legal 
system and its legislators. Shariah principles were codified by the Islamic legislature due to 
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the demands of technological developments and the conditions of the Iranian society. The 
Iranian Parliament is not the only legislative body. Authorities such as the Guardian Council 
of the Constitution play important roles in codifying laws and regulations and their 
conformity with the Shariah.  
The laws and regulations on air carrier liability in Iran are complex. When studying air carrier 
liability in Iran, attention should be paid to the principles of liability in the Civil Code, 
Commercial Code and Islamic Criminal Code, as well as applicable treaties as implemented 
in domestic law, and specific statutes. For passenger’s death or bodily injury, in addition to 
the general rules of the Civil Code and the Commercial Code, as well as the Specific Act 
1985 implementing the provisions of limited liability in the Warsaw-Hague Convention in 
Iranian law, one should refer to the Islamic Criminal Code. This Code, which follows the 
Shariah, provides special provisions for civil liability as well as criminal liability.  
The most important issue in this Code is the determination of liability limits for death and 
bodily injury, which is in contradiction with the limited liability and unlimited liability for 
death and bodily injury in the Warsaw-Hague regime. Hence, the principles of liability for 
death or bodily injury in the Warsaw-Hague Convention and the Shariah collide in Iranian 
law.  The wide gap between the Diyah and liability limits under this system causes a huge 
difference in the compensation levels for domestic and international flights. Familiarity with 
these principles is essential for comparing the principles of liability in the Shariah with air 
carrier’s liability in international instruments in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 deals with the general principles of liability that govern air carrier’s liability in 
international instruments. There, the author analyses these principles and compares them with 
the Shariah principles. The Chapter 4 argues and demonstrates that the principles of air 
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carrier’s liability in international treaties are neither static nor completely dependent on the 
common law and civil law systems. It is a dynamic system that continuously evolves. 
Therefore, States with diverse legal systems including common law, civil law and Islamic 
law, can adapt themselves to the principles of the international system. Chapter 4 explains 
that there are issues in the international system of air carrier’s liability that are designed 
flexibly, so that States with different legal systems may investigate legal cases according to 
the principles of their respective legal systems.  
Chapter 4 also deals with air carrier’s liability for death or bodily injury in domestic flights, 
which operate under the influence of the Shariah and the Warsaw system. In addition to the 
Act 1985, the liability of air carriers for passenger’s death or bodily injury is determined by 
the Diyah in the Islamic Criminal Code which places a special limitation on liability. As a 
result, there is a conflict between the Diyah and the compensation scheme under the Warsaw-
Hague Convention for passenger’s death or bodily injury (whereby limitation of liability was 
prescribed in Article 22 and unlimited liability in Article 25). 
There is no judicial consensus with regard to liability for death or bodily injury in domestic 
flights. The Guardian Council of the Constitution in its interpretive opinion declared that the 
Diyah regulations should be applied to all Iranian citizens. Thus compensation should be 
meted out according to the Diyah regulations for Iranian air passenger’s death or bodily 
injury in domestic flights. Courts have made different decisions based on this interpretive 
opinion. Some have accepted it and awarded compensation according to the Diyah, while 
others have focused their judgments on the Act 1985 which considers the Warsaw-Hague 
Convention enforced and ruled according to its Article 22.The author claims that regulations 
of the Warsaw-Hague Convention and the Diyah can be simultaneously applied to domestic 
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flights. Conflicting cases can be resolved through the application of contractual conditions, 
the la zarar principle, or the ratification of a specific statute.  
Chapter 5 provides a general conclusion. It addresses the question of whether Islamic States, 
whose independent liability principles for death or bodily injury differ from those of the 
common law and civil law, are in a position to adopt the international system of air carrier’s 
liability. Drawing on the discussion in previous Chapters, this Chapter concludes by 
highlighting that the Shariah is indeed consistent and able to co-exist with the liability 
principles of the Warsaw-Montreal regime. Also, Iran may adopt the Montreal Convention 
1999. Any probable conflict between the provisions of this Convention and the Shariah can 







DE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID VAN DE LUCHTVAARTMAATSCHAPPIJ, IN HET 




Het Verdrag van Warschau is opgesteld op basis van de twee voornaamste juridische 
systemen, namelijk ‘Common Law’ en ‘Civil Law’. Aangezien de luchtvaart destijds vooral 
werd uitgevoerd en groeide in Europese landen was het gerechtvaardigd de aansprakelijkheid 
volgens hun juridische systemen te regelen. Echter, in de periode na de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
kwamen nieuwe landen en regio’s op, waarvan enkele  systemen hebben die verschillen van 
de heersende Westerse systemen. Een groot deel van deze nieuwe landen waren Islamitisch, 
vooral gelegen in het Midden-Oosten, Noord-Afrika en een paar in Zuid-Oost Azië.  
Aan de ene kant is er een trend in Islamitische landen om het Islamitisch recht toe te passen. 
Aan de andere kant groeit het internationale luchtvervoer snel in deze landen. Wanneer 
derhalve Islamitische landen erop staan bepaalde voorschriften, zoals voorschriften over 
vergoeding voor dood of lichamelijk letsel volgens de Shariah toe te passen, zou er een 
conflict kunnen ontstaan tussen deze voorschriften en die van het internationale systeem van 
aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder, met als gevolg dat dit conflict de uniformiteit van 
de internationale regeling aantast. Daarom is het noodzakelijk de voorschriften voor 
aansprakelijkheid in de Islamitische regelgeving te bestuderen om hun overeenkomsten en 
verschillen met het internationale systeem duidelijk te maken en om de uniformiteit van 
internationale regels te handhaven. 
279 
  
De meerderheid van Islamitische landen past ‘Civil Law’ of ‘Common Law’, in combinatie 
met Islamitische regelgeving toe. Het wettelijk systeem van bijvoorbeeld Iran wordt 
beïnvloed door civiel recht en Islamitisch recht. 
Het Iraanse juridische systeem is derhalve een mengsel van deze twee regimes die op 
verschillende wijze invloed uitoefenen op het luchtvervoer. Terwijl bijvoorbeeld 
aansprakelijkheid voor dood of lichamelijk letsel de Shariah volgt, vallen verplichtingen en 
handelsrecht onder invloed van het civiele recht. De basis van juridische aansprakelijkheid en 
vergoeding in het Islamitisch recht zijn deels verschillend van de voorschriften van ‘Civil 
Law’ en ‘Common Law’, met als gevolg dat het Islamitisch recht zich op die punten 
onderscheidt van de internationale verdragen betreffende de aansprakelijkheid van de 
luchtvervoerder. 
Iran heeft het Verdrag van Warschau (1929), het Haagse Protocol (1955) en het Guadalajara 
Protocol (1961) voor internationale vluchten vanaf 1975 toegepast. Overeenkomstig de 
Iraanse Wet van 1985, getiteld “Determining the Scope of Liability of Iranian Carriers on 
Domestic Flights” past Iran bij luchtvaartongelukken op binnenlandse vluchten de 
voorschriften toe betreffende de beperkte aansprakelijkheid van het Verdrag van Warschau 
zoals gewijzigd in Den Haag in 1955. 
Dit verschil tussen de Shariah en het internationale regime wordt duidelijk als de 
voorschriften van de Verdrag van Warschau en zijn opvolger, het Verdrag van Montreal 
(1999) en die van het Islamitische recht gelijktijdig worden toegepast op de uitvoering van 
binnenlandse vluchten in Iran. Bedoeld verschil is des te opvallender waar er een hiaat is 
tussen de Diyah in de Shariah regels en aansprakelijkheidsbeperkingen in het internationale 
systeem. Ten einde de internationale aansprakelijkheidsregels gelijk te schakelen met de 
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lokale regelgeving is het nodig om intensief aandacht te schenken aan het Islamitisch 
systeem, waarin het belangrijkste concept de Diyah is. 
Kan de Shariah haar regels aanpassen aan ‘Common Law’ en ‘Civil Law’ beginselen om een 
harmonieus samenspel met het internationale regime te realiseren? Het voornaamste doel van 
deze studie is de vraag te onderzoeken of, hoewel het Islamitische recht zijn onafhankelijke 
voorschriften voor aansprakelijkheid heeft, Islamitische landen aansprakelijkheid voor schade 
ontstaan bij internationale vluchten kunnen aanvaarden, en de twee systemen op coherente 
wijze kunnen toepassen op schade ontstaan tijdens binnenlandse vluchten, ondanks het feit 
dat deze landen niet actief zijn geweest bij het opstellen van het merendeel van deze regels. 
Hiervan uitgaande richt deze studie zich hoofdzakelijk op het juridisch systeem van Iran. De 
bovenstaande vragen worden behandeld aan de hand van vijf hoofdstukken.  
Na een inleiding over mogelijkheden en vragen betreffende de uniformiteit van internationale 
regels voor de aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder, en over het doel en de methodologie 
van de studie in Hoofdstuk 1, bespreekt Hoofdstuk 2 de heersende juridische systemen, te 
weten het ‘Common Law’-systeem en ‘Civil Law’-systeem, die beide het Warschau Systeem 
hebben beïnvloed. Een nauwkeurige studie van de voorschriften die ten grondslag liggen aan 
de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid volgens deze twee traditionele systemen leidt tot een 
onderkenning van hun overeenkomsten en verschillen. Dit onderzoek is ook nuttig om de 
aansprakelijkheid in luchtvervoer onder het internationale privaatrecht te analyseren, vooral 
omdat internationale commentatoren de aansprakelijkheidsbeginselen van twee systemen 
wilden gebruiken om een hoger niveau van uniformiteit in het Verdrag van Montreal (1999) 
te bereiken. Verder verschaft deze analyse een belangrijk inzicht in de redenen voor de 
tekortkomingen van het Warschau systeem, terwijl die ook duidelijk maakt dat, ter wille van 
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de uniformiteit, landen voorschriften aannemen zoals beperking van aansprakelijkheid, 
ongeldige contractuele voorwaarden, of het vermoeden van schuld voor dood of lichamelijk 
letsel, welke voorschriften geen prioriteit hebben in hun eigen juridische kaders.  
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de juridische aansprakelijkheid onder de Shariah en de Iraanse 
wetgeving. De Shariah voorziet in een opzichzelfstaand en onafhankelijk systeem van 
beginselen. Het belangrijkste onderwerp in verband met deze studie is de Diyah  als een 
juridisch beginsel ter vergoeding van schade in geval van dood of lichamelijk letsel. 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat ook over regels voor luchtvervoer in Iran. Om het 
aansprakelijkheidssysteem in Iran te begrijpen moet het juridisch systeem inclusief de 
wetgeving van het land worden uitgelegd. Shariah voorschriften die worden gecodificeerd 
door de Islamitische wetgevende macht worden aangepast aan de eisen van technologische 
ontwikkelingen en de voorwaarden van de Iraanse gemeenschap. Het Iraanse Parlement is 
niet het enige wetgevende lichaam. Instanties zoals de Raad van Toezicht op de Grondwet 
spelen een belangrijke rol in het codificeren  van wetten en regels, en hun aanpassing aan de 
Shariah. 
De wetten en regels voor de aansprakelijkheid in het luchtvervoer in Iran zijn ingewikkeld. 
Bij de bestudering van aansprakelijkheid bij luchtvervoer in Iran moet aandacht worden 
besteed aan de voorschriften voor aansprakelijkheid in  het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Wetboek 
van Handelsrecht en het Islamitisch Wetboek van Strafrecht, alsmede relevante verdragen die 
zijn opgenomen in het binnenlandse recht en in specifieke wetten. Voor dood of lichamelijk 
letsel van een passagier moet, in aanvulling op de algemene regels van het Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, het Wetboek van Handelsrecht en de Speciale Wet van  1985, die de bepalingen 
van beperkte aansprakelijkheid van het Verdrag van Warschau – zoals gewijzigd in Den Haag 
in de Iraanse wet heeft ingevoerd, ook rekening worden gehouden met het Islamitisch 
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Wetboek van Strafrecht. Dit Wetboek, dat de Shariah volgt, voorziet in speciale bepalingen 
voor zowel civiele als strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid. 
Het belangrijkste punt in het laatstgenoemde Wetboek is de bepaling van 
aansprakelijkheidsbeperkingen voor dood en lichamelijk letsel die niet stroken met de 
beperkte aansprakelijkheid, en in bepaalde gevallen ongelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid voor 
dood en lichamelijk letsel zoals neergelegd in het Warschau - Den Haag regime. Immers, de 
voorschriften betreffende aansprakelijkheid voor dood en lichamelijk letsel in het Warschau - 
Den Haag regime en in de Shariah conflicteren met bepalingen van de Iraanse wet. Dat grote 
verschil tussen de aansprakelijkheidsbeperkingen van de Diyah enerzijds en die van het 
internationale systeem anderzijds veroorzaakt een enorm verschil in de niveaus van 
vergoedingen bij binnenlandse en internationale vluchten. Bekendheid met deze voorschriften 
is noodzakelijk om de voorschriften betreffende aansprakelijkheid in de Shariah te kunnen 
vergelijken met aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder onder internationale verdragen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de algemene beginselen aangaande de aansprakelijkheid van de 
luchtvervoerder onder internationale regelgeving. Daarin analyseert de auteur deze beginselen 
en vergelijkt ze met de Shariah beginselen. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat de beginselen over de 
aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder in internationale verdragen noch statisch, noch 
geheel afhankelijk zijn van ‘Common Law’ en ‘Civil Law’ systemen. Het is een dynamisch 
systeem dat zich steeds verder ontwikkelt. Daarom kunnen landen met verscheidene 
juridische systemen zoals  ‘Common Law’, ‘Civil Law’ en ‘Islamic Law’ zich aanpassen aan 
de beginselen van het internationale regime. Hoofdstuk 4 legt ook uit dat er punten zijn in het 
internationale systeem van aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder, die flexibel zijn 
ontworpen, zodat landen met verschillende juridische systemen juridische vragen kunnen 
aanpassen aan hun respectievelijke wettelijke systemen. Dit hoofdstuk gaat ook over de 
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aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder voor dood of lichamelijk letsel bij binnenlandse 
vluchten die worden geregeld door de Shariah en het Warschau Systeem.  
Naast de Wet van 1985 wordt de aansprakelijkheid van de luchtvervoerder voor dood of 
lichamelijk letsel van een passagier bepaald door de Diyah in het Islamitische Wetboek van 
Strafrecht, die een speciale beperking voor aansprakelijkheid oplegt, met als gevolg dat er een 
conflict bestaat tussen de Diyah en het vergoedingsschema volgens het Warschau Systeem 
voor dood of lichamelijk letsel van een passagier, in welk systeem beperking van 
aansprakelijkheid is neergelegd in Artikel 22 en ongelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid in Artikel 
25. 
Er is geen gerechtelijke consensus met betrekking tot de aansprakelijkheid voor dood of 
lichamelijk letsel bij binnenlandse vluchten. De Raad van Toezicht op de Grondwet 
verklaarde dat de Diyah regels moeten worden toegepast op alle Iraanse burgers, als gevolg 
waarvan vergoeding moet worden toegekend volgens de Diyah regels in geval van dood of 
lichamelijk letsel van een Iraanse passagier bij binnenlandse vluchten. Rechtbanken hebben 
verschillende beslissingen genomen die zijn gebaseerd op deze interpretatie door de Raad van 
Toezicht. Sommige rechtbanken hebben die geaccepteerd en vergoeding toegekend in 
overeenstemming met de Diyah, terwijl andere hun oordeel hebben gebaseerd op de Wet van 
1985, die het Warschau - Den Haag regime als richtinggevend beschouwt en hebben derhalve 
gehandeld overeenkomstig Artikel 22 van deze verdragen. De auteur poneert dat de regels 
van het Warschau - Den Haag regime en de Diyah gelijktijdig kunnen worden toegepast bij 
binnenlandse vluchten. Tegenstrijdige zaken kunnen worden opgelost door gebruik te maken 




Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een algemene conclusie. Het onderzoekt de vraag of Islamitische landen 
waarvan beginselen voor aansprakelijkheid voor dood of lichamelijk letsel verschillen van 
‘Common Law’ en ‘Civil Law’, in staat zijn het internationale systeem van aansprakelijkheid 
van de luchtvervoerder aan te nemen. Voortbordurend op de discussie in de voorafgaande 
hoofdstukken concludeert dit hoofdstuk met nadruk dat de Shariah inderdaad consistent is 
met de aansprakelijkheidsvoorschriften van het Warschau - Montreal regime, en dat Iran het 
Verdrag van Montreal zou kunnen ratificeren. Een mogelijk conflict tussen de voorschriften 
van het Verdrag van Montreal en de Shariah kan worden opgelost door gebruik te maken van 
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WHAT IS IN A NAME? (Note from Prof. Dr. P.C.C. Haanappel) 
Liability regimes have received different names in different jurisdictions, and even within a 
single jurisdiction one author may use a name, term or expression that differs from another 
author. 
The essence of this short note is to postulate that it is not the “name” that counts, but the 
liability regime as laid down in a law or treaty. This applies as well in general as in the case 
of the Warsaw 1929 / Montreal 1999 air carrier’s liability regime. In other words: look at the 
text, the words of the law / treaty rather than putting a “sticker”, a name on it. The latter 
approach may lead to confusion, as is perhaps best illustrated in air law in one of Bin Cheng’s 
articles, in (1981) VI Annals of Air and Space Law 3. In casu, what Bin Cheng (educated in 
the British legal system) calls absolute liability, Mircea Matte (educated in the Romanian and 
French legal systems, and not to be confused with his brother Nicolas) calls strict liability 
with respect to the Montreal Intercarrier Agreement 1966 (modifying the Warsaw Convention 
1929 for traffic to/from/via the USA). 
Common law is less “doctrinal” in nature than civil law. Judges and the laws they apply count 
more heavily than authors. In the literature what is “fault”, or to use a better term, 
“negligence”, is fairly clear, whether it needs to be proven by the plaintiff or disproved by the 
defendant. In the latter case, one can speak of a presumption of liability or a presumption of 
fault. In the case of the Warsaw Convention, it is probably best, on the basis of the words of 
the treaty itself, to speak of a presumption of liability which can be rebutted by the defendant 
by proving absence of negligence / fault. 
Common law gets more “fuzzy” when it comes to absolute or strict liability. For most, 
absolute liability is a form of liability (for instance, for nuclear damage) where, once there is 
damage and causation, the defendant has no defenses at all (the opinion, for instance, of 
Mircea Matte). Strict liability then is no-fault liability where, nevertheless, the defendant has 
defenses available such as Act of God / fortuitous event, and own fault of the victim. But, 
where the defense of Act of God / fortuitous event is not available but the defense of own 
fault of the victim is, some (like Bin Cheng) speak of absolute liability. Again, nobody, it is 
submitted, is right or wrong: it is not the “word”, the expression that counts, but the actual 
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